JOURNAL OF CRITICAL SOUTHERN STUDIES

Volume 2. Spring 2014.

IN THIS ISSUE:

Of Doctors and Wires: ICT, healthcare and India's telemedicine venture into Africa

Vincent Duclos

Points of Departure: Shifting Traditionalist Caymanian Understandings of Jamaica and Jamaicans

Christopher Williams

Aspects in the construction of Brazil's transcontinental lusofonia

Ana Ribeiro

Book Reviews

GLOBAL HANDS PUBLISHING

Journal of Critical Southern Studies
ISSN 0796-1901

Editorial Board:

Editor: **Dr. Baba G. Jallow**, Creighton University
E: babajallow@creighton.edu

Associate Editor (special issues/commissioning): **Dr. Abou Jeng**, Centre for Research, Development and Social Justice Advocacy.
E: abou.jeng@gmail.com

Associate Editor (compliance and copy editing): **Sam Bamkin**, De Montfort University.
E: sbamkin@dmu.ac.uk

Africa Editor: **Dr. Nathan Carpenter**, Lehigh University
Asia Editor: **Dr. Michael Hawkins**, Creighton University
Book Reviews Editor: **Dr. Joanna Tague**, Denison University
Gender & Childhood Editor: **Dr. Jill Brown**, Creighton University
Latin America Editor: **Dr. Thomas Kelly**, Creighton University
Religion Editor: **Dr. Jay Carney**, Creighton University

Editorial Advisory board:

Dr. Siga Fatima Jagne, Gender and Development Consultant, Gambia
Dr. Sara Motta, University of Newcastle, NSW, Australia
Dr. Jayan Nayar, University of Warwick, UK
Prof. Vanessa de Oliveira, University of Oulu, Finland
Dr. Don John Omale, Salem University, Lokoja, Nigeria
Prof. Abdoulaye Saine, Miami University, Ohio, USA
Dr. Momodou Sallah, De Montfort University, UK
Dr. Perry Stanislas, De Montfort University, UK

Contents

Journal of Critical Southern Studies

Volume Two. March 2014

Editorial 5

Of Doctors and Wires: ICT, healthcare and India's telemedicine venture into Africa 7

Vincent Duclos

Points of Departure: Shifting Traditionalist Caymanian Understandings of Jamaica and Jamaicans 35

Christopher Williams

Aspects in the construction of Brazil's transcontinental lusofonia 58

Ana Ribeiro

Book reviews

***Reconciliation, Justice, and Peace: The Second African Synod*, edited by Agbonkhianmeghe E. Orobator** 95

Joseph Ogbonnaya

***Homo Redneckus: On Being Not Qwhite in America*, by William Matthew McCarter** 98

Vicki J. Sapp

Editorial

One step at a time

Slowly but surely, the Journal of Critical Southern Studies is inching forward in the world of academic publishing. Our first issue came out in the summer of 2013 and as planned, our second issue is coming out according to schedule in Spring 2014. It has not been an easy journey, not for lack of submissions, but for the fact that our external reviewers find most of the articles submitted needed substantial revision before publication in a scholarly journal.

Since our first issue, the JCSS's editorial team has worked closely together not only in reviewing submissions, but in finding a way of making us a viable journal. Early this year, faced with a paucity of publishable articles, we engaged in a comprehensive discussion of the best way forward for the JCSS. The majority of the editorial team members supported a suggestion by Jay Carney, our religion editor that we publish the journal on an annual rolling basis as opposed to the initial planned bi-annual basis. This was considered to be a feasible option that will allow us to publish good articles as they come in without scrambling to meet arbitrary deadlines. For that reason and beginning with 2014, the JCSS will be published on an annual rolling basis. In the 2014 volume, we start with three important studies and two book reviews.

In "Of Doctors and Wires: ICTs, Healthcare, and India's Telemedicine Venture into Africa" Vincent Duclos examines the increasing presence of Indian businesses in Africa as suggestive of growing Indo-African engagement in recent years. Duclos argues that "ICTs and healthcare occupy a strategic position in both Indo-African discursive practices and the creation of new market opportunities for an Indian industry eager to flex its economic muscle in the global arena. In critically engaging these concomitant processes, this paper touches the core of India's distinctive desire to become a major economic power." While most recent discourses of Asia's engagement with Africa focuses mainly on China, Duclos's study suggests that attention needs to be paid to the increasing role India is playing in Africa as a potential major economic power. In effect, Duclos suggests, Indo-African commercial relations are a win-win situation.

In "Points of Departure: Shifting Traditionalist Caymanian Understandings of Jamaica and Jamaicans" Christopher Williams focuses on the "positive Caymanian traditionalist interpretations of Jamaicans and Jamaica throughout the early to mid-20th century" and "traces the historical junctures at which these interpretations were negatively reworked to the point where Jamaicans in the Cayman Islands, and in general, are now being viewed derogatorily by many Caymanians." Williams argues that "the putative alteration of once-positive expressions of Jamaicans was inevitable, given the existence of a stark yet benign Caymanian/Jamaican differentiation in earlier, largely positive

Caymanian understandings of Jamaica and Jamaicans.” This differentiation, Williams suggests, was bound “ in its later inversion, to highlight independent Jamaica’s decline into various social, political, and economic hardships, while highlighting the economic rise of the politically-stable Cayman Islands.”

In “Aspects in the construction of Brazil's transcontinental lusofonia” Ana Ribeiro argues that “through a marriage between academia and the Quadros-Goulart presidencies, Brazil underwent a gradual change in discourse starting in the early 1960's towards the idea that the country, like its African “brethren,” had been a victim rather than an extension of its former colonizer Portugal, in a turnaround of Freyrean ideology.” Ribeiro argues that this new discourse “meant a move away from traditional alignments and towards a more autonomous foreign policy involving diversifying partnerships in the South.”

While the going has been tough, the JCSS is determined to overcome its teething difficulties and eventually claim its place among the most highly respected academic journals in global academia. We have no illusions that this is a formidable challenge; nor are we in any doubt that our editorial team is more than equal to the task. We hope you find the studies in this issue useful.

Journal of Critical Southern Studies, vol 1(1) 7-34

Of Doctors and Wires ICTs, Healthcare, and India's Telemedicine Venture into Africa

Vincent Duclos

ABSTRACT

The commercial activities of Indian companies in Africa have increased significantly in recent years. Based on anthropological interviews conducted in India, this paper addresses the discursive and commercial dimensions of the contemporary resurgence in Indo-African relations. I first offer a critical examination of discursive strategies inherent to India's engagement with Africa, which desperately strives to differentiate itself from contending approaches, in particular, that of China. As the paper shows, beyond long-standing claims of (post)colonial solidarity, what distinguishes such an engagement is the contention that a rise in Indo-African commercial activities can, in itself, be considered as a pragmatic form of cooperation. The paper then examines the expansion of the Indian ICTs and medical sectors into Africa. It focuses on the emergence of global techno-medical zones in which data, patients, capital, and knowledge circulate, through practices such as medical tourism and telemedicine. ICTs and healthcare occupy a strategic position in both Indo-African discursive practices and the creation of new market opportunities for an Indian industry eager to flex its economic muscle in the global arena. In critically engaging these concomitant processes, this paper touches the core of India's distinctive desire to become a major economic power.

KEY WORDS: Indo-African relations, medical sector, telemedicine, ICTs, globalization.

"The 21st century is often described as the Asian century. India wishes to see the 21st century as the Century of Asia and Africa, with the people of the two continents working together to promote inclusive globalisation."

Prime Minister of India Manmohan Singh

"Caring for the World with World-Class Healthcare"

Apollo Hospitals' slogan

In May of 2011, the Second Africa-India Forum Summit took place in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Held under the theme, “Enhancing Partnership: Shared Vision,” the event welcomed heads of states from several African countries as well as an important Indian delegation of state officials, and of diverse groups that included some of India's most powerful business people, impatient to tap new markets with high growth potential. Meant “to create a positive ambience for enhanced flows” in trade and investment, the Forum Summit was no one-off happening. Concluding with the adoption of two documents (the Addis Ababa Declaration and the Africa-India Framework for Enhanced Cooperation), it occurred in the context of a resurgent wave of Indo-African cooperation[i]. Most importantly, it pursued the work initiated a few years earlier with the India-Africa Forum Summit held in 2008 in New Delhi. Indisputably a key moment for what may be framed as the revival of Indo-African cooperation, this event was the first such meeting between the heads of state of the government of India and of a significant delegation of African countries. “The time has come to create a new architecture for our engagement in the twenty-first century”, had then explained Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. This statement acted to formalize political support for trade and cooperation that had recently become a hallmark of increasing Indo-African economic relations. These two landmark events illustrate a shared eagerness to craft original economic circuits for knowledge, technology, and capital circulation. While recent developments can be traced to the wave of liberalisation that swept across India in 1991, setting the stage for new era where global economic expansion would occupy the forefront of the country’s international policy (Bhattacharya 2010), the summits were the first explicit celebrations of the sort of aspirations that drive the current state of affairs. As expressed by the Africa-India Framework for Enhanced Cooperation, the stakes couldn’t be made any clearer:

> Both sides agree to further expand cooperation and sharing of experiences to increase trade, investment and financial flows between India and Africa as they provide a common paradigm of cooperation in the true spirit of South-South engagement (Second Africa-India Forum Summit 2011).

And indeed, trade, investment, and financial flows between India and Africa are being tapped. While bilateral India-Africa trade was evaluated at $US 967 million per year in the mid-1960s, it has grown by nearly 32% annually between 2005 (US$ 12 billion) and 2011 (US$63 billion) (CII and WTO 2013). This intensification in trade shows no sign of abating, as analysts suggest it might reach $US 70 billion (Dogbevi 2009) or even US$ 90 billion by 2015 (CII and WTO 2013). Given such commercial effervescence, it is hardly surprising that much has been

written within the last few years about what the renaissance or revival of Indo-African relations (Cheru and Obi 2010; Hawley 2008; Hofmeyr and Williams 2011; Mawdsley and McCann 2011a). However, while significant attention has been given to India's scramble for natural resources (Beri 2005; Lafargue 2006) or political support (Harshe 2002; McCormick 2008), less has been made of the potential of African markets for Indian products and services (Carmody 2011). Indeed even though Africa's trade surplus with India rises rapidly,[ii] Indian exports to Africa grew annually at 23.6% between 2005 and 2011 (CII and WTO 2013) and Indian companies show a readiness to expand their activities into the African market (Cheru and Obi 2011). These expanding commercial horizons are at the heart of this paper.

Based on a review of current literature and on interviews[iii] conducted in India, this paper explores the discursive and practical dimensions of India's engagement with Africa. This paper argues that, from a discursive point of view, such an engagement is premised upon the widespread (and largely unexamined) claim that the expansion of Indian commercial activities in Africa may in itself be considered as a form of cooperation. Accentuating the inherent virtue of the contemporary resurgence in Indo-African relations, such a claim contributes in legitimizing recent economic developments and future ambitions in concrete and effective ways. The first part of the paper critically discusses how Indian discursive strategies are, as far as cooperation with Africa is concerned, shifting emphasis from moral claims based on past South-South solidarity to the commercial opportunities Indian enterprises apparently have to offer their African counterparts. Accordingly, an upsurge in commercial activity is implicitly framed as a "win-win" scenario: while Indian companies expand their presence on relatively untapped markets, African consumers are expected to benefit from reportedly custom-made products and services. Despite the fact that the shortcomings and negatives effects of such an economic development approach have been well documented within India[iv], it is widely celebrated as an appropriate path for African partners to follow. As the second and third sections of this paper will discuss, the ICT and healthcare sectors are cases in point. Standing for the country's ability to compete at a global level, these sectors occupy a strategic position in branding India as the genuine exporter of products and services apparently suitable for an emergent African clientele – therefore not portrayed as mere purchasers of foreign goods, but as participants in a beneficial partnership, a global cooperation framework. Concretely, the expansion of the Indian ICT and medical sectors into Africa tends to generate techno-medical zones in which data, patients, and knowledge circulate through activities such as medical tourism and telemedicine. This paper critically analyses how such zones occupy a strategic

position in both emergent Indo-African discursive practices and the actual creation of new market opportunities for an Indian industry eager to flex its economic muscle in the global arena.

Emergent Discursive Practices: Towards an "Indian Model"?

The last few years have witnessed the emergence of various discursive practices and strategies aimed at promoting what is commonly presented as an "Indian model" of engagement with the African continent (IANS 2013; PTI 2013). This is particularly the case in government, industry, and institutional literature pertaining to the contemporary resurgence in Indo-African relations. While such a "model" is often loosely or not explicitly defined (Xavier 2010), and even though it certainly does not constitute an homogeneous whole, the next few pages introduce some of its key features.

On the one hand, depictions of past struggles and common legacies, are still frequent when times comes to insist on the specificity of Indo-African relations (Singh 2011). Indeed nearly fifty years after Nehru's death, evocations of a solidarity rooted in past colonial struggles are still alive and well in the promises for bright days ahead (Bhatia 2010; Viswanathan 2010). This is a discursive strategy which consists in mobilizing the past as a moral evidence both asserting the distinctiveness of India's African ambitions and foreshadowing the form that nascent partnerships might take. In the first sentences of a book recently published by the Ministry of External Affairs, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh summarizes some of these commended historical traits:

> The India-Africa partnership is based on firm historical foundations. Through the decades it has grown into one of the most productive and durable partnerships, befitting the increased interdependence among nations that characterises the 21st Century. Our similar historical experiences have engendered a common worldview. Understanding and sensitivity to each other's strengths, requirements and constraints gives our partnership lasting strength and resilience. For the people of India, Africa is the land of awakening of the Father of the Nation, Mahatma Gandhi. In the middle of the last century, within a decade of each other, both India and Africa broke through the yoke of colonial domination after a long and painful struggle. (Singh 2011: 4)

Past colonial struggles, common developmental challenges, a Ghandhian moral legacy[v], as well as shared cultural roots are all familiar themes when time comes to explain the distinctiveness of an "Indian way" to cooperate with Africa (Mawdsley 2011; Wade 2008). In this regard, India is particularly concerned with offering an alternative to China's mode of intervention in Africa, hastily associated with self-interested natural resources extraction, cheap labour exportation and exploitative economic practices[vi]. As a senior officer at the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) explained:

> The difference between the Chinese model and the Indian model is that the Indian model is more sustainable, developing the local capacities. India has been a colony. So we understand those sensitive things better than some other countries. We want an inclusive growth, not an exploitative growth. » (Mr. Kaushlendra Sinha, CII, 16 December 2010, Interview by author)

Or, as the Indian Minister of State for Commerce Jairam Ramesh stated during the India–Africa Forum Summit held in New Delhi in 2008: "The first principle of India's involvement in Africa is unlike that of China. China says 'go out and exploit the natural resources', our strategy is to add value." (Vines 2010: 15) Such statements are not exceptional. In fact, it is now commonplace to hear that while China shows insensitive behaviour in its scramble for African resources, India proposes an alternative approach:

> China's parallel claims to anti-colonial solidarity are dismissed by many within the Indian administration and media as disingenuous and self-serving in the face of its evident ambitions in Africa, while Indian engagement is viewed – sometimes rather uncritically – through a lens coloured by past notions of the Nehruvian moral high ground. (Mawdsley and McCann 2010: 89).

Despite such rhetorical claims, the commercial interests of Indian companies in Africa are evident and neither the Indian state nor the private sector has ever been secretive in this regard. As a matter of fact, while it remains unclear to what extent the Indian state is willing to directly intervene in favour of its own industry, what is becoming obvious is the ambiguity about the role it is expected to play. On the one hand, it is commonly observed that the so called "Indian model" draws its originality from the fact that it is mainly driven by private sector players. As an officer at the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) stated:

> The Indian way is totally different. China has been indifferent to the political situation in the country while extending aid. But India has not been so insensitive like that. Of course,

> we have Lines of Credits. But it's not aid or Lines of Credit. The Indian industry's engagement is driven by the private sector. It is not Government sector while in China it is so. And that is why they have big pockets. Private sector in India cannot afford to give away funds like that. So it is a sounder engagement. (22 December 2010; Interview by author).

What apparently makes India's engagement "sounder" would then be the state's restraint in putting in big money and outbidding competition as it is claimed the Chinese government does. In contrasting with such rhetorical claims, the steady upward path on the Indo-African trade front has largely benefited from an enhanced involvement of the Indian state in promoting the interests of Indian companies in Africa (CII and WTO 2013). Tied aid, economic diplomacy missions, and favourable fiscal incentives are all becoming common practices designed to expand trade and investment with Africa. Eminent examples include the Focus Africa Programme (2002-2007), a US$ 550 million scheme administered by the Exim Bank of India and aimed at securing commercial links between India and African countries by offering export subsidies to Indian companies and Lines of Credits (LOC) to African governments (Kragelund 2010). Providing eight West African countries with LOCs worth US$ 500 million, TEAM-9 (Techno Economic Approach for Africa India Movement) was another landmark intervention made by the Indian state. Funding specific projects in sectors like rural development, telecommunications, or pharmaceuticals, LOCs have become a customary strategy adopted by the Indian state to shore up trade with Africa. The government's contribution to business meetings[vii], trade exhibitions, and regional forums, is also illustrative of a willingness to generate commercial opportunities for an expanding business sector. In other words, it is difficult to assess the actual difference between an apparently soft-Indian-mutually-beneficent cooperation and an allegedly hard-Chinese-self-interested exploitation (Kragelund 2010), as the Indian state's policy remains relatively ill-defined and stretches along a large range of practices. The balance between cherished takes of past solidarities and rising commercial expectations is apparently hard to find.

Against such a commercial background, there has been a significant shift in Indo-African discursive strategies over the last few years. Although past solidarities are still regularly invoked to morally differentiate the "Indian way" to engage with the "sister continent", a whole new set of contentions, emphasizing how Indian companies hold shining promises for mutual welfare and development, are increasingly identified as core features of Indo-African relationship (Second Africa-India Forum Summit 2011; Singh 2008). The Addis Ababa

Declaration that emerged out of the Summit was explicit in this regard: “[...] Africa is determined to partner in India’s economic resurgence as India is committed to be a close partner in Africa’s renaissance.” (Second Africa-India Forum Summit 2011) Leaning on concepts such as capacity-building, inclusive growth, or knowledge and technology transfer, the backdrop for escalating Indo-African relations is thus a commitment to mutual economic resurgence. During the World Economic Forum in 2010, prominent Indian entrepreneurs could thus summarize their country’s aspirations in this way: “India’s agenda is to promote entrepreneurship and economic growth in Africa.” (Chowdhry, et al. 2010) As Mawdsley and McCann suggest: “The vision of development that is articulated by India is unabashedly capitalist and modernist – economic growth equates to development.” (Mawdsley and McCann 2011b: 180)

At the core of such a discursive strategy, one finds a moral argument based on the implicit, supposed value of commerce per se: to do business is, in itself, considered a form of cooperation, and thus to promote trade is equated with strengthening capacity-building and development. Hence, while the Indian state overtly acknowledges that its involvement is meant to foster business opportunities for its own, these are generally presented as being *desirable*[viii] for all. The distinction between trade and cooperation thus tends to get blurred and it is precisely from this fuzzy zone of capital flows and state support that Indo-African cooperation draws its originality: “The symbolic claim that emerges from this language of horizontal rather than vertical relations is that of mutual opportunity.” (Mawdsley 2011: 176) Nowhere are these figures of horizontality and mutual benefit as prominent as in the ICT and healthcare sectors.

Exporting the ICT Dream, or Branding India Anew

Trade, science and technology play a central role in India’s enlarging presence in Africa (Vines 2010: 3). Acknowledging its incapacity to compete with Western countries or with China when it comes to large-scale grants, loans or investments, India’s economic cooperation strategy focuses on value-added services such as expertise provision, low-cost technology, human resource development or education (Obi 2010). As noted by Alex Vines, who heads the Africa Programme at Chatham House, the ICT sector China’s domi¬nance in several areas in

Africa has prompt¬ed India to move into less saturated eco-nomic areas: “India is competing in niche areas, in which the Chinese are not so in-terested.” (Jacobs 2012: 54) One such area is definitively the ICT sector.

Over the last few years, ICT giants such as Tata Consultancy Services (TCS), Nihilent Technologies, Hindustan Computers (HCL), and Wipro have been entering the African market at a decisive pace. For instance, the upsurging Indian presence within the African ICT sector is exemplified by the acquisition of Kuwait-based Zain Group’s mobile operations in 15 African countries by ICT giant Bharti Airtel – the fifth largest telecom operator in the world (Ribeiro 2010). This $US 10.7 billion transaction gave a significant push to the Indian ICT breakthrough into African soil. Airtel Africa now has nearly 45 million customers spread across 16 countries. With a presence in more than 40 countries, Telecommunications Consultants India Limited (TCIL), a Government of India company, also embodies this growing footprint in the African ICT sector. Enjoying a global reputation, TCIL is providing training, consultancy, managerial support, and turnkey project implementation in various ICT settings. Once again, such an economic effervescence contributes to shape discursive practices.

Despite the fact that the actual benefits of India’s ICT growth story have been the object of heated debates domestically[ix], it is actively branded as a development model to be emulated. A report by KPMG summarizes the sort of discursive strategies at play: “Learning from the success of IT-based economic growth in India could help African countries bridge this digital divide and improve their competitiveness in the global marketplace.” (KPMG 2012: 11) Praising the emergent “India-Africa IT corridor”, the report insists on the role played by the Indian state in this regard:

> The Government of India, too, has started playing an active role with the 54 nation African continent, with a promise to expand cooperation in technology and knowledge. India’s booming economy, the appetite of its public and private sector enterprises for investment overseas, and its leadership in science and technology have collectively shaped its policy toward Africa. (Ibid.: 12)

The Africa-India Framework for Enhanced Cooperation, adopted as an outcome to the 2nd Africa-India Summit in 2011, similarly ascertained the key role played by ICT in triggering economic cooperation:

> Africa has immense regard and admiration for the strides made by India in the development of its information and communications technology. The contribution of the

> Government of India towards developing the infrastructure and the resourcefulness of the private sector and India's scientific and technological manpower in allowing this sector to make important contributions to the growth of GDP in India, are well recognized in Africa. Africa and India recognize the importance of an early introduction of information and communication technologies as key enablers of capacity building for youth and for poverty eradication and accelerated growth. (Africa-India Framework for Enhanced Cooperation 2011:5)

Arguably, the fast-growing ICT sector epitomizes India Inc.'s achievement at successfully competing at a global level. According to the World Bank, India accounts for 54% of the world's IT services: in 2007-08, its total export of IT services and IT enabled services was worth $40.4 billion, about 5.5% of the country's GDP (World Bank 2008). Generally, ICT may be considered as the poster child for India's economic liberalization and booming global trade. As the story goes, due to a mixture of cultural, political, and economic factors, ICT is to propel India as the world's software and services capital (Chopra 2008; Das 2002). It has enabled India to get rid of the infamous image of the "Hindu rate of growth", and to display its ability to compete globally. Success stories like Infosys and Wipro are indeed sources of great national pride, while ICT entrepreneurs such as Dewang Mehta, Azim Premji, or Nandan Nilekani have reached superstar status and are present in several public spheres. In short, ICT attracts attention towards the new image of India in the 21st century, as a major player in technology and commerce (Beri 2003: 228). As former president of NASSCOM Kiran Karnik explains, the plan is "to make India and IT as synonymous as France and wine or Switzerland and watches" (Einhorn 2002). Greenspan summarizes the branding process at play: "The project of branding India works by reconceptualizing those things which are stereotypically Indian in such a way as to show that, no matter how ancient, they were always closely intermeshed with the digital technology of today."[x] (Greenspan 2004: 142) Furthermore, the high profile associated with ICT derives from the conviction that it has the power to "flatten" the world (Friedman 2007), enable capacity building, accelerate economic growth, and combat poverty.[xi] As former Indian President Dr. Abdul Kalam states: "Connectivity is strength. Connectivity is wealth. Connectivity is progress." (Kalam 2007: 172) According to such claims, it would be in ICT's networking nature to stand as a strong social and economic transformative force.

In sum, ICT is celebrated as a sector in which India represents an « ideal partner for Africa », one particularly suitable "for new models of African development given its advantages and

experiences in genuinely ‘Triple A technologies’, namely appropriate, adaptable and affordable (technology that is not the reinvented bullock cart but genuinely state of the art)” (Modi 2009). The way « Indians glided smoothly into the digital age » (Versi 2012: 57) shall therefore be considered as a crucial component of a « marriage made in heaven » (Ibid: 56) between Indian companies and what is assumed to be « African needs ». As a report co-authored by the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) recently explained : “Investments from India will also bring in technology that is ‘Appropriate, Affordable and Adaptable’, pitched as the "Triple A" technology transfer mode, during the 8th India Africa Conclave.” (CII and WTO 2013: 56) Once again, the report insists : ICT is expected to play a central role in this regard (Ibid.: 47). Another sector which is commonly presented as crucial to the rise in Indian services exports to Africa – and thus to Indo-African economic cooperation – is the healthcare sector. The next section discusses this situation.

Caring for the World with “World-Class Healthcare”: Medical Tourism and Telemedicine

As happens every year, it is from the entrance hall of Apollo Hospitals’ first and landmark hospital, in Chennai, that Dr. Prathap Reddy was delivering a speech at the occasion of “Founder’s Day”. The yearly celebration of Dr. Reddy’s birthday was taking place in a festive atmosphere, in the presence of several hundred employees and of distinguished guests, including prominent members of the Indian political and business community. For this occasion, the founder and CEO of Apollo Hospitals was giving an impassioned speech. The message couldn’t have been clearer: only a healthy India could lead to a wealthy India and Apollo’s mission was to make the nation stronger, more prosperous, an example for the world to follow:

> [Dr. Reddy] In the last decade, the five world leaders have all visited India. Because of the promise that we are making! They want to be with us! There were days when you would say: “You’re an Indian and ‘hahahaha.’” But today, everybody’s looking at us. That is what India is today. To keep our momentum, to go on and get on top of everything, we need our healthy, happy people. People understand, they know the momentum coming from Apollo and they say : “Wow, you have done so much for the country.” We have made this country proud! By doing this, it’s not just about being

proud, we are building the new India that everybody is dreaming about. We are now helping the country to become a new India. Yes?

[Audience] Yes!

[Dr. Reddy] And to be on the top of the world!

[Audience] Yes!

[Dr. Reddy] Because Indians are capable. Our skills are second to none. This Apollo family is making a tremendous difference for this country. And all over the world. (Founder's Day, Apollo Hospital, Chennai, 5 February 2011)

Dr. Reddy's speech was taking up the major themes of Apollo Hospital's branding strategy. It was reflecting the company's mission statement, as it highlighted the vital role it is expected to play both at a national and a global level: "Our mission is to bring healthcare of international standards within the reach of every individual. We are committed to the achievement of excellence in education, research and healthcare for the benefit of humanity." (Reddy 2012)

Far from being the exception, this ambition to turn India into a global healthcare hub is widespread within the Indian hospital sector. Indeed the Indian healthcare market is experiencing a remarkable expansion, growing at over thirty percent every year and being evaluated at around $30 billion (India Africa Connect 2012). This growth is driven by global trade, as Indian hospital chains are ever more benefiting from a worldwide presence (Lefebvre 2010)[xii]. While the Indian ICT sector claims its ability to connect the world, its hospital sector likes to boast about its capability to offer affordable healthcare to all. Once again, evidence from the domestic transformation of the Indian healthcare sector tends to seriously call such claims into question. For instance, authors have convincingly shown how the privatization of the Indian healthcare sector in the wake of the economic reforms undertaken in the 1990s, has contributed in restraining access of the poor to healthcare services (Kumar 2009; Priya, et al. 2004; Qadeer 2000). Despite such evidence, Indian hospitals insist on their capacity to offer what is framed as "first-class treatment at Third World prices" (Modi 2010: 128). As a COO at Manipal Hospital – a Super-Specialty Hospital (SSH) located in Bangalore – explained: "We are very proud. Because we are able to deliver the quality health care at a price which is 1/10 or 1/20 or the rest of the world." (Dr. Nair, 23 September 2010; Interview by author) The potential patient-base that such hospitals attend to is implicitly global. In a manner reminiscent of Dr. Reddy's speech (and of Apollo's mission statement), Dr. Devi Shetty, eminent Chairman at Narayana Hrudayalaya, explains:

> India is privileged as a nation to have the largest number of medical personnel in the world, who also strive towards the service of humanity so passionately. We are certain that India will be the first country in the world to dissociate healthcare from affluence. (Narayana Hrudayalaya Healthcity 2011: 02)

This ambition relies on the idea that Indian private hospitals are capable of treating a remarkable amount of patients, at a fairly low cost[xiii]. However, while cost-efficiency certainly is an important factor to take into consideration (making it possible to "dissociate healthcare from affluence", to borrow Dr. Shetty's phrasing), it is only one reason among many others why Indian hospitals emerge as global leaders. According to Dr. Prathap Reddy, Chairman and Founder of Apollo Hospitals, low costs should not be the principal trademark of Indian hospitals. Instead, it is their aptitude at providing compassionate, committed, and skillful care that would best delineate what that they can offer the world:

> I think if you say that India is really a global healthcare hub, the anwer is 'no'. Is there a potential for that? Yes. There are two reasons to say 'yes'. Number one, Indian healthcare personnel have their own set of skills, and have shown that they can do what anybody else anywhere in the world is doing. And they did that with great compassion and commitment. And also, it has shown tremendous cost benefits. But I don't want anybody to come to India or Apollo because it's cheap. My liver transplant programme costs $US 55,000. American hospitals charge about $US 550,000. I don't want them to come to me because it is $US 55,000. I want them to come saying 'my results are the same in 90% or plus', which is as good as Mayo Clinic or Pittsburg, or whatever. (Dr. Prathap Reddy, 14 February 2011; Interview by author)

Putting their words into action, within the last few years many Indian hospitals have achieved international accreditations from organizations such as the Joint Commission International (JCI). In 2006, the Quality Council of India also implemented the National Accreditation Board for Hospitals & Healthcare Providers (NABH), to monitor Indian healthcare institutions. Even the Eleventh Five Year Plan of the Indian government notes the crucial importance of such certification in order to turn India into "a world-class destination for medical tourism" (Planning Commission 2008: 275). As Dr. Narottam Puri, president of the NABH and manager at Fortis Healthcare, explains:

> India is moving up the charts as for the quality of healthcare services. And believe me after training abroad, I've visited virtually every countries' healthcare system and the

> sort of care provided in the top quality Indian hospitals is not at all inferior to any of the top institutions in the world. (Dr. Narottam Puri, 3 January 2011; Interview by author)

In practice, the commercial ambition to provide "healthcare for all" is primarily developing through medical tourism. With over 100,000 patients per year coming to India to receive treatments, medical tourism was estimated to be a $US 2,3 billion industry in 2012 – a tenfold growth since 2002 (Pitti 2009). While most patients are coming from neighbouring countries, African patients of Indian origin have been coming to India for several years, and black Africans have been accessing treatment since the late 1990s (Modi 2011). Promotional tours are conducted by Indian hospitals in order to "brand India" as a destination for healthcare while "hospital groups are engaged in setting up promotional and relationship-building exercises through established hospitals and individual doctors who are currently travelling to African countries on a personal basis" (Ibid.: 135). It is thus hardly surprising that healthcare was made – just in front of ICT – the top focus sector of the India Africa Business Partnership Summit, held in Hyderabad in October 2011. Similarly, many Indian healthcare providers were present at the Ethio Health Exhibition that was held in Addis Ababa in May 2011, under the theme of "Health for All".

In addition to treating patients coming from all over the world, Indian healthcare giants have recently started to engage in a whole array of commercial activities on African soil. Among the emerging trends, hospitals are being opened abroad, ventures are set up with local healthcare providers, and consultancy services are offered to African partners. For instance, the Apollo Group recently got involved in the management of the Lagoon Hospitals Group, in Nigeria. As the website of the Apollo Global Projects Consultancy[xiv] explains:

> The hospital group was experiencing stagnant patient and revenue numbers for quite some time. Apollo undertook an evaluation of the existing healthcare system and a review of the local healthcare market. A plan for enhancing service quality, facility expansion, technology upgradation, training and healthcare communication was devised and implemented (Apollo Global Projects Consultancy 2009a)

Apollo's contribution apparently resulted in savings of 40% in budgeted capital cost for equipment purchase, as well as in an 86% increase in the per bed revenue over a two year period. Then, on 28 May 2011 Apollo Hospitals and the Tanzanian health ministry signed Tanzania's first memorandum of understanding (MoU) for a public-private partnership (PPP) in the health sector (Chatterji 2011). Signed in the presence of both the Indian PM Manmohan

Singh and the Tanzanian President Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete, the MoU states that Apollo Hospitals is to provide expertise and machinery for a 350-bed Super Speciality Hospital in Dar es Salaam, while the Tanzanian government will provide the land and bear the construction costs. Tanzania's health secretary Mrs. Blandina S J Nyoni explained that the project would contribute in building capacities, while Apollo Hospitals' CEO publicly expressed the wish to expand the company's presence in Africa. This should most likely be the case, given that President Kikwete announced that he expected five more hospitals to be set up by Apollo in various parts of the country.

The Apollo Group's ambitions in regards to the African continent started to materialize in 2009, when it opened a 220-bed hospital in Mauritius. As Chairman Prathap Reddy then stated, the corporation's "vision is to build hospitals which serve as destination points for the global healthcare traveller in key international markets", with Mauritius serving as a strategic location to "address the patient community in the African continent" (Apollo Global Projects Consultancy 2009b). Mauritius is apparently a targeted destination for Indian investments. Apart from Apollo's venture, Sri Ramachandra Medical Centre (SRMC) – a tertiary multi-specialty university hospital and medical college based in Chennai – was also granted the approval to set up a medical college in Mauritius, the Sri Ramachandra Academy of Health Sciences. Sri Ramachandra Academy Health Sciences is to come up in 50 acres and be a self-contained township (Leena 2009). Similarly, in a move that was clearly stating its interest in Africa's potential in healthcare, Fortis Healthcare acquired - along with local partner Novelife - Clinique Darné in Mauritius in 2009. As a senior officer at Fortis explained:

> We certainly see potential in Africa. Africa is underserved with quality destinations for healthcare. Apollo has made an entry into Mauritius after we did. We actually entered it through a partnership with an existing company which was running the hospital. They were finding it very difficult to run the hospital but are not experienced in handling healthcare. So we not only are majority shareholders in that hospital now, but we also operate it. With Burundi we signed an MoU, we will train their nurses, we will train their doctors. Their super-speciality care patients will be flying down here and we will send our doctors from time to time to go and work with them. We are trying to work on that kind of arrangement with Tanzania, Burundi, and other places. (3 January 2011; Interview by author)

Another way used by Indian hospitals to get involved in the provision of healthcare and expertise in Africa is telemedicine. At the junction of ICT and healthcare, telemedicine consists in services such as the remote provision of medical training, and the delivery of healthcare consultations at a distance. Telemedicine comes with many advantages. For instance, it may contribute in boosting the quantity of patients who will later travel to India to receive treatment – following what has been decided through distant consultations or diagnostic procedures. It may also help building a commercial presence, getting the hospital's existence known at a relatively low cost. Furthermore, doctors do not have to travel. As an MEA officer explained during this research, it is very difficult to get Indian doctors to travel to Africa. They tend to have a poor opinion of the quality of life they will encounter there, and worry about security issues. Telemedicine brings in the best of ICT, namely the possibility to offshore several aspects of the medical training and clinical work. As Dr. Prathap Reddy, Chairman of Apollo Hospitals Group, explains:

> I think India can play a great role as global healthcare provider in a broader [than medical tourism] context. Not only people coming here. I don't see why I can't manage beautifully if the rules don't come in-between. All the aging population in the US, they are suffering for not being able to get a doctor. I have enough doctors and there is technology to give them live advise. On telemedicine. It's no longer in the pipeline. We have demonstrated. (Dr. Reddy, 14 February 2011; Interview by author)

Indeed, within the last few years, Indian hospital chains have considerably expanded their medical activities on African soil resorting to telemedicine. Once again, the Apollo group is a forerunner. On 13 September 2012, Prathap Reddy and the Health Minister of Nigeria inaugurate three telemedicine units, in Lagos, Port Harcourt, and Abuja. Apollo's Chairman also announced that the company had signed an agreement with AfroIndia Medical Services, relating to the installation of over thirty similar units in West and East Africa. With offices across the continent, AfroIndia Medical Services is an integrated medical service provider, specialized in medical tourism. It offers its client "medical tours" to Europe, Israel and, mostly, India. The transnational agency describes its mission this way: "To maintain a healthier and productive Africa by providing accessible and affordable medical care with unparallel quality."[xv] Services provided include all logistics from visa procurement to flight arrangement and private accommodation for patients, adding to medical treatments themselves. But AfroIndia Medical Services is also adding a telemedicine dimensions to its bracket of services. That's where Apollo comes into play. AfroIndia Medical Services is now offering its patients

the opportunity to travel to a particular point of service to directly consult, by appointment, a medical specialist from the Apollo group. This alliance of telemedicine and medical tourism is of course no coincidence. In fact, at a commercial level, telemedicine and medical tourism have very much in common. As a manager at the Apollo Telemedicine Networking Foundation (ATNF) explained:

> What they will do is they will have a tele-consultation with a specialist doctor. Through telemedicine, the patient will be screened, examined, monitored, diagnosed. Everything will be given. And if they want any further medication or any surgery is required, they have to come to India. (Mr. Krishna Murthy, 24 Septembre 2010; Interview by author)

And Apollo is not alone. Telemedicine projects involving Indian hospitals and African partners have indeed been multiplying within the last few years. For instance, for many years now cardiologists at Narayana Hrudayalaya (Bangalore), have been reading and analysing electrocardiogram (ECG) reports from patients in Tanzania. Similarly, over the last year or so, Care Hospital (in Hyderabad) has been reading over 25,000 radiology images from patients in Nigeria. Cases are sent (via broadband internet) by Me Cure Healthcare Limited (MHL), a diagnostic center based in Lagos. Killing two birds with one stone, MHL is also doing in the medical tourism business, and regularly sends patients to India to receive treatments deemed to be unavailable in Nigeria. Once again, telemedicine and medical tourism tend to coalesce. Telemedicine is particularly useful in expanding the patient pool, putting potential patients in contact with a medical specialist with whom a therapeutic relation will develop. As a pioneer of the development of telemedicine in India explained :

> Telemedicine has helped in facilitating this going overseas. Medical tourism has a lot to do with telemedicine. I don't know you but I've seen you before you come to this country for treatment, right? First, there is pre-referral screening. I talk to you, I tell you a problem, my images are seen by you. So I should get their scans and everything before they are coming here. By connecting to this doctor, I get customer satisfaction. I just reached at this stranger and if you need a surgery you want to go see that doctor. This is pre-referral screening. This is what I do day in and day out here. (Prof. S.K. Mishra, SGPGIMS, 5 December 2011)

And again, project managers from tertiary healthcare centres in South India comment:

> We would like to tie up telemedicine and medical tourism. We are getting foreign patients, mostly from the Gulf countries and the African countries. So telemedicine is for follow-up. They'll be here for a week or 10 days, they should come back for the review after a month or two. Just for the review they need not to travel along all the way. So they can go to the nearest centre and connect with us. So they can save their time and money. (Mr. Satheeshkumar, Sri Ramachandra Medical Centre, 24 September 2010; Interview by author)

> It brings them here where we will do that surgery at a minimal cost. Because the other choice left to them would be to either go to Europe or the US which would actually cost them a lot. And they know that a surgery in India would cost maybe 1/20 or 1/10 of the cost in a Western country. [...] You can come here and get you surgeries done and go back. It is all about it. That's how I would define "growth". (Narayana Hrudayalaya Health City, Septembre 2010; Interview by author).

Another similar story is that of Indo-US Healthcare, a Hyderabad-based company which started a few years ago with a mission to extend medical connectivity across India. Through its Pan India Teleradiology Network, Indo-US Healthcare is installing and operating medical imaging facilities at community hospitals in India and networking them to a Central Radiology Centre. Relying on a pool of hired radiologists, it dispenses 24/7 reporting services. Interestingly enough, the company is now making its entry into the African diagnostic solutions market. It has recently signed agreements to install digital X-Ray and ultrasound equipment at 100 second and third tier hospitals in Malawi and link them to Daeyand Luke Hospital (Lilongwe) for reporting. A nationwide insurance system is also being put in place to facilitate patient referrals to Indian hospitals from Daeyand Luke Hospital. Then, Indo-US Healthcare announced its intention to put together a $US 100 million programme to "provide an Indian push to the ongoing healthcare transformation envisioned by Rwandan President Paul Kagame to make Rwanda the Switzerland of African continent" (Indo-US Healthcare 2011). The programme should connect every hospital in the country (70) through an ICT network, aiming to create a "digital eco-system facilitating seamless flow of clinical information from any point of generation to any other point of evaluation" (Ibid.).

Another company which has specialized in the outsourcing of radiology services is Bangalore-based Teleradiology Solutions. Founded in 2002 by Yale-trained Dr. Arjun

Kalyanpur and Dr. Sunita Maheshwari, Teleradiology Solutions initially provided hospitals in the United States with night shift radiology solutions. Ranked the top-rated national teleradiology vendor in the Unites States by KLAS - an independent research and consulting firm –, it is now reporting for more than 100 health centers in 20 countries, most being located in the US, Singapore, and Europe. Interestingly enough, in 2011 the company has signed an agreement with Regency Medical Centre (RMC) in Tanzania, to serve the Hospital Radiology Services sector of Tanzania and Sub-Saharan Africa. A strategic move by Teleradiology Solutions to establish its presence in Sub-Saharan Africa, the partnership is meant to counter the huge shortage of radiologists in East Africa. As Dr. Kanabar, Chairman of RMC, states: “We believe the partnership with TRS will help patients in East Africa get their diagnostic test results in a timely fashion resulting in improved patient care in this part of the world.” (PRWEB 2011) In 2012, Teleradiology Solutions was expanding its activities to Nigeria and Djibouti, and recently to Ethiopia and Zimbabwe. As of October 2013, Teleradiology Solutions had reported more than 16 000 scans from Africa.

Given the lack of medical specialists that many African countries have to deal with, it is likely that analogous telemedicine efforts will soon be on the rise. In fact, Teleradiology Solutions’ and Indo-US Healthcare’s use of ICT to transform healthcare services goes beyond the outsourcing of radiology solutions. It conveys the eagerness of Indian companies to tap into rapidly growing and potentially lucrative markets. As a FICCI officer in charge of developing commercial relations with Africa noted:

> One could also look at the basic facilities like a diagnostic center. They don’t have laboratories and diagnostic center. Then, the Indian government can encourage small and medium players to set up there. That would be a great service for Africa! (Ms. Kitta, 22 December 2010; Interview by author).

Such developments herald the emergence of new global techno-medical zones, mostly or entirely private, in which data, knowledge, and patients circulate. In designing such zones, Indian healthcare providers are trying to assert themselves – both rhetorically, and in practice – as holders of world-class technologies and expertise deemed appropriate for the needs and means of potential institutions, doctors, and patients. What is promoted is a vision of healthcare which is mimicking the one already adopted in India: telemedicine services are expected to compensate existing healthcare inequities while providing opportunities to hospital

chains expanding their commercial presence[xvi]. The question remains as to whether such services actually improve the accessibility of healthcare or create a situation of dependence towards foreign investment and expertise.

Conclusion

It is difficult to fully grasp what form the breakthrough of companies such as the Apollo Hospitals Group, Bharti Airtel, or Indo-Us Healthcare into the African market may take in the following years or decades. What is, however, becoming increasingly obvious, is that this unfolding commercial scenario has little in common with the sort of South-South cooperation or solidarity often regarded as a distinctive feature of Indo-African relations. Such a solidarity was best incarnated by the African policy of former Indian President Jawaharlal Nehru, the architect of postcolonial India's foreign relations (Bhattacharya 2010; Sahgal 2010). For Nehru, Indo-African relations were to be built upon a moral commitment to the "cause of humanity". On the eve of India's Independence, he expressed this engagement in his "Tryst with Destiny" speech: "It is fitting that at this solemn moment we take the pledge of dedication to the service of India and her people and to the still larger cause of humanity." (Nehru 1947) Without a doubt, science and technology occupied a central position in the vision Nehru had of such a service to humanity. After all, hadn't Nehru proposed, in The Discovery of India, that humanity should be considered as the God of the modern spirit, and "social service" as its religion (Nehru 2004: 621)? However, this conception of a "common humanity" was uncompromisingly linked to an ideal of political self-determinacy and economic self-reliance (Khalid 2010). From a Nehruvian standpoint, collective self-reliance among the developing countries was meant to contribute to the establishment of a new economic order (Chhabra 1989: 105). And indeed it is following such an ideal of self-reliance that Indo-African relations were traditionally underpinned by a strong version of the nation-state. This was true both of commerce and of cooperation (Duclos 2012). It is only in the aftermath of the liberalization reforms initiated in 1991 that Indo-African relations undertook the "pragmatic" turn described precedently, aimed at encouraging economic activity both in India and abroad (Cheru and Obi 2011). From a political point of view, the question that arises could be framed as follows: what's left of the Nehruvian, postcolonial, conception of "humanity", now that economic self-reliance has given way to global trade and commercial integration?

On the one hand, considering that it is primarily driven by private investment, free trade, and capital flows, the resurgence in Indo-African relations can only half-heartedly claim to honour the legacy of socialistic nation-building efforts. Indeed the ideal of "global integration" and borderlessness around which current Indo-African discursive practices revolve has little in common with the sort of collective self-reliance promoted by generations of Indian politicians. On the other hand, India is clearly not prepared to let go of the "moral" quality of past South-South solidarity. This results in discursive strategies marked by a tension between stated intentions to accelerate economic integration and a desperate attempt to hold on to an ideal of self-reliance. Such an uneasy position is perhaps best represented by the Prime Minister Manmohan Singh himself, when he claims: "Self-reliance means trade, not aid." (Bhushan and Katyal 2004: 27)[xvii] In other words, promoting the global flows of capitals and investments would, in itself, amount to a form of cooperation or, at least, of self-reliance.

As it has been suggested in this paper, such discursive strategies are particularly relevant in the ICT and healthcare sectors. ICT embodies the sort of "horizontal" or "all-inclusive" world image that India seeks to associate its global economic ambitions with. Then, as expressed by the likes of Drs. Reddy and Shetty, the globalization of the Indian healthcare sector would find its ethical expression in a "care for the world", for the "benefit of humanity". However, healthcare providers such as Apollo Hospitals, Fortis Healthcare, or Narayana Hrudayalaya admittedly do not seek to extend their commercial presence out of benevolence. They engage with economic partners, with clients, with patients they claim can benefit from "world-class healthcare" at a minimal cost. A minimal cost which most can't afford, in India or Africa alike. Finally, joining the "economic horizontality" of ICT and the moral posture of healthcare, telemedicine reportedly enables Indian hospitals to reach out and provide "healthcare for all", wherever located. Clearly, the "humanity" Nehru once fought for has thus retained its teleological, prophetic flavour. However, his bottom-up, materially and geographically grounded economic approach has given way to a passionate belief in a flattened, global world. A neutral, romantic, immaterial world in which capital, knowledge, and expertise seamlessly circulate, breaking down barriers to healthy days ahead.

Notes

[i] Throughout this article, the notion of "cooperation" is used in a rather broad sense. For a discussion of Indo-African cooperation per se, see Duclos (2012).

[ii] The fact that Africa meets 20% of India's oil needs plays an important part in setting the trade balance clearly in favour of Africa. This lopsided commercial balance is not expected to change any time soon, as India's demand for African minerals and fuels should remain unabated.

[iii] Industry, government, institutional, as well as academic literature was surveyed. Also, the author conducted some 50 interviews within the Indian business sector as well as within commercial and governmental organizations working specifically on Indo-African relations. The data presented here is thus a mixture of this fieldwork material and of a survey of pertinent literature.

[iv] For a critical examination of top-down development approaches – including neoliberal economic reforms – in India, see Das and Das (2011), or Chandrasekhar and Ghosh (2006).

[v] Interviewed during this research, former President of India, Dr. A P J Abdul Kalam probably best recaps what is framed as a cultural specificity: « What can I give? You can give knowledge. You can remove the pain of the people. If you have money, fantastic. That is also good. Ok? So, that is that type of culture we have. Our aim is to see what we can give. (Dr. A P J Abdul Kalam, 14 March 2011; Interview by author).

[vi] Over the last decade, trade between Africa and China has grown at a breathtaking pace. It was $10.5 billion in 2000, $40 billion in 2005 and $166 billion in 2011 (Ighobor 2013). China is currently Africa's largest trading partner, having surpassed the US in 2009 (Ibid.)

[vii] For instance, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry has supported the organization of FICCI's Namaskar Africa - a series of sub-regional India-Africa business networking forums and exhibitions –, and CII's EXIM Bank conclaves on India-Africa Project Partnership, while both the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and the Ministry of External Affairs provided support for the organization of the India Africa Business Partnership Summit, held in October 2011.

[viii] As per a senior officer at the Ministry of External Affairs: "We had the same problems here so we are in a good position to show them. We want them to understand how we developed!" (16 December 2010; Interview by author).

[ix] India's ICT prowess has proven to be of little help in achieving sustainable, inclusive growth domestically. For original and critical perspectives, see Biao (2007), and Nisbett (2009).

[x] References to Indianness as a chief factor explaining the country's recent successes as a "knowledge economy" abound (Planning Commission Government of India 2004; Varna 2004). These accounts converge on the image of culturally and historically significant Indian traits indicating bright technoeconomic futures. These traits include cultural factors such as a popular propensity toward never-ending argument, the logical structure of the Sanskrit language, a history in mathematics (the invention of the zero being generally given in example), or linkages between scientific thinking and Indian spirituality.

[xi] For a critical discussion of the "world-flattening" qualities often associated with ICT, see Duclos (2013).

[xii] Apollo Hospitals and Fortis Healthcare are the leaders in this regard. Fortis Healthcare operates healthcare services in many countries such as Australia, Canada, Dubai, Hong Kong, New Zealand, Singapore, Sri Lanka and Vietnam. The Indian giant is the owner of 74 hospitals (with more than 12,000 beds combined), 190 diagnostic facilities, 580 primary care clinics and 191 day care centers across 10 countries.

[xiii] It's important to insist: this paper does not intend to defend such an untenable position. It simply seeks to identify major thrusts in Indo-African discursive practices, as formulated from India Inc.'s perspective.

[xiv] Apollo Global Projects Consultancy thus defines its activities: "We provide end to end solutions across the healthcare spectrum. From formulating strategies in the healthcare sector to assisting the set up of entire healthcare facilities and operations management, we do it all." (Apollo Global Projects Consultancy 2009a)

[xv] The excerpt is from the website of the company : http://afroindiamedical.com/. The slogan of the company is also very explicit in this regard : "Good Health is Wealth."

[xvi] Once again, this approach has shown mixed results in India. While telemedicine services offered by companies such as Teleradiology Solutions, Indo-US Healthcare or Apollo Hospitals are beneficial in many ways, their existence must be understood as part of a wider economic context in which healthcare services are centralized in metropolitan cities and accessible only to those who can afford them – leaving behing the vast majority of Indians, living in rural areas.

[xvii] This commercial approach has so far been welcomed by many African leaders. For instance, former Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade summarized things this way: "The challenges of development that ensued in India's post-colonial era, and the nation's subsequent economic expansion — ranging from an innovative green agricultural revolution to the information technology boom — provide a hopeful model for many African nations." (Wade 2008).

References

Apollo Global Projects Consultancy

2009a Apollo Global Projects Consultancy: Projects. http://www.apolloglobalprojects.com/projects_lagoon.htm (Accessed on 05/02/2012).

2009b The Apollo Hospitals Group Expands International Footprint to Mauritius. http://www.apolloglobalprojects.com/ (Accessed on 05/02/2012).

Beri, Ruchita

2003 India's Africa Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: An Assesment. Strategic Analysis 27(2):216-232.

2005 Africa's Energy Potential. Prospects for India. Strategic Analysis 29(3):370-394.

Beri, Ruchita and Uttam Kumar Sinha, eds.

2009 Africa and Energy Security: Global Issues, Local Responses. New Delhi: Academic Foundation.

Bhatia, Rajiv

2010 India's Africa policy: can we do better? The Hindu, 15 July 2010. http://www.thehindu.com/ (Accessed on 04/01/2014).

Bhattacharya, Sanjukta Banerji

2010 Engaging Africa: India's interests in the African continent, past and present. In The Rise of China & India in Africa. F. Cheru et C. Obi, eds. Pp. 63-76: Zed Books.

Bhushan, K. and G. Katyal

2004 Visionary to Certainty. New Delhi: A.P.H. Publishing Corporation.

Biao, Xiang

2007 Global "Body Shopping": An Indian Labor System in the Information Technology Industry. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Carmody, Pádraig

2011 India and the 'Asian drivers' in Africa. In India in Africa: Changing Geographies of Power. E. Mawdsley et G. McCann, eds. Pp. 30-47. Oxford: Pambazuka.

Chandrasekhar, C.P. and Jayati Ghosh

2006 The Market that Failed: A Decade of Neoliberal Economic Reforms in India. New Delhi: LeftWord.

Chatterji, Saubhadra

2011 Apollo inks Tanzania's first MoU for PPP in health sector. Business Standard, 28 May 2011. http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/apollo-inks-tanzania%5Cs-first-mou-for-ppp-in-health-sector/437046/ (Accessed on 04/01/2014).

Cheru, Fantu and Cyril Obi, eds.

2010 The Rise of China & India in Africa: Challenges, opportunities, and critical interventions. London & New York: Zed Books.

2011 India-Africa relations in the 21st century: genuine partnership or a marriage of convenience? In India in Africa. Changing Geographies of Power. E. Mawdsley et G. McCann, eds. Pp. 12-29. Oxford: Pambazuka Press.

Chhabra, Hari Sharan

1989 Nehru and Resurgent Africa. New Delhi: Africa Publications.

Chopra, Rohit

2008 Technology and Nationalism in India: cultural negociations from colonialism to cyberspace. Amherst, NY: Cambia Press.

Chowdhry, Ajai, Tejpreet Singh Chopra and Brij Kothari Kothari

2010 India-Africa Partnership: Gateway for Innovation Transfer and Investment. World Economic Forum, Davos-Klosters, Switzerland, http://www.weforum.org/sessions/summary/india-africa-partnership-gateway-innovation-transfer-and-investment (Accessed on 30/12/2013).

CII and WTO

2013 India-Africa : South-South Trade and Investment for Development. Confederation of Indian Industry and World Trade Organization, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/a4t_e/global_review13prog_e/india_africa_report.pdf (Accessed on 30/12/2013).

Das, Gurcharan

2002 India unbound. New York: Anchor Books.

Das, V. and R. Das

2011 Sociology and Anthropology of Economic Life 2: Strategies, Networks, and Markets: OUP India.

Dogbevi, Emmanuel

2009 India to counter China's influence in Africa with Pan-African Stock Exchange. Ghana Business News. http://ghanabusinessnews.com/2009/05/05/india-to-counter-china%E2%80%99s-influence-in-africa-with-pan-african-stock-exchange/ (Accessed on 30/12/2013).

Duclos, Vincent

2012 Building Capacities: The Resurgence of Indo-African Technoeconomic Cooperation. India Review 11(4):209-225.

2013 Bandwidth for Life: Global eHealth, or the Expected Space of a Common Humanity. IFIP Working Group 9.4. 12th International Conference on Social Implications of Computers in Developing Countries, Ocho Rios, Jamaica, 2013, pp. 889-902, http://www.ifipwg94.org/ifip-conference-2013 (Accessed on 30/12/2013).

Einhorn, Bruce

2002 India and IT: "Like France and Wine". BusinessWeek, 28 January. http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/jan2002/nf20020128_4904.htm (Accessed on

Friedman, Thomas

2007 The World is Flat. A Brief History of the Twenty-first Century. Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre Ltd.

Greenspan, Anna

2004 India and the IT Revolution. Networks of Global Culture. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Harshe, Rajen

2002 Recasting Indo-African Development Cooperation. Economic & Political Weekly 37(40):4116-4120.

Hawley, John C., ed.

2008 India in Africa, Africa in India: Indian Ocean Cosmopolitanisms. Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.

Hofmeyr, Isabel and Michelle Williams, eds.

2011 South Africa & India: Shaping the Global South. Johannesburg: Wits University Press.

IANS

2013 Tharoor unveils Indian model of engagement with Africa. Indo-Asian News Service. http://www.indiaafricaconnect.in/index.php?param=news/665/india-africa-conclave/120 (Accessed on 23/12/2013).

Ighobor, Kingsley

2013 China in the heart of Africa. Africa Renewal Online, January. http://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/january-2013/china-heart-africa (Accessed on 26/12/2013).

India Africa Connect

2012 Health in India: An Overview. http://www.indiaafricaconnect.in/ (Accessed on 05 February 2012).

Indo-US Healthcare

2011 Indo-US to expedite healthcare services transformation in Rwanda. http://indoushealthcare.com/html/news_events.html (Accessed on 5/02/2013).

Jacobs, Sherelle

2012 India-Africa Trade: A Unique Relationship. Global. The International Briefing (12):53-55.

Kalam, Abdul

2007 Indomitable Spirit: Rajpal.

Khalid, Mohammed

2010 Nehru and Globalisation. In Gandhi, Nehru and Globalisation. H. Thakur, ed. Pp. 159-177. New Delhi: Concept Publishing Company.

KPMG

2012 KBuzz: Sector Insights. KPMG, http://www.kpmg.com/Ca/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Kbuzz-Magazine/Documents/India-Kbuzz-2012-May.pdf (Accessed on 30/12/2013).

Kragelund, Peter

2010 The Potential Role of Non-Traditional Donors' Aid in Africa. International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, http://ictsd.org/i/publications/71586/

Kumar, Girish

2009 Introduction: Health Sector Reforms in India: Issues, Experiences and Trends. In Health Sector Reforms in India. G. Kumar, ed. New Delhi: CSH-Manohar.

Lafargue, François

2006 L'Inde en Afrique: logiques et limites d'une politique Afrique contemporaine 3(219):137-149.

Leena, Bridget

2009 Sri Ramachandra plans medical college in Mauritius Business Line, 30 March. http://www.thehindubusinessline.in/2009/03/30/stories/2009033051040300.htm (Accessed on 27/01/2012).

Lefebvre, Bertrand

2010 Hospital Chains in India. The Coming of Age ? IFRI, http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/68/71/05/PDF/IFRI_asievisions23blefebvre.pdf (Accessed on 30/12/2013).

Mawdsley, Emma

2011 The rhetorics and rituals of 'South-South' development cooperation: notes on India and Africa. In India in Africa: Changing Geographies of Power. E. Mawdsley et G. McCann, eds. Pp. 166-186. Oxford: Pambazuka Press.

Mawdsley, Emma and Gerard McCann

2010 The Elephant in the Corner? Reviewing India-Africa Relations in the New Millennium. Geography Compass 4(2):81-93.

2011a India in Africa: Changing Geographies of Power. Oxford: Pambazuka Press.

2011b Introduction: Towards a re-evaluation of contemporary India-Africa relations. In India in Africa. Changing Geographies of Power. E. Mawdsley et G. McCann, eds. Pp. 1-10. Oxford: Pambazuka Press.

McCormick, Dorothy

2008 China & India as Africa's New Donors: The Impact of Aid on Development. Review of African Political Economy 35(115):73-92.

Modi, Renu

2009 India: An ideal partner for Africa? Pambuzeka, 30 July 2009. http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/58068 (Accessed on 30/12/2013).

2010 The role of India's private sector in the health and agricultural sectors of Africa. In The Rise of China & India in Africa. F. Cheru et C. Obi, eds: Zed Books.

2011 Offshore healthcare management: medical tourism between Kenya, Tanzania and India. In India in Africa. Changing Geographies of Power. E. Mawdsley et G. McCann, eds. Pp. 125-139. Oxford: Pambazuka Press.

Narayana Hrudayalaya Healthcity

2011 Transforming Healthcare: Narayana Hrudayalaya Healthcity. Narayana Hrudayalaya Hospitals, ed. Bangalore.

Nehru, Jawaharlal

1947 Speech On the Granting of Indian Independence. http://www.fordham.edu/ (Accessed on

2004 The Discovery of India. New Delhi: Penguin Books.

Nisbett, Nicholas

2009 Growing up in the Knowledge Society: Living the IT Dream in Bangalore. New Delhi: Routledge.

Obi, Cyril

2010 African oil in the energy security calculations of China and India. In The Rise of China & India in Africa. F. Cheru et C. Obi, eds. Pp. 181-192: Zed Books.

Pitti, François

2009 Chine et Inde : vers une stratégie de marque. En temps réel Cahier No. 38:1-34.

Planning Commission

2008 Eleventh Five Year Plan (2007–2012). Volume I : Inclusive Growth. Government of India, http://planningcommission.nic.in/plans/planrel/fiveyr/welcome.html (Accessed on 04/01/2014).

Planning Commission Government of India

2004 India Vision 2020: The Report. New Delhi: Academic Foundation.

Priya, Ritu , Alpana Sagar, Rajib Dasgupta and Sanghamitra Acharya

2004 CMP on Health. Making India World Class. Economic and Political Weekly 39(27):2971-2974.

PRWEB

2011 Teleradiology Solutions Now Sends Reports to Sub-Saharan Africa PRWEB, 24 November. http://www.prweb.com/releases/2011/11/prweb8988531.htm (Accessed on 26/01/2012).

PTI

2013 Indian model of partnership with Africa "more promising than Chinese: Salman Khurshid. The Economic Times, 20 November 2013. http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-11-20/news/44285370_1_india-and-africa-chinese-model-indian-model (Accessed on 23/12/2013).

Qadeer, Imrana

2000 Health care systems in transition. The Indian experience. Journal of Public Health Medicine 22(1):25-32.

Reddy, Pratap

2012 Indraprastha Apollo Hospitals. http://www.apollohospdelhi.com/about-us/ (Accessed on 05/02/2013).

Ribeiro, John

2010 India's Bharti Airtel Completes Acquisition of Zain Africa. PCWorld, 8 June 2010. http://www.pcworld.com/article/198287/article.html (Accessed on 18/11/2013).

Sahgal, Nayantra

2010 Jawaharlal Nehru. Civilizing a Savage World. New Delhi: Penguin Books.

Second Africa-India Forum Summit

2011 Africa-India Framework for Enhanced Cooperation. http://indiaafricasummit.nic.in/staticfile/framework-en.pdf (Accessed on 05/01/2014).

Singh, Manmohan

2008 PM addresses the first India-Africa forum Summit. http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=37177 (Accessed on 05/01/2014).

2011 A Time for Renewal. In Two Billion Dreams...Celebrating India-Africa Friendship. M. Chand, ed. Pp. 4. New Delhi: IANS Publishing.

Varna, Pavan K.

2004 Being Indian: The Truth about Why the Twenty-First Century Will Be India's.

Versi, Anver

2012 A marriage made in heaven? Indian companies in Africa. Global. The International Briefing (12):56-58.

Vines, Alex

2010 India's Africa Engagement: Prospects for the 2011 India–Africa Forum. Chatham House, www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/109541 (Accessed on

Viswanathan, H.H.S.

2010 India's Engagement With A Resurgent Africa, Lecture at Central University of Jharkhand, http://indiandiplomacy.blogspot.com/2010/09/indias-engagement-with-resurgent-africa.html (Accessed on 23/12/2013).

Wade, Abdoulaye

2008 Why India is essential to Africans The Hindu, 7 April. http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-opinion/why-india-is-essential-to-africans/article1234456.ece (Accessed on 05/01/2014).

World Bank

2008 South-South Experience: What can Africa learn from India's IT miracle?, http://web.worldbank.org/ (Accessed on 05 February 2012).

Xavier, Constantino

2010 India's strategic advantage over China in Africa. Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/IndiasstrategicadvantageoverChinainAfrica_cxavier_300610 (Accessed on 23/12/2013).

Points of Departure: Shifting Traditionalist Caymanian Understandingsof Jamaica and Jamaicans

Christopher Williams

ABSTRACT

Initially focusing on positive Caymanian traditionalist interpretations of Jamaicans and Jamaica throughout the early to mid-20th century, this article thereafter traces the historical junctures at which these interpretations were negatively reworked to the point where Jamaicans in the Cayman Islands, and in general, are now being viewed derogatorily by many Caymanians. As the author attests, any foundational understanding of this reworking is inextricably linked to the historical relationship between the Cayman Islands and Jamaica, where British Jamaica controlled the then-economically struggling Cayman Islands to the former's independence in August 1962. As noted throughout this article, although the well-to-do Caymanian merchant establishment demonstrated an unmistakable animosity toward any proposal that the Cayman Islands join an initially successful independent Jamaica, many working class Caymanians spoke fondly of Jamaica in the years leading up to its independence, demonstrating their gratitude for Jamaican rule; such state of affairs confirms that although toward Jamaica's independence Caymanian views of Jamaicans typically varied according to social class, by the 1970s a general cross section of Caymanians had come to regard Jamaica and Jamaicans to varying degrees of negativity. The author thus argues that the putative alteration of once-positive expressions of Jamaicans was inevitable, given the existence of a stark yet benign Caymanian/Jamaican differentiation in earlier, largely positive Caymanian understandings of Jamaica and Jamaicans, a differentiation bound, in its later inversion, to highlight independent Jamaica's decline into various social, political, and economic hardships, while highlighting the economic rise of the politically-stable Cayman Islands.

Introduction

With a total population of 55,456 people, just under half of this constituting foreign nationals, the Cayman Islands are a prosperous self-financing British Dependency located in the western Caribbean. In order of size and importance, the Cayman Islands – hereafter collectively referred to as Cayman – comprise the islands of Grand Cayman, Cayman Brac, and Little Cayman. Cayman's total landmass is 100.4 square miles, and lies about 195 miles to the northwest of Jamaica and 180 miles to the south of Cuba (see map below). With over 110 nationalities represented there,[1] Cayman is a truly cosmopolitan and international destination caught irreversibly, *irresistibly*, in the grip of globalization, where globalization stresses a local economy's substantive economic and financial contribution to the integrated global economy. Yet, as we shall see, Caymanians did not always know a life steeped in prosperity, but, from 1655 to the late 1960s, had been developing along a somewhat opposing path.[2]

Although Cayman came under English rule in 1655, Grand Cayman was only permanently settled in 1734, its inhabitants, some of them brigands on the run, more or less left to their own devices, receiving little to no directive from imperial overlord Jamaica, which demonstrated an unmistakable administrative disinterest in an otherwise backwater colony. Although Cayman was not officially recognized as a dependency of British Jamaica until 1863, only receiving its first appointed British commissioner in 1898, Caymanians, generally financially beleaguered, continued to exercise near-complete autonomy over their internal affairs, although many of them regarded Jamaica as *their* metropole toward the latter's independence from Britain on August 6, 1962.

To its independence, Jamaica, once Britain's premier Caribbean island colony, represented a developed and progressive country for many Caymanians who either went there to shop, on business, to school, or else to live. 'There was a load of Caymanian living up there [in Jamaica]', David Foster recollects in 2009, 'cause [in] those days, Jamaica was *everything* to us [sic].'[3] Mr. Foster initially provides a truly pragmatic Caymanian understanding of the importance of Jamaica to Cayman in the latter's lean economic years: 'They were [the metropole]…[and] we were [the] Dependency[.] [T]hey supplied all our medical needs…literally; religious, the monetary side of it, using their currency…Everything, our prisons, our mental health was all supplied by them.'[4] '[Jamaica] was quite different from Cayman', Desmond Watler similarly opined in 1990; Mr. Watler moved to Jamaica in 1929 to attend Calabar College, a premier high school in Kingston: 'The truth is we were a

dependency of Jamaica at that time', he continues, 'and Jamaica was the mother…for us and more developed than we were, and…[I felt] kind of lost [there].'[5] Indeed, it was for reasons of Jamaica's perceived superiority that Glair Hennings and his wife, Amy, also decided to move to Jamaica in the 1940s, and their ideas of Jamaica at this time, as these are being relayed in the couple's 2002 interview, echo comments made by others:

> …there [was] a great deal of differences between Jamaica and Cayman Brac…[o]h, yes [a] tremendous amount. The Cayman Islands, as you are aware, were controlled by Jamaica then…We ate Jamaican food, we spent Jamaican money, we…everything we did was Jamaica. If you wanted a semi-decent education, you had to go to Jamaica. If you wanted employment, you had to go to Jamaica…just about everything we did, we had to go to Jamaica.[6]

These views of Jamaica set the basis for a brand of traditionalist Caymanian thought, or, put another way, a pattern of thinking in the present that continues to be shaped by history and traditions, and the experiences accrued therein.[7] By introducing a traditionalist language based on the fundamental differences between Jamaica and Cayman, any subsequent verbalizations offered by certain older Caymanians, as I have shown elsewhere, have striven to explain the extent of this difference to varying degrees of benignity.[8] Although the Jamaica of the 1940s is being touted as great and grand by these Caymanians, a ubiquitous us/them dichotomy resonates in their recollections of Jamaica. With this in mind, I am mindful of the fact of the inherent dialectical nature of any dichotomy, where dialecticism denotes any sort of conflict that is bound to eventually arise from even the most benign of ideologically differing forces.[9] In this sense, Caymanians will carry their own self-conscious understandings in relation to Jamaica and Jamaicans regardless of the perception in the traditionalist Caymanian imagination that Jamaica was Cayman's economic and political superior throughout the first half of the 20th century.

According to initial traditionalist Caymanian interpretations of Jamaica, the image of the latter island looms large, if in retrospect. In the same way that American popular culture had amassed global hegemonic clout in the years following World War II, many Caymanians were being "culturally affected" by a more developed Jamaica toward the 1960s. When I use *culturally affected*, I am speaking of the ways in which Jamaican ways of doing and being were bound to influence Caymanians. For instance, when the Henningses and Mr. Foster speak about being affected by Jamaican cuisine, shopping, education, and so on, they have demonstrated that they were influenced by a general Jamaican way of life. However, we

return to the idea that although Caymanians might have been culturally affected by Jamaica, Jamaica's status as Caymanians' cultural hegemon need not be interpreted in strictly positive terms of cultural affectation. In other words, where the term cultural hegemony represents '…the binding together of people…around cultural norms and standards that emanate over time and space from seats of power occupied by authoritative actors',[10] Caymanians would have nonetheless still been keen to preserve their singular selves in relationship to Jamaica and Jamaicans. Just because Cayman came under Jamaica's charge in no way translated into the fact that Caymanians were likely to completely assimilate into Jamaican culture. In hindsight, thus, it seems inevitable that such deferent yet profoundly internalized Caymanian understandings of Jamaica, and by extension, Jamaicans, were bound to undergo a negative shift as both jurisdictions developed along diametrically opposing lines, with Cayman transitioning from an economic backwater to a politically-stable, prosperous offshore financial sector, and Jamaica steadily fumbling along political, social, and economic lines since the 1970s.

Elsewhere, I have comprehensively traced the source of the currently tense Caymanian-Jamaican relationship in Cayman back to Cayman's phenomenal economic development beginning in the late 1960s, development which witnessed a substantial influx of foreign-nationals, notably Jamaicans, who at present account for little under a fifth of Cayman's present population.[11] Thus, where Caymanians had developed enduring traditionalist ideas of themselves in relation to Jamaicans before the onset of globalization, not only does the present discourse of the Caymanian's singularity continue to depend on such traditionalist ideas, but is also further reworked by the deafening Caymanian complaint that because of the great number of foreign-nationals in Cayman, *Caymanians* have become the minority in their own country; a complaint, which to be sure, continues to justify Caymanians' xenophobic regard for certain *inundating* foreign-national groups.[12] Keeping in mind that there are more Jamaicans in Cayman than any other foreign nationality, I contend that the historical reasons for such a complaint find their bases in the shifting political relationship between Jamaica and the Cayman Islands towards 1962 and beyond. Consequently, I trace the negative shift in hitherto positive traditionalist Caymanian understandings just before and after Jamaica's independence with the intention of demonstrating the indispensability of economic prosperity and political stability both in Caymanian self-understandings and the Caymanian's eventual othering of the Jamaican.

Tracing Cayman’s political evolution in relation to Jamaica and the West Indies Federation

In 1944, Jamaica’s government was transformed into a ministerial and representative political entity, a transformation made possible by the introduction of universal adult suffrage that same year. The introduction of what is considered to be one the most inalienable of human rights, first in Jamaica and then gradually throughout the rest of the British West Indies over the next two decades, came, as I explore below, as a direct result of the labor riots that raged throughout the region in the 1930s.

The early to late-1930s was marked by economic degradation as the global financial crisis intensified and the already disenfranchised masses of the British West Indies continued to find themselves jobless, voiceless, undernourished, and all but condemned to filthy living conditions. As a result, many riots broke out across the region as the unemployed and underemployed turned their dissatisfaction both towards the indifferent proprietary class and the government, whose officials and administrators seemed hardly concerned with the plight of the people under their charge; racist intent coursed throughout the mentalities of the largely white upper social crust, which, being of privilege, could not empathize, let alone sympathize, with the miserable conditions of the masses. The ensuing labor riots, which represented a mass strike for every grievance imaginable, from low wages, to unemployment, to the lack of worker protection, were usually suppressed with force, but it is safe to say that the seed of popular frustration had been so profoundly sown that its germination was all but inevitable.

With the notable exceptions of the Bahamas, Cayman, the Turks and Caicos islands, the British Virgin Islands, Dominica, Grenada, and Antigua – colonies curiously free of any rioting, the situation throughout the British West Indies had become so untenable that in early 1938 the British Cabinet agreed to send a royal commission to the region to investigate the causes of its widespread unrest. The commission was led by former Minister of Agriculture and Financial Secretary, and future Colonial Secretary Walter Edward Guinness – Lord Moyne – who landed in the West Indies in November 1838. A little over a year later, Moyne’s report was revealed to British officials, its findings so damning against the colonial regimes in the West Indies that they had to be suppressed during the stalemate period of World War II, lest the German’s got hold of the report and used it as confirmation of Britain’s own hypocrisy where the issue of human rights was concerned. The Moyne Commission, as it would become known, was subsequently published in 1944, and detailed the horrific circumstances of the masses in the West Indies, further calling for the

introduction of basic human amenities and political rights, in addition to easier access to education and greater government accountability to its people.

With the exception of Jamaica, Guyana, and Trinidad, trade unions were illegal throughout the British West Indies by 1932, and even in the jurisdictions where trade union legislation was legal, it 'did not permit peaceful picketing of employers', let alone any adequate protections 'for breach of contract in the event of strikes.'[13] However, by the early 1940s trade unions had become commonplace throughout the British West Indies, their very success made possible by the earlier initiatives prompted throughout the 1930s, and earlier, by the likes of Alexander Bustamante and Norman Manley of Jamaica, Arthur Cipriani and Albert Gomes of Trinidad, Grantley Adams of Barbados, and Antonio Sobreanis Gomez of Belize, among others. Such developments, as outlined above, signaled the initial stages of Jamaica's independence process.

By 1953, Jamaica's political parties, the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) and People's National Party (PNP) had amassed considerable local support, marking the earnest beginnings of a Jamaican populism premised on trade unionism. However, it was the JLP that would win the 1953 general elections, and its leader, Alexander Bustamante, who would become Jamaica's first Chief Minister. At the heart of the local Jamaican political imperative rested the desire to achieve full internal self-government, something that could not have been achieved overnight, but which Jamaica's charismatic leaders in the figures of the PNP's Norman Manley and JLP's Bustamante had been long envisioning. In 1959, due in large part to the increasing pressure being placed on Britain by America to free its colonies from the ostensible despotism of colonialism, "complete" internal self-rule was granted and Jamaican affairs were concentrated in the hands of new Chief Minister Norman Manley.[14] Jamaica's Crown Colony status remained, with the Jamaican Cabinet falling under the oversight of a British-appointed governor for whom was reserved the ability to veto any decisions made by the local executive branch of the government.

Yet as I attempt to figure the position of Cayman in Jamaica and indeed the wider political advancement of the British West Indies, Jamaica's grant of full internal self-rule in 1959 did not happen in isolation but within the context of federation. The main objective of the British Caribbean Federation Act of 1956 was to bind its Caribbean members politically and economically: the Caribbean islands of the British West Indies were quite small and thus more vulnerable to the vicissitudes of the global economic market. Therefore, any such federation, which had the option of remaining part of the British Commonwealth, would

lessen the economic stress and vulnerability of eventual independence among its members, thereby rendering any such scheme politically and economically more able in its solidarity. The West Indies Federation was formally established in 1958; its members were: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, and Trinidad and Tobago. The Federation lasted only four years, however, dissolving in 1962, after Jamaica's decision – countenanced by a fracturing national referendum in 1961 – to leave it. Trinidad withdrew not long after, and without the Caribbean's two flagship economies to guide it, the Federation's fate was effectively sealed. Denis Benn has argued that Norman Manley and his supporters only used the Federation to precipitate Jamaica's total independence from Britain on August 6, 1962.[15] Ulf Hannerz gives any ostensible "ulterior motive" of these jurisdictions a firmer historical basis, if in retrospect: '…it seems as if [some] of the British Caribbean territories were moving quickly toward individual independence in the form of the West Indies Federation.'[16]

The Cayman Islands and its inhabitants were, more or less, bystanders in the events surrounding the establishment and dissolution of the West Indies Federation. Yet, as we shall see, despite any earlier positive Caymanian understandings towards Jamaica, the emergence of negative perceptions of Jamaica among the Caymanian merchant elite especially can be compellingly traced throughout federation developments.

In the first instance, although they had been participating in proposed federation talks from as early as 1947, Caymanian legislators Ernest Panton and Willie Farrington had initially 'made it clear that their Assembly would agree to join [any British West Indian union] only if the Cayman Islands had direct representation [in it]…' But given Cayman's lack of political and economic influence, even in relation to the smaller islands of the eastern Caribbean, this hardline ultimatum was rejected by the Standing Closer Committee in 1949, and the Cayman Islands' status in any future Federation was unilaterally confirmed as 'a dependency under the administration of the Governor-General of the Federation.'[17] As such, Cayman never became a full-fledged participating member of the short-lived West Indies Federation. Yet, any such confirmation of Cayman's subordinate position both in relation to the potential West Indies Federation and, later, a Jamaica poised for greater self-rule would, by 1961, not sit well with a structurally anachronistic Caymanian legislature – or vestry – which consisted of 32 elected members largely left to their own whims and fancies, a legislature whose very *raison d'etre* centered largely on promoting the interests of Cayman's well-to-do white and near-white merchant class.[18] According to Dave Martins, so keen was the Cayman elite to

safeguard its position of political privilege, that in 1958 it systematically worked to destroy the first political party in Cayman, the Cayman Vanguard Progressive Party, to ensure the absence of any spirited opposition against its political representatives-cum-actors.[19]

Becoming almost immediately aware of the political insularity and myopia of Cayman's mercantilist-driven upper class upon arriving in Cayman, in addition to sensing a pan-Caribbeanist change in the air, new Commissioner to Cayman in 1952 Andrew Morris Gerrard stressed that Cayman's elite must face the 'new realities' and abandon living according to the principles of a past settler tradition steeped in nepotism, racism, favoritism, and unequal classist economics. Gerrard did not like that the vestry did not apply unequivocal fairness when it came to collecting taxes and customs duties from qualified citizens, for where else would substantial revenue be made in an economy still surviving largely on the remittances of its already struggling overseas seamen?[20] Although Gerrard was of the firm opinion that the Caymanian vestry needed to take a more pro-active, modern approach to ideas and issues of development, the vestry's understanding that any such development be indispensably linked to a Jamaica rapidly becoming less British, it seemed, was destined not only to prove the basis for its displeasure, but the displeasure for the elite class it represented.[21]

In technical terms, Cayman's lack of a constitution meant that Jamaica had the right to make decisions on behalf of Caymanians without consulting them, even though since earliest times the British-led Jamaican political machine had been allowing them to manage their own affairs. Nonetheless, by 1959 the very idea of a Jamaica becoming less and less British did not, for all intents and purposes, sit well with Caymanian merchants especially, many of whom were determined to maintain their connection with Britain. Among these merchants was Ducan Merren. Heir to a substantial fortune, Ducan Merren returned to Cayman just before the onset of World War II, and by 1959 was a long-standing member of Cayman's Federation delegation, demonstrating his displeasure with Jamaica's potentially wide and unequivocal control over Cayman's internal affairs after that island had been granted complete internal self-government.[22] Although he wanted the relationship between Jamaica and Cayman to remain "close", he argued that any such relationship must be tempered by an ultimate 'British connection', and especially in light of the very – by then – clear *Jamaican* intention to achieve greater and greater independence from Britain.

On the other end of Cayman's political spectrum was Ormond Panton's firebrand, populist type of politics. Panton was also a Federation delegate by 1959. With great political ambition,

Panton, unlike Merren, was keen to forego the British connection, in favor of forging an intimate – but not necessarily *dependent* – political relationship with a federated Jamaica. Merren's political desires echoed the merchant establishment's dedication to maintaining the status quo, while Panton was determined to excise Cayman's original imperial overlord, forge links with a Jamaica poised for eventual federated independence, and subsequently ensure Cayman's total independence.[23]

Nonetheless, and despite Cayman's dependency position within the West Indies Federation, the British government was keen to constitutionally modernize Cayman, demonstrating its understanding that internal Caymanian political affairs should fall under a constitution constructed to serve local particularities. A collaborative effort between Jamaican governor Kenneth Blackburne, Cayman Commissioner Jack Rose, and Caymanian politicians, Cayman's first written constitution was implemented on July 4, 1959. The constitution did away with an archaic legislation system, implementing an 18-member legislative assembly. Fifteen of these figures were to be elected by the newly introduced Adult Suffrage Act, enabled at the same time as the constitution, while three were to be appointed official members in the posts of Chief Secretary, Attorney-General, and Financial Secretary. An Executive Council was also introduced, headed by the Administrator along with 'two official, one nominated, and two elected members.' The Executive Council had the powers to implement social policies. The constitution also ensured that Cayman's legislature did not fall under the oversight of Jamaican legislators, although the Jamaican governor headed Cayman's Legislature and had the right to intervene accordingly on behalf of the Crown.[24]

By early 1962 Cayman's status in relation to the West Indies Federation – itself unstable by this time given Jamaica's desire by then to completely free itself of British control – was most precarious, and much to the alarm of Jamaican Governor Kenneth Blackburne, who visited Grand Cayman on January 17, 1962. Given Cayman's status in the Federation, once the likely dissolution of that entity was achieved – a dissolution which would occur just months later in May – Cayman, in theory, could cease to be a British Dependency.[25] In light of this automatic severing, Blackburne, perhaps at the behest of Cayman's political and merchant elite, devised a plan intended to ensure the continuation of Cayman's British connection, in addition to securing a greater degree of self-rule among Caymanians. According to Blackburne's plan, Caymanians would, for a period of five years, be given a chance to control their own affairs. Britain would appoint a Lieutenant Governor whose normal powers under Crown Colony arrangement would be drastically curtailed, as he would

have been immediately answerable to a Caymanian council of ministers. Merren's earlier desire that the Cayman-Britain connection remain in the face of growing Caymanian political autonomy seemed on the cusp of being realized, albeit with a greater degree of autonomy than he could have ever imagined.[26]

Blackburn's plan never materialized, and when Jamaica gained its independence on August 6, 1962, Cayman and the Turks and Caicos Islands (another of Jamaica's dependencies) became direct dependencies of Britain, though British officials were able to convince the Jamaican government to send vital human resources to its erstwhile dependencies, including teachers, nurses, police officers, construction workers, and so on; Cayman even continued to use Jamaican currency up to a decade after Jamaica's independence.[27] Important to note here is that most of the remaining members of the Federation, with the exception of Anguilla, were not assured automatic independence, nullifying any theoretical understanding that Cayman would cease to be a British Dependency once the Federation was dissolved. Conversely, the remaining former member states of the West Indies Federation remained dependencies of Britain for a while, achieving their respective independence throughout the subsequent 30-year span.

As we shall see, however, the Jamaica "threat" had not quite passed immediately following Jamaica's independence, and not only did many Caymanians continue to actively resist the very possibility of becoming a dependency of an independent Jamaica that still wielded considerable influence over Caymanian affairs, but it was this very resistance that worked to crystallize an already-palpable elitist indictment of Jamaica and Jamaicans.

By November 1962 Caymanian politicians had split into two camps: Ormond Panton's National Democratic Party (NDP), formed a year earlier, and Willie Farrington's Christian Democratic Party (CDP), also established in 1961. Issues of self-government were at the forefront of a burgeoning internal political Caymanian awareness, with Panton keen to retain close political ties with Jamaica and Farrington devoted to sustaining Cayman's British connection. Accordingly, when public elections were held in Cayman less than four months after Jamaica had become officially independent, it did not sit well with Cayman's merchant elites – who were CDP supporters – that Panton's party had won seven seats while the CDP had only managed to win five. Nonetheless, and bizarrely so, with the help of British Administrator to Cayman, Jack Rose, and Governor Blackburne (still in Jamaica at the time), together with the support of popular pro-British populists Roy McTaggart and Captain Eldon Kirkonnell, who were actually NDP members, the CDP 'effectively formed…[Cayman's]

government in 1962', blocking any desire whatsoever on Panton's part to bring an independent Jamaica and Cayman closer.[28] The CDP and Administrator Rose had been able to manipulate the election results to their own political end, but there is evidence, as we shall see, that this political strong-arming was supported by many Caymanians who were very dedicated to not becoming a dependency of Jamaica.

Interrogating the effects of altered traditionalist Caymanian understandings of Jamaica and Jamaicans

The relieved sighs of prominent Caymanian merchant Captain Charles Kirkonnell in 2007 that Cayman did not ultimately become a dependency of Jamaica sets the tone for a distinct brand of Caymanian xenophobia towards Jamaica and Jamaicans that developed in earnest upon Jamaica's independence:

Charles Kirkonnell: So, independence and all that never crossed our mind, or didn't… it was meaningless. Actually Caymanians could have been caught, and this is where Dr. Roy [McTaggart] came in. He saved the day when he got up there and… otherwise Cayman, today, would have been under Jamaica.

Heather McLaughlin: Yes, yes.

CK: So that was his redeeming feature

HMc: Yes.

CK: And we all owe him a great debt of gratitude for…he saw the…foresight.

HMc: For seeing what this was going to mean.

CK: He was very forceful when it came to that, in convincing…and from then on, people became more aware of the consequences.[29]

Just what were the consequences of which Captain Kirkonnell spoke? Although he is speaking about the past, notably Jamaica's political decline upon independence (discussed later), one cannot help but question the likely extent to which the present social condition of Jamaica influences the Captain's intimations. In January 2006 the Caribbean media dubbed Jamaica, and in particularly its capital Kingston, 'the murder capital of the world, after 2005 saw more than 1600 people killed – a tally of at least five murders a day'.[30] Four days into 2006, thirteen people had already been murdered, but this was nothing new for Jamaica, statistically speaking.[31] Between 1995 and 1999, a total of 4,545 people, mostly Jamaicans, were murdered: 780 people were murdered in 1995, 925 in 1996, 1,038 in 1997, 953 in 1998, and 849 in 1999; in contrast, only five people were murdered in the Cayman Islands in the same period. Between 2000 and 2001, an astonishing 2,026 murders were committed in Jamaica, at total that '[exceeded] the total number of murders for the period 1960-1974 [which came to] a total of 1,767 murders.'[32] Trevor Munroe has compellingly associated Jamaica's alarming murder rate with a violently charged culture of dependence on charismatic yet suspect leaders and figureheads, political and economic underdevelopment, together with the Jamaican masses' almost-suicidal deference to prominent politicians of lighter hew.[33]

In economic terms, Jamaica has also struggled. By 2009, that country's public debt stood at 131.7 percent of a gross domestic product of $23.36 billion. In real-growth-rate terms, this meant that Jamaica's economy had contracted by 4 percent that very year.[34] This economic reality, together with a social milieu bedecked with criminality, is likely to prompt a further Caymanian understanding of modern Jamaican existence: where economic opportunities are scarce, people tend to turn to a life of crime, continuing this life even when they are living abroad. As I explore below, this line of logic seems to drive the tenacious belief of successful Caymanian merchant Nolan Foster and his interviewer Heather McLaughlin that too many Jamaicans in Cayman will destroy both Cayman's prosperity and its relatively crime-free, peaceful nature.

Mr. Foster's sense of relief in 1999 that Cayman did not decide to remain a dependency of Jamaica seems, from the outset, also to be substantively informed by the latter's present reality.[35] Signaling his continuity with Captain Kirkonnell's socio-political understanding of Jamaica, Mr. Foster also pays homage to Roy McTaggart – a Caymanian medical doctor and politician in the 1960s and 1970s – and his efforts to secure Cayman's continued connection

with Britain through petition: '…Dr. McTaggart…got credit for swinging [the votes our way]', Mr. Foster begins:

> [and] I could not see [us] remaining with Jamaica. At that time we had a preacher here publishing a little newssheet [sic] called the Cayman Brac Herald or something. I still have it a home somewhere. A little article I wrote in that about choosing between Jamaica and Crown Colony Status. I mean I gave my views. I told them plain and straight. I wanted to be clear, I had nothing against Jamaica, they had been good to us and all the rest of it but I felt that Jamaica would have enough problems of her own without having the burdens of these islands on her at that time.[36]

Over 3,000 Caymanians – more than half of the islands' entire population of nearly 6,000 – signed their name to this petition in late 1962, which called for Cayman to remain with Britain and not become a dependency of an independent Jamaica.[37] Indeed, Caymanians living in Cayman Brac were so convinced that Grand Cayman would imminently become a Jamaican territory that they threatened to secede from Cayman. It was Dr. McTaggart who was quick to assert that Cayman would have been in a precarious position had Caymanians opted to remain a dependency of Jamaica after Jamaica's independence. As a newly independent nation, Jamaica had to concern itself with matters of military security and economic survival, and for Dr. McTaggart, expressed some thirteen years after Jamaica's independence, it was indeed wise that Cayman had decided to remain under a long-established, stable Western nation.[38]

Mr. Foster's reasons for not wanting to remain with Jamaica find echo in Dr. McTaggart's foregoing opinion: '[The Jamaicans] haven't [even] got them [their problems] ironed out yet', he begins, '...and I realize this, too, that where we have plenty Jamaicans here now, if we had gone along with Jamaica it would have been wide open and they could have come in at will.' His interviewer, Mrs. McLaughlin, breaks the interviewer's code of neutrality when she affirms that 'Yes. Yes. And there'd be no control whatsoever.' 'Be no control', Mr. Foster further concurs, '[a]nd we would not have been the prosperous island that we are today.' 'No', Mrs. McLaughlin reiterates.[39] Mr. Foster and his interviewer have emotionally demonstrated their feelings about Jamaicans, in effect tying these emotions to current Jamaican realities so as to achieve an impassioned justification for their anxious desire both to remain with Britain and prevent too many Jamaicans from coming to Cayman. However, what remains to be fully

confirmed is the historical juncture at which Jamaica began to decline socially and economically; as we shall see, this historical juncture coincides, not with the beginning of shifting ideas of Jamaicans, per se, for such ideas existed among the merchant classes before Jamaica's independence and had indeed crystallized by the 1962 general elections in Cayman; rather, it is ahistorical juncture that provides a justification grounded in reality for otherwise negative, reappropriated popular Caymanian understandings of Jamaica and Jamaicans.

To fully clarify and unravel the ideological connection between Caymanian prosperity and Jamaican criminality, in articulatory *Caymanian* terms, is to appreciate, in the first place, the commanding powers of reappropriation, upon which rests the linguistic reshaping of preexisting traditionalist ideas, feelings, and sentiments according to a relatively new logic driven by a present reality, but inextricably influenced by traditionalism in the first place.[40] Mr. Hennings, for instance, begins to give voice to a reappropriated traditionalist interpretation of Jamaica and Jamaicans on ostensibly economic and social grounds. When his interviewer evokes an earlier, more honest time where 'you could go anywhere in Kingston and never think about locking your door or anything', Mr. Hennings's response seems not only to extend an earlier positive Jamaican/Caymanian differentiation, but, more importantly in this instance, potentially portrays present-day Jamaicans in a derogatory manner, as expressed by his hesitancy: 'Oh, yes, you never…when I was a boy in Kingston…I was a little boy in Kingston, there was no people… well, the Jamaica people are still wonderful, I don't mean to imply in any way that there's anything wrong with the people…I mean the average person. There [is] a tremendous amount wrong with some of the people.'[41] Mr. Hennings' hesitation attempts to hide uncomfortable implications about Jamaicans that are, as with Captain Kirkonnell and Mr. Foster's understandings, likely dependent on Jamaica's current political, economic, and criminal conditions. However, as every reappropriated expression has its justificatory, veridical source, its shaping trajectory borne of historical circumstance, it becomes necessary to pinpoint the origins of Jamaica's present condition in order to imbue Mr. Hennings' non-elitist Caymanian understandings a firm and truly transformative historical-ideological foundation.

When Jamaica achieved independence in 1962, for a decade thereafter the nation was politically and economically stable under Bustamante's Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) leadership. As testament to Jamaica's potential economic and social success, Singapore sent officials during this time to analyze the island's strengthening economic and political

infrastructures. Regardless of Jamaica's initial successes, Cayman's merchant elites' powerful ideological ties to Britain not only ensured Cayman's continued link with Britain, but underwent a greater degree of popularity among the Caymanian masses, beginning in late 1962 and proceeding apace until 1972, at which time Jamaica's prosperity honeymoon came to a somewhat precipitous end; indeed, Jamaica's fall from grace, if you will, served not only to vindicate an earlier elitist ideological position, promulgated by the likes of Nolan Foster and Captain Kirkonnell, but also coincided with the beginnings of economic success in Cayman, a state of affairs that powerfully juxtaposes Caymanian prosperity with Jamaican criminality.

As a politically-stable Cayman was being discovered by curious tourists and legitimate and not-so-legitimate high profile investors keen to amass as much profit as possible by paying as little taxes as possible, Jamaica had begun its downward political and economic spiral after Michael Manley's PNP came to power in 1972, although Manley is to be credited with introducing free education to the masses as well as providing them jobs. A close friend of Cuba's Fidel Castro, Manley developed the idea that democratic socialism might actually cure Jamaica of its gaping social and economic disparities. Inevitably, Jamaica's newfangled relationship with Cuba met the disapproval of the United States, so much so, it has been argued elsewhere, that the CIA began shipping guns to the JLP in the covert hopes of destabilizing Manley's regime, fearful that Jamaica would become another Cuba.[42] Elsewhere, Anthony Payne has suggested that the triangular relationship between the US, Cuba, and Jamaica was the stimulant behind Jamaica's political and economic downfall: A displeased America had simply used its hegemonic clout as a bargaining chip; either Manley cut ties with Castro or the Jamaican economy, by then absolutely dependent on American and European "free" markets, would be systematically shut out. The American ambassador to Jamaica at the time, Sumner Gerrard, 'pointedly told a group of Kingston businessmen that "allegations of US destabilization [were] scurrilous and false.'[43] Rather, according to some, Jamaica's escalating violence and economic decline represented a number of factors, including the opposition of multinational bauxite companies in Jamaica to the production levy imposed by the PNP government in 1974; the corresponding economic pressures which the United States in turn placed on the Jamaican government for the imposition of such a levy; and Edward Seaga's desire to propel his JLP to power by attacking the socialist economic and "politically debilitating" vision of the PNP, a view that eventually brought both parties into armed conflict in 1976 and the resultant declaration of a state of emergency.[44]

In light of Jamaica's declining social and political situation since the early 1970s, Mr. Hennings's non-elitist, working class Caymanian position that most Jamaicans are still good people despite his implication of Jamaica's perceived current lawless trajectory marks a definite, *justificatory* socio-ideological shift in traditionalist Caymanian understandings of Jamaica and Jamaicanness, a shift benignly countenanced by Tenson Scott, a non-elitist who lived in Jamaica in the 1950s:

> From what I knew of Jamaica…it was wonderful; really good to be in Jamaica…back in those days…knowing what has happened with their politics…The trouble is with…their politics, the way their people is doing the island. I had found it to be a wonderful place up [t]here, you could get such nice things. We were treated fairly and very good[:] [for instance,] [m]y brother would leave home for hours in the daytime…[and we didn't think] he was dead or nothing…[It would a] different thing [now] if he was missing for so much hours in Jamaica [sic].[45]

Important to note is that there is likely some sort of causality between Mr. Scott's social status as a working class Caymanian and his implication that the starting point of Jamaica's woes began upon that country's political decline. Unlike the Caymanian elites who never entertained the idea of becoming a dependency of Jamaica, Mr. Hennings and Mr. Scott's pronouncements should be contextualized not only in the statistical reality in which much of the Caymanian masses were convinced by these elites in late 1962 that it was not wise for Cayman to become a dependency of Jamaica, but also in accordance with that commencement point at which Jamaican politics were to succumb to unprecedented bipartisan violence. In this instance, the reappropriated expressions of these men are the enlightened byproducts of an earlier anti-Jamaican elitist position. Yet because residually positive traditionalist sentiments of Jamaicans can be detected in these expressions, we may say that the basis of their enlightenment rests not entirely on elitist rhetoric, although there is a definite link between both lines of thought given their converging, univocal conclusion, but more so on the very reality of Jamaica's decline, a reality that both Mr. Hennings and Mr. Scott all but imply when accounting for the starting point of Jamaica's accumulating woes; in this sense, enlightened Caymanians who had previously regarded Jamaica and Jamaicans in intensely positive terms tend to be of the working class variety, Caymanians who were first influenced by elite positions, and thereafter by the very reality that these positions had earlier anticipated. Mr. Scott and Mr. Hennings, among other working class Caymanians, have nonetheless contributed to a Caymanian xenophobia specifically expressed towards

Jamaicans. Where xenophobia can be conceptually understood as an intense indigenous dislike or fear for certain foreign nationals and their incoming, perhaps inundating way of life, reappropriated traditionalist Caymanian understandings of Jamaica and Jamaicans, as I attempt to show in the following paragraphs, possess a latent xenophobic component.[46]

In traditionalist terms especially, Caymanian ideas of belonging are necessarily undergirded by participation and emotion: participation in a way of life with its own customs, traditions, and behaviors is ultimately indebted to the accompanying emotions that come with feelings of national belonging.[47] Other older Caymanian respondents used elsewhere, such as Adinah Whittaker – "Miss Tooksie" – and Deal Ebanks, have revealed the emotional timbre of historical situations and circumstances. For instance, for Miss Tooksie the normal act of walking and/or running to school as a child in any kind of weather represented a legitimate social, mundane reality of historical Caymanian society, a reality that, in its very simplicity, corroborates ideas of a traditional-historical Caymanian way of life. Similarly, Mr. Ebanks's recollection of the importance of blowing the conch horn as a way to signal the return of fishermen after a long day's work evokes a historical act of Caymanian seafaring culture. In emotive terms, such mundane acts, as outlined above, constitute historically-bound customs and behaviors, and any emotional attachment to them is directly related to their traditional, *legitimate* Caymanian worth. Thus, traditionalist ideas that exude emotions of national and cultural belonging ultimately speak to the Caymanian ancestor's participation in, and contribution to, the shaping of a way of life.[48]

As simple and mundane as many of the recollections and mediations about the past appear on the surface, they are in the process of social construction where they determine a reality based on perceived ideas and understandings about truth.[49] Whether it is Miss Tooksie's account of aspects of her childhood growing up in Cayman, Mr. Hennings's shifting understanding of Jamaica or Jamaicans in relation to the *preferred* Caymanian way, or Mr. Foster's potential xenophobic understandings of Jamaicans, these relays count for them as truth. Trenton Merricks asserts that '[w]hen a statement is true, there is, *of course*, a state of affairs which makes it true.'[50] If a statement is to be *perceived* to be true, then, equally, it must be guided by an actual state of affairs, itself bound by perception. I agree with Peter van Inwagen that the act of being – or existing – is an activity whose meaning accrues in the cognitive realms, which in turn selectively develops ideas of truth from lies.[51] Any such selectivity in our context therefore speaks to an emotional investment in a national and cultural way of life.

Thus the same emotional investment that drives subjective feelings of national belonging also, in large part, forms the basis for shifting Caymanian ideas of Jamaica and Jamaicanness; put more holistically, reshaped Caymanian understandings of Jamaicans depend as much on historically-bound emotions as emotions that are elicited by current social circumstance. Where historically-bound emotions attempt to capture, detail, and understand the past by relaying veridical recounts of it, nationalist emotions that are shaped by present circumstance, in our context, derive their importance from a more selective information pool in which accumulate ideas and sentiments keen on safeguarding the prosperous present. Yet, despite the clear ideological differences that may appear to underwrite both strains of emotion, historically-bound emotions represent an ideological evolution of present-day nationalist emotions that are also largely determined by Cayman's economic and financial rise, together with the elevated lifestyle of Caymanians. In the context of globalization, any shifting patterns in traditionalist thinking comes as a direct result of the obsessively selective focus on social change; put another way, as Caymanian society was transformed by globalization, traditionalist thought was altered in tandem with this transformation, its altered state keen to juxtapose, to varying degrees of subtlety, a singular indigenous identity with an incoming identity in many ways the former's diametrical opposite, although it is still quite possible for traditionalist thought to remain free of xenophobic intent in the present.[52]

To further contextualize the foregoing, it is true that the traditional culture of Caymanians was never perceived to be at risk in the years leading up to 1962; with a weak economy and political dynamic, foreign nationals were not likely to have wanted to come to Cayman in search of a better life. It was for this reason that widespread Caymanian xenophobic thought was all but nonexistent during the first four decades of the twentieth century. Possessing a decidedly insular and unassuming way of life during this time, working class Caymanians, both at home and abroad, would not have been concerned with "getting the foreigners out", but with their economic survival; as we have seen, only the members of the merchant class and the vestry demonstrated a potentially xenophobic posture, not towards incoming Jamaicans, but towards the possibility of becoming a dependency of independent Jamaica. Yet with the economic miracle of the 1970s, Caymanians were to find themselves surrounded by an unprecedented lavishness of lifestyle, a state of affairs that, by default, ensures the alteration of traditionalist thoughts and ideas once invested in the vaunted appreciation of contentment in the midst of hardship.

As one of the enabling features of this state of affairs underwritten by globalization involves the legitimacy of large numbers of incoming immigrant workers, I have anticipated the properties and functions of Caymanian traditionalism as shaped by the *shaping* present. Reappropriated traditionalist understandings of Jamaicans springs from the fact that Jamaicans at present represent the largest immigrant group in Cayman, and together with their perceived aggressiveness and criminality – based, for my recent respondents, in large part on Jamaica's social and political circumstances – many Caymanians are devoted either to expressing their concern about the preponderance of Jamaicans in their society, or explaining when and why Jamaicans changed for the worst. Although Caymanians like Mr. Scott and Mr. Hennings have striven for political correctness by contrasting the wonderful Jamaica of old with its present, understood to be violent and unstable, their intention is nonetheless compatible with the more potentially xenophobic and one-sided expressions of Nolan Foster and his interviewer. When, for instance, Mr. Foster affirms that too many of "them" would have been able to enter Cayman at will had Cayman decided to remain with Jamaica, his affirmation resonates with Mr. Henning's uncomfortable expression that Jamaica's current plight is directly relatable to the actions of "some" of its people. Similarly, when Mr. Foster's interviewer asserts that there would have been no control had Jamaicans been allowed to freely enter Cayman, her words find easy association with Mr. Scott's own reappropriated thoughts of Jamaica as a currently dangerous place, which in turn is directly relatable to *some* Jamaicans being dangerous and lacking in social control. Not only do such profoundly subtle correlative understandings of Jamaicans in Cayman resonate with many Caymanians, but they can also set the mood for a distinct brand of xenophobia more fiery and unabashed in its vocality. It therefore becomes important to assess the evolution of traditionalist Caymanian thought precisely for the shaping context of its evolution, together with the likelihood that any understandings to be unearthed in assessing traditionalist thought works to imbue anecdote with objectivity.

In the final analysis, rational people who tend to say or implicate how they feel on a given issue usually have a historical precedent in mind. By therefore probing the historical determinants of a present-day Caymanian discourse regarding a specific foreign-national group in Cayman has allowed us not only to answer *why* this discourse came to be, as well as to understand the properties of its evolutionary making, but has also encouraged us to look to the shaping powers of both the immediate past and the present if we are to have any true

appreciation of just *how* and *why* xenophobia especially continues to play out in an intensely multicultural society replete with its various national and cultural factions and allegiances.

Conclusion

Jamaica might have been relatively stable by its independence, but some Caymanians in the present are breathing a sigh of relief that Ormond Panton's countenance of post-independence Jamaican politics did not lead Cayman to ultimately sever ties with Great Britain. The words of my respondents suggest that had Cayman remained with Jamaica, the former would have been in the same social, political, and economic state. Beyond this, the expressions of, for instance, Mr. Foster work to evoke a new reappropriated us/them differentiation of an essentially derogatory nature: the fact that "they" would be allowed to come in to Cayman freely had Cayman remained with Jamaica introduces a vibrant, evolved internalized Caymanian sense of self. For all intents and purposes, this self is not what the Jamaican self has become, that is, economically backward, murderous, and politically corrupt, to employ the crudest terminology; when Mr. Foster exclaims that the Jamaicans have not been able to sort out their problems since independence, he is, in my opinion, implying these very properties of the Jamaican self, while further implying that the Caymanian community, in light of its prosperity and internal political stability, is without such "problems". A differentiation of this nature speaks to more than just issues of social, political, and economic differences between Jamaicans and Caymanians, but illuminates the past-present continuum of this Caymanian sense of judgment. Such a sense is ideologically assured, on one side, by "sacrosanct" Caymanian interpretations of its unassuming yet singular past; and on the other, by the bold, subtle, and/or hesitant responses that, while extensions of traditionalist thought, are also in large part shaped by Caymanians' interactions and experiences with external identities and forces.[53] As a corollary to the foregoing, the respondents used throughout the second half of this article especially have begun to demonstrate, to varying degrees of subtlety, that this evolved Caymanian sense needs a lesser "other" if it is to continue to accumulate essences of legitimacy, superiority, and/or singularity.

Notes

[1]At present, approximately 23,000 foreign nationals are on work permit in Cayman; see the Economics and Statistics Office (ESO), *The Cayman Islands' 2010 Census of Population and Housing Report*, at http://www.eso.ky/UserFiles/File/The%202010%20Cayman%20Islands%20Census%20Report.pdf

[2]For a particularly useful introductory understanding of globalization, see Manfred Steger, *Globalization: A very short introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

[3] CINA, Interview with David Wade Foster, February 24, 2009, p.5.

[4] *Ibid*.

[5] CINA, Interview with Desmond Watler, November 27, 1990 p.4.

[6] CINA, Interview with Amy & Glair Hennings, April 15, 2002, p.35

[7]Christopher A. Williams, 'Perpetuation, imagination, and subjectivity: Investigating the effects of expressed traditionalist Caymanian memories', in The Journal of Memory Studies,

[8]See Williams, Caymanianness, History, Culture, Tradition, and Globalisation: Assessing the Dynamic Interplay Between Modern and Traditional(ist) Thought in the Cayman Islands, University of Warwick, Unpublished PhD thesis, 2010.

[9] Alan Norrie, *Dialectic and Difference: Dialectical Critical Realism and the Grounds of Justice* (Oxford: Routledge, 2010), part 1. For more pioneering ideas on dialectism, see Max Horkheimer *et al., Dialectic of Enlightenment* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002 1st edition); Georg W.F. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, translated by J.B. Baillie (www.digireads.com: Digireads.com Publishing, 2009 reprint).

[10] John Agnew, *The New Shape of Global Power* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2005), p.2.

[11]See footnote 8.

[12]*Ibid*.

[13]Richard Hart, *Labour Rebellion of the 1930s in the British Caribbean Region Colonies* (Kingston: Caribbean Labour Solidarity and the Socialist History Society, 2002), p.4.

[14] See, in its entirety, Trevor Munroe, *The Politics of Constitutional Decolonization: Jamaica, 1944-62* (Kingston: University of the West Indies Press, 1972, 1st edition); Michael Kaufman, *Jamaica under Manley: Dilemmas of Socialism and Democracy* (London: Zed Books, 1985), chapter 3; Anthony Payne, *Politics in Jamaica* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), introduction.

[15] Kaufman, *Politics in Jamaica*, introduction.

[16] Ulf Hannerz, *Caymanian Politics: Structure and Style in a Changing Island Society* (Stockholm: Department of Social Anthropology, University of Stockholm, 1974), p. 125.

[17] Quoted in Craton, *Founded*, p. 307.

[18] Hannerz, *Caymanian Politics*, p.132.

[19] See Dave Martins, *A Special Son: The Biography of Ormond Panton* (Staffordshire: Pansons Ltd., 1994).

[20] *Ibid.*

[21] Hannerz, *Caymanian Politics*, p.133.

[22] Craton, *Founded*, p.307.

[23] See Martins, *A Special Son*, chapters 1 and 2.

[24] Craton, *Founded*, p.321.

[25] *Ibid*., p.314.

[26] Hannerz, *Caymanian Politics*, p.138.

[27] See Brief for British Representatives in the Turks and Caicos and the Cayman Islands, October, 1962, PRO, CO 1031/3387, ff. 7-11.

[28] Craton, *Founded*, p.316.

[29] Interview with Captain Kirkonnell, p.15.

[30] BBC Caribbean, 'Jamaica "murder capital of the world"', http://www.bbc.co.uk/caribbean/news/story/2006/01/060103_murderlist.shtml, January 3, 2006; May 15, 2009.

[31] See Caribbean Net News, 'Jamaica is murder capital of the world', *Caribbean Net News*, http://www.caribbeannetnews.com/2006/01/09/capital.shtml, January 9, 2006; May 15, 2009.

[32] See Anthony Woodburn, 'Jamaica becoming a lawless country', *Jamaica Gleaner*, http://www.jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20020210/focus/focus1.html, February 10, 2002; May 15, 2009.

[33] Trevor Munroe, *Renewing Democracy into the Millennium: The Jamaican Experience in Perspective* (Kingston: University of the West Indies Press, 1999).

[34] See CIA World Factbook: Jamaica, at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/jm.html, 2010; March 22, 2010.

[35] CINA, Interview with Nolan Foster, April 2, 1999, p.7.

[36] *Ibid*., p.8.

[37]Information gathered from

[38] Doren Miller, *Upon the Seas*, 1975.

[39] Interview with Nolan Foster, p.10.

[40] This thought is indebted to Judith Butler's *Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative* (New York: Routledge, 1997).

[41] Interview with Amy and Glair Hennings, p.23.

[42]See, for instance, Michael Kaufman, *Jamaica under Manley: dilemmas of socialism and democracy* (New York, Between the Lines, 1985).

[43] Payne, *Politics in Jamaica*, p.50.

[44] Carl Stone, *The Political Opinion of the Jamaican People, 1976-1981* (Kingston: Blackett Publishers, 1982), chapter 1.

[45] Interview with Tenson Scott, p.7.

[46] For comprehensive understandings of xenophobia, see, for instance, Francis Nyamnjoh, *Insiders and Outsiders: Citizenship and Xenophobia in Contemporary Southern Africa* (London: Zed Books, 2006); Rosana Barbosa, *Immigration and Xenophobia: Portuguese Immigrants in Early 19th Century Rio de Janeiro* (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 2009).

[47] Cf. Ray Taras, *Europe Old and New: Transnationalism, Belonging, Xenophobia* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2009), introduction.

[48]Christopher A. Williams, 'Perpetuation, imagination, and subjectivity: Investigating the effects of expressed traditionalist Caymanian memories', in The Journal of Memory Studies,

[49] Ruth E. Ray, *Beyond Nostalgia: Ageing and Life-Story Writing* (Charlottesville, Virginia: University of Virginia Press, 2000), p.26.

[50] Trenton Merricks, *Truth and Ontology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), chapter 1.

[51] Peter van Inwagen, *Ontology, Identity, and Modality: Essays in Metaphysics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, 1st edition), p.14.

[52] See Williams, 'Caymanianness, History, and Culture, Section

[53] See Anthony Smith, *National Identity* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1993), chapter 4.

Aspects in the construction of Brazil's transcontinental *lusofonia*

Ana Ribeiro

ABSTRACT

Through a marriage between academia (i.e. The Brazilian Institute for Afro-Asian Studies) and the Quadros-Goulart presidencies, Brazil underwent a gradual change in discourse starting in the early 1960's towards the idea that the country, like its African "brethren," had been a victim rather than an extension of its former colonizer Portugal, in a turnaround of Freyrean ideology. This meant a move away from traditional alignments and towards a more autonomous foreign policy involving diversifying partnerships in the South. This paper examines some building blocks of Brazil's anti-colonial current and of the change in Brazil's use of lusofonia (Portuguese language and culture) bonds into a tool to reach Africa – initially hampered, then better able to flourish under later global scenarios.

For decades, a simultaneously romantic and perverse idea of miscegenation and lack of racism in the tropics was used as a geopolitical tool, at one point to argue for Portuguese colonial retention, and at another, or sometimes simultaneously, to defend Brazil's rapprochement with Africa. Most famously through the writings and activism of Brazilian sociologist Gilberto Freyre starting in the 1930's – reinforced and modified by a constellation of other academics and politicians – the picture of a harmonious transcontinental family bred by the Portuguese colonizers along Africa, Asia and Brazil was labeled the "science" of lusotropicalism and progressed to make an indelible mark on the *lusofonia*-related discourse. In Brazil the founding bricks of the political project of *lusofonia*, based on Portuguese language and culture bonds to some extent present and to another constructed for the tropics, can be traced at least as far back as the mid-19th century. Brazil had by then become independent and the divisions between the lusophile and nationalist camps had begun to be defined, with Brazilian elites becoming torn over their Portuguese legacy in a dichotomy that would be perpetuated. [1]

Lusophile Brazilian historian Francisco Adolfo de Varnhagen at that time promoted the idea that the Portuguese had been a civilizing force and that Brazil was a “continuation” of the metropole. This countered the intellectual movement that sought to emphasize the importance of the pre-colonial natives to Brazil's societal formation as opposed to Portuguese influence, as a tool to build Brazilian national identity, according to the Luso-Brazilian history book by Cervo and Magalhães (2000). The idea of aggregating an international “lusophone” bloc – which would change hands between elite camps depending on who was in power in Brazil at the time, and what the main political and economic project was – goes back a bit further, to the Brazilian independence movement and prince Dom Pedro I, heir to the Portuguese throne.[2] He declared the country independent from his father's kingdom in 1822, and although its recognition would take a few years of political tug-of-war and armed battles, it would not require a bloody 14-year independence war like the one Portugal's African and Asian colonies would have to fight a century and a half later (Cervo and Magalhães 2000). The hierarchy had been heavily tilted towards Portugal and Brazil amid their special family relationship and Brazil's centrality to the colonial system, for the extent of the latter's natural resources, economy and political base, unlike the other colonies' marginal extractive position. For a while Rio de Janeiro became the seat of the Portuguese Empire, receiving the royal family as it fled from Napoleon's grip, and being bestowed with the political and social infrastructure that would ironically aid its separation from the metropole (ibid).

Brazil today has climbed higher in the constructed international relations hierarchy. It has replaced the United Kingdom as the world's sixth largest economy (Inman 2012), being internationally portrayed as a “BRIC” country and an “emerging donor.”[3] It is among the countries called upon by international organizations to complement traditional (developed) donors' development aid in Africa amid a perceived shift in wealth away from the former colonial powers and the U.S. towards the East and South (OECD 2011; Reisen 2011). A growing tangent of *lusofonia*-related international action by Brazil is technical cooperation, the brunt of which is given to the former Portuguese colonies, the countries known as the PALOPs (African Countries of Portuguese Official Language, or *Países Africanos de Língua Oficial Portuguesa*).[4] The official rationale behind it – given by Brazilian diplomats I interviewed in Mozambique in 2012 – is that Brazil feels a historical debt to these countries (due to the slave trade and slaves' contribution to Brazilian society) and therefore compelled to help them develop while sharing techniques it has honed as an emerging economic power. The sharing of cultural traits and language by Brazil, a truly majority Portuguese-speaking country, with the former Portuguese colonies has also been part of Brazil's political discourse,

but actually Portuguese proficiency varies widely among these countries, with ethnic languages or creole being spoken by large groups within their populations (PTC 2011; Medeiros 2006; Lewis and Simons 2013). Still, Portuguese is an official language in each of them – Africa's Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and São Tomé and Príncipe, and Asia's East Timor – and they are all members of the political and cultural cooperation Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP), created in 1996.

Brazilian diplomats have contended that since their country still has some of the problems of a developing country and similarities in (tropical) climate and soil, it can relate well to what the recipient countries need, a discourse largely dating back to a rapprochement with Africa in the 1960's. However, at the start of this paper's analysis, which will focus on Africa, the Brazilian rhetoric towards its "lusophone brethren" was considerably different from what it is today. To understand Brazil's present brand of *lusofonia*-related cooperation, it is useful to look at how such rhetoric evolved to prioritize Africa, a statement clearly made under the Lula da Silva presidency. Brazil, on its quest for a bigger piece of the global capitalist and normative pie, has navigated through different historical moments and national priorities shaping its attitude towards the PALOPs and Africa in general.

Lusophilia and colonialism

In 1960, the year when an additional 17 African countries became independent in the massive on-going decolonization process, the Brazilian government threw a big party. The celebratory theme, however, was not the liberation of fellow former colonies across the Atlantic Ocean: Brazil was marking the inauguration of its new capital, Brasília, a feat of modernist architecture and engineering built in a mere three and a half years. At the time Brazil held a close rhetorical allegiance to its former colonizer which, for the next 14 years, would struggle against the global current and admonitions to hang on to its so-called African and Asian "overseas provinces." As it turns out, the synchronous moment of decolonization could not be stopped, and neither could the end of the decades-long Portuguese dictatorship in 1974. After centuries of what Newitt (1995) characterizes as weak civil society opposition to Portuguese colonialism, the colonial wars abroad would eventually spur discontent domestically in Portugal, which would in turn help lead to the overthrow of the regime and freeing of its remaining colonies. Independence from Portugal after five centuries of colonial rule meant the advent of Marxist regimes in the new states, followed by other struggles such as civil wars in Angola and Mozambique and the Indonesian occupation of East Timor.

Although the government of President Juscelino Kubitschek (1956-1960) rejected decolonization in favour of Portugal, other Brazilian politicians, along with anticolonial-minded intellectuals, gathered steam to affect a dramatic change in political discourse within the year (Saraiva 2012; Alberto 2011). In his book *Hotel Trópico*, U.S.-based scholar Jerry Dávila traces the internalization of Freyre's lusotropicalism discourse by Brazilian diplomats and intellectuals and how it framed their actions and interactions in African countries amid Brazil's commercial and political rapprochement project in the 60's and 70's (see Dávila 2010). (My own research trajectory has sometimes intersected with Dávila's[5].) But before the change in administration that would bring in that major discourse revision, in April 1960 it was Kubitschek's shining modernist achievement that had the spotlight, with an inauguration ceremony centered on Brazil-Portugal bonds (and their complexity). On the 50th anniversary of Brasília, Brazilian magazine *Veja* recounted that the cardinal chosen to officiate its inauguration was from Portugal, Manuel Gonçalves Cerejeira. The magazine described a highly symbolic scene as unfolding during the ceremony: “Above the altar stood the iron cross that, 460 years earlier, had blessed the first mass on Brazilian soil, officiated by Friar Henrique de Coimbra, chaplain of the fleet of Pedro Álvares Cabral. Brought from the Sé museum of Braga, Portugal, the old cross was not the only relic incorporated into the solemnity: Minutes later, in the instant of the Consecration, pealed the bell whose chime had supposedly announced in Vila Rica the execution of Tiradentes on another April 21, the one in 1792” (Veja 2000, translation mine). [6] Then lights went on to unveil and bathe Brasília's government quarter, evoking a tearful display from Kubitschek, whose administration presided over the capital's construction as the flagship of Brazil's developmentalist prerogative after World War II.

While the former part of the scene at the ceremony was a tribute to the first Portuguese fleet to arrive in Brazil on April 22, 1500 – its commander-in-chief Cabral being routinely lauded as the “discoverer” of Brazil and Portuguese colonizers in general discursively glorified in Kubitschek's time – the second part offered a reminder that the Portuguese had executed Tiradentes, who would become Brazil's most celebrated martyr, as he strove for Brazilian independence. Brazil seemed to be using the occasion to recognize, through historical memory, deep religious, cultural and political bonds with Portugal but also to send a message of self-determination and nationalism, with Brasília as physical evidence that Brazil had come on its own as a nation, poised for major development and leadership.

Brasília-based scholar José Flávio Sombra Saraiva (2012) describes Kubitschek's government as dedicated to aligning itself with developed countries to secure international

financing for Brazil's ambitious rapid growth plans, which involved tripling the country's productive capacity under the motto “50 years in five.” The scholar analyzes that it had little interest in Africa except for fearing that the country's growth could be hampered by competition from African primary exports entering the European market, under a protectionist scheme of the newly formed European Economic Community. He writes that the logic shaping Brazilian foreign policy then, “almost mistaken for an obsession, sought to enlarge the spaces of Brazil in the Western order, without hurting the special relations with the United States, but seeking a certain margin of autonomy in the interior of dependency by means of the developmentalist project” (Saraiva 2012, 31, translation mine).[7] In the meantime, the Kubitschek administration's support for the Portuguese claim over the colonies was clear, its lusophile rhetoric channeled into political action; this, in Rampinelli's (2006) opinion, represented a big contradiction to Brazil's project of greater autonomy and Latin American regional leadership. But Rampinelli also listed specific political motivations that could explain it, including securing the Portuguese dictatorship's support against communist currents and the electoral support of the large Portuguese community residing in Brazil.

Other, higher ambitions surrounding Brazil-Portugal cooperation during Kubitschek's government manifest themselves through letters, speeches and interviews found in the private archives of Brazilian politician Negrão de Lima, held at Fundação Getúlio Vargas (FGV) in Rio de Janeiro.[8] The documents show a Brazilian rhetoric of seeking to engage in the game of the world powers, expressing a megalomaniac desire to “conquer” together with Portugal on Earth and beyond. Lima had been Minister of Foreign Affairs under Kubitschek in 1958-59, leaving the post to serve as Brazil's ambassador to Portugal under the same president. His ambassadorship managed to survive two changes in administration, until he resigned in 1963 to head the national committee for Kubitschek's (unrealized) reelection (FGV/CPDOC 2013). The two politicians' attitudes regarding Portugal seemed to be in sync, and differed from that of Álvaro Lins, whom Lima replaced as ambassador in Portugal. More critical of the Portuguese stance, Lins had gone so far as to suggest that Brazil support African countries' independence, according to Saraiva (2012). Lins later quit his ambassadorship and cut off relations with Kubitschek over his government's handling of the case of a Portuguese political asylum-seeker Lins had protected, and proceeded to launch a media campaign attacking both the Portuguese and Brazilian governments and their relations (Cervo and Magalhães 2000).

One letter in Lima's archives, from May 1960, features a suggestion by Kubitschek to Portuguese President Américo Tomás that Brazil and Portugal join efforts and resources to create an “Institute of Astronautics, in which the Brazilian and Portuguese generations would

avail themselves in emulating their glorious ancestors in the exploration and conquest of the sidereal spaces... I believe, Mr. President, that in this way... we would make it so that Brazil and Portugal, perfectly up-to-date, would intimately cooperate in the sense of contributing with the faith, the vigor and knowledge of their new generations to the era which interplanetary trips, possibly very soon, will open up for humankind." (Kubitschek 1960, translation mine).[9] Geopolitical aspirations involving an alliance with Portugal were also clear in Lima's eulogy written for his arrival as ambassador there in 1959:

> I arrive in Portugal in a historic moment, when the international conjuncture is characterized by the economic, cultural and political integration of the nations that most identify with each other for their affinities and for whatever exists of essential in their common interests... The precise time has come to reunite our lusiad family. We need to also put ourselves among the conquerors of the future, like our common ancestors were the pioneers in the conquest of the New World, the trail-blazers in the darkness and the ones who unveiled the mystery of the seas. Those of our flock belong to the race of those who are capable of yet another feat, if to this they dedicate themselves with the effort, the tenacity and the genius that they did not lack in dominating the impracticable oceans, discover new spaces for man's physical and spiritual life and create nations of the size and unity of Brazil... I salute the Portuguese motherland. I see it alongside Brazil, marching towards the dawn of this new world that is born and in which we will have to participate to survive with the dignity to which we are entitled. The history, the navigations, the old triumphs and the glorious fights lived impel the Portuguese Nation towards new conquests and towards the full realization of its marvelous destiny. (Lima, 1959, translation mine).[10]

The anti-colonial seed

This lusophile foreign policy carried over from the previous governments of Getúlio Vargas and Café Filho (Cervo and Magalhães 2000). A landmark agreement was the 1953 Treaty of Friendship and Consultation (*Tratado de Amizade e Consulta*), which established that Portugal and Brazil should consult each other on international matters of common interest and that their citizens could freely settle down in and be generally treated as citizens in each other's countries; this, however, excluded the "overseas provinces," as Portuguese politicians would come to refer to the Portuguese colonies, insisting they were not colonies but inseparable parts of the Portuguese nation (Cervo and Magalhães 2000). FGV archival

materials spanning the 1930's to 50's illustrate a strong discursive commitment by the Brazilian ruling elite to strengthening and celebrating relations with Portugal, credited in Brazilian speeches with giving Brazil its civilization and Christian and democratic ideals.[11] The discursive construction of a lusophone community in the world often featured Brazil and Portugal as the agents (the word "Luso-Brazilian" was often used) and the then-colonies as the passive recipients of their influence and decisions, being treated as mere extensions of Portugal and possible containers for the expansion of Brazilian culture and capital.

But this did not go unopposed. Linked to the anti-colonial line of thinking were intellectuals amid the massive black contingent in Brazil, descendants of the several million African slaves trafficked there from the Portuguese colonies until the mid-19th century. Instrumental in building Brazilian society, culture and economy, blacks were nevertheless still treated as second-class citizens (as elsewhere in the Americas) and were demanding greater recognition domestically just as the colonized peoples across the ocean were demanding their independence. Freyre's advancement of the idea of his country as a "racial democracy" predominantly made up of mestizos – while rejecting the then-popular portrayal of darker-skinned people as biologically inferior to whites – would initially fuel blacks' optimism, according to U.S.-based scholar Paulina Alberto (2011). But by denying the existence of racism in Brazilian society, Freyre's work would also propel specific cultural and political manifestations in a "struggle to assert blacks' racial or ethnic difference [that] would lead black thinkers, in one way or another, back to Africa, then in the grip of vast political and cultural transformations," writes Alberto (2011, 198). An important step in addressing racism in Brazilian society was the signing of the Afonso Arinos Law in 1951, which declared it a crime – punishable by imprisonment, fine or loss of position – to deny anyone service, education or employment based on race (Rebouças 2010). The law was written by white Congressman Afonso Arinos, who would go on to condemn colonialism in the 1960's as head of the Brazilian delegation to the United Nations and as Brazil's Minister of Foreign Affairs (FGV/CPDOC 2013). The "racial democracy" card, however, would become an important selling point for Brazil internationally, while social exclusion based on race would remain pervasive, Brazilian politicians being predominantly white to this day.

In the 50's and 60's, as Marxist and Gramscian ideas fueled Africans' postcolonial aspirations, black Brazilians, too, had begun to question the social sciences and call for participation in producing knowledge about race rather than being treated as mere objects or study subjects (Alberto 2011). A landmark of the postcolonial current in Brazil was the foundation, at the University of Bahia in 1959, of the Center for Afro-Oriental Studies

(*Centro de Estudos Afro-Orientais*, CEAO). Alberto writes that “the reference to the 'Afro-Oriental' or 'Afro-Asian' world, common to several of the African studies centers that emerged in Brazil in those years, reflected a sense of global politics that issued from the 1955 Bandung Conference in Indonesia, in which colonized nations affirmed their rights to sovereignty and their nonaligned status... From its inception, the CEAO worked to establish ties with other African studies centers around the world and, as they gradually emerged, in Brazil as well” (Alberto 2011, 229-230). The center was founded by George Agostinho da Silva, a Portuguese political exile living in Brazil and an adviser to politician Jânio Quadros, the latter ascending to the Brazilian presidency in 1961 (Pereira 2008; Alberto 2011). Alberto (2011) contends that, through CEAO's work, Silva sought to influence Brazil's political agenda towards updating Africa-related policies to reflect the global decolonization moment and channel Brazil-Africa cultural ties into building Brazilian leadership to eventually surpass Portugal's importance in Portuguese-colonized Africa.

Quadros would certainly catch on to this idea, while also being influenced by Freyrian ideology, as Silva and many other intellectuals and politicians in Brazil also were at the time (ibid). Another important figure to emerge in the *lusofonia* scenario was historian Sergio Buarque de Holanda: His seminal *Raízes do Brasil* from 1936 proposed that “in the roots of Brazil, that is, in the Portuguese legacy, a 'long tradition' was to be found, very much 'alive until today,' capable of nurturing a 'common soul,' which associated the country in America to the old European metropole, for it was 'from there [that] came the present form of our culture'” (Cervo and Magalhães 2000, 233, translation mine).[12] But it was Freyre's highly seductive lusotropicalism that would perhaps become best known as having carved a lasting spot in both Brazilian and Portuguese political discourses, if not self-perception, being exhaustively discussed, refuted and praised over the decades both at home and abroad (Dávila 2010b; Freyre 1933; Glasgow 1972; Saraiva and Gala 2002; Oliveira 2011; Castelo 1998).

The political manipulation of the tropics

Freyre's philosophy was that a harmoniously united lusophone transcontinental community had been built by religious and cultural transfers and widespread miscegenation via sex between the Portuguese male colonizers – described as better able to adapt to the tropics than any other colonizers – and the darker-skinned female colonized, as well as other intimate social interactions between them and later the masters and the slaves. This lusotropical

ideology would take on a life of its own, coming to serve different political purposes over the decades (and even, ironically, the anti-colonial discourse to a certain extent). His ideas have been conveniently malleable, open for interpretation and manipulation by different groups: Freyre has been accused of helping keep racism off the political agenda in Portugal and Brazil by denying its existence in the Portuguese-colonized tropics and being against black empowerment movements (Dávila 2010b; Marques 2007); on the same token, as previously mentioned, black empowerment movements in Brazil had availed themselves of lusotropicalism as a way to provoke social debates on the race taboo (Alberto 2011) Also,UNESCO was using Freyre's image of Brazil as an example of racial harmony and tolerance to be followed in the aftermath of the Holocaust (Amaral Jr. 2002). [13]

At the international relations level, from Dávila's point of view in a journal article, Freyre's work was instrumental in building Brazil's self-esteem and the idea that it had a "special destiny" regarding leadership in Africa: "His philosophy opened up the possibilities for visualizing a greater presence of Brazil in the world, as an essential counterpoint to the racism predominating in other societies (especially the United States). This idea projected Brazilian culture as an alternative to the ideologies in conflict in the Cold War and led Brazilians to believe that their country had a special destiny regarding the recently liberated African countries" (Dávila 2010b, 169, translation mine). [14] At the core of this "special destiny" is the concept of "bestowing" economic development upon other countries – as development became one of the pillars of Brazil's national defense, sovereignty and power-building strategy (Morton 1981). (This was exemplified by Kubitschek's highly ambitious growth enterprise.) Freyre himself had lobbied for greater Brazilian (regional) leadership but also ardently defended colonial retention by Portugal's authoritarian António Salazar regime, in the process serving diplomatic functions surrounding Brazil-Portugal relations. After an initial period of hesitation, the Portuguese regime adopted Freyre's rhetoric so profoundly for its colonial retention purposes – although lusotropicalism valued the mestizo, contrary to the Portuguese rulers' creed – that it changed its colonial decrees to reflect it, according to Portuguese scholar Cláudia Castelo (see Castelo 1998). As a widely reported symbolic gesture, at Salazar's request in 1952 Freyre gave Brazil's then-President Vargas a rare (colonial) silver and gem-studded edition of the classic *Os Lusíadas*, a 1572 epic poem chronicling Portuguese maritime conquests in Africa and Asia – upon returning himself from a Portugal-sponsored tour of its then-colonies (Dávila 2010b; Amaral Jr. 2002; Camões at al 1992).

As the tide turned inexorably against Portugese colonialism, Freyre used his persona andwritten work, such as 1933’s *Casa Grande e Senzala* and 1961’s *O Luso e o Trópico*,– to defend the image of a fraternal, non-racist transcontinental community of mestizo Portuguese-speakers, and thus the colonial status quo (see Freyre 1933, Freyre 1961, Castelo 1998). His lusotropicalism would become a running thread in Brazil's official political discourse, even while being modified to fit shifting objectives and priorities. It would also prove useful, in a critical moment, to the Portuguese cause at the UN:

> To each criticism by the United Nations, the Portuguese diplomats responded that Portugal was an indivisible nation constituted by the metropolitan provinces and the overseas provinces and that neither discrimination nor racial segregation existed in any of these provinces. Lusotropicalism thus began to make part of the political and diplomatic argumentation by providing it an added value of so-called 'scientific' legitimacy. Gilberto Freyre's international popularity and the image, widely diffused in the 1940's-50s, of Brazil as the most perfect example of a 'racial democracy' played an important role in this appropriation of lusotropicalism. The Brazilian situation, owing to the particularity of Portuguese colonization, should therefore constitute an example to be followed in Africa (Marques 2007, 81-82, translation mine). [15]

Brazilian diplomats at the time also joined in to defend Portuguese colonialism, along similar lusotropical-inspired lines. In July 1955, just months after India and other newly independent countries met in the Bandung Conference, India requested that the Portuguese government – which insisted on territorial claims in the country – withdraw its diplomatic mission from New Delhi. Portugal immediately asked Brazil to take over the representation of Portuguese interests in India, which the Brazilian government agreed to, besides clearly siding with Portugal in the UN (Cervo and Magalhães 2000). In response to a proposition in 1957 by an Iraqi representative that Portugal provide information on its colonies, the Brazilian representative Donatello Grieco firmly and effusively defended Portugal (Cervo and Magalhães 2000). Rampinelli writes that Grieco's affirmation that “touching Portugal was [the same as] touching Brazil,” as well as his proclamation of Portugal's “civilizing mission overseas” prompted the Indian delegate, R. Jaipal, to state that he had never heard such a faithful exposition of the Portuguese point-of-view as Grieco's (Rampinelli 2006, 83). Brazil maintained this position, reflected also in much of its voting pattern in the UN, until the end of Kubitschek's presidency, trying to exclude the Portuguese claim from Brazil's own recognition of the principle of self-determination promoted at Bandung and at the UN (Cervo and Magalhães 2000; Dávila 2010).

But an important shift in rhetoric would soon take place in the next change of administration, starting with the election of Quadros in 1960. The following year, chief Brazilian delegate Afonso Arinos would give a very different speech at the UN General Assembly, including both France and Portugal and two major colonial claims in his arguments (also reproduced in Cervo and Magalhães 2000):

> Our fraternal relations with Portugal and our traditional friendship with France do not impede us from taking a clear position on the painful divergences pertaining to African colonialism that have been presenting themselves between the United Nations and those countries, to which we owe so much and with which we still have so much in common. The two European states ought to, in our understanding, ensure the self-determination of Algeria and Angola. Nothing will detain the liberation of Africa. It seems clear that Africa does not desire submission to either of the blocs. It desires to affirm its personality, which is the same as conquering its liberty. Brazil will always help out the African countries in this just effort (Corrêa 2012, 204, translation mine).[16]

The last sentence would not prove true, as Brazilian representatives' subsequent waffling on actual voting at the UN on colonial issues – supporting some resolutions while rejecting or abstaining on others – would soon reveal (Aragon 2010). Perceived support for Portuguese colonialism by Brazil would cause considerable resentment among some African leaders towards the country's government, as Dávila (2010) has written. Still, with Quadros and his successor João Goulart, the counter-current in Brazil had managed to reach the presidency and turn lusotropicalism and other established philosophies around to fit an anti-colonial rhetoric that would progress into actively seeking out new African markets. In Alberto's words, Quadros's election embodied the aspirations of the "small, dissenting group of Brazilian diplomats [who] in the late 1950s began to argue that the emergent independence movements of the Afro-Asian world provided an opportunity for Brazil to break out of its subordinate position in the Cold War order. If Brazil could position itself as a mediator between the colonial and colonized, First and Third World nations, it might secure for itself a more prominent profile in international affairs. Africa in particular, they believed, could provide Brazil with important commercial and diplomatic opportunities" (Alberto 2011, 237).

Scholar Daniel Aragon analyzes that "for Goulart and Quadros, Brazil's interests in Africa were distinctive from other Westerners because Brazil had never been a colonial power in Africa. Hence, Brazilians were not colonists or racists. Furthermore, Brazilians diverged from the eastern bloc nations because they were not communists or totalitarian. They differed from other Western nations because their nation was a developing state, not an industrial

powerhouse. Thus, Brazil represented the best common aims with Africans since the new presidents deemphasized Cold War and colonial dominance" (Aragon 2010, 122). But besides a rapprochement with Africa, the presidents sought to "extend ties" with all those countries Brazil supposedly differed from, pledging "an innovative overhaul of foreign relations that would... move away from sixty-years of foreign policy centered around a strong alliance with the United States" (ibid). This major discursive change would never be completely reversed – even with Brazil's subsequent turn to a right-wing dictatorship that would last two decades – but also would not be fully embraced until long after the Cold War. It represented a trend known as Brazil's "independent foreign policy" (see Dantas 2009).

The transition begins

As he became head of Quadros's Technical Assistance Office in 1961, prominent Brazilian political activist and academic Cândido Mendes recalls seeing in the new president's office portraits of the first prime minister of independent India, Jawaharlal Nehru, and of the first president of independent Indonesia, Sukarno. To Mendes, the portraits Quadros chose to display illustrated what the scholar referred to, during an interview he gave me in March 2013, as "an absolutely emergent and foundational vision with which [Quadros] thought up [Brazil's] independent foreign policy" Mendes said Quadros was preoccupied, above all, with establishing closer political relations with Africa, which prompted Mendes to come up with the idea of founding the Brazilian Institute of Afro-Asian Studies (*Instituto Brasileiro de Estudos Afro-Asiáticos*, IBEAA).[17] "I thought it up as a way to obtain this other alternative for the country's international vision, departing from two principles: One, that Brazil had a vision considerably different inside Latin America and above all was the only country that massively had an African influence in its formation. This didn't exist in the rest of the continent and this transatlantic protagonism could be done in that moment," said Mendes.[18]

Alberto interprets IBEAA's creation as a response to an attempt by Brazil's Ministry of External Relations (known as Itamaraty) to catch up on gathering Africa-related knowledge "after a century of silence about the continent in foreign policy circles" (Alberto 2011, 239), with its members going on to write the first Brazilian books on Brazil-Africa relations. The new IBEAA sought out intellectuals from the previously mentioned Center for Afro-Oriental Studies in Bahia, whose academic work and contacts, according to Alberto (2011), surpassed that of Itamaraty's; the two institutes then partnered up to bring African students to attend university in Brazil, under a scholarship scheme that included a mandatory Portuguese

language program. Mendes said IBEAA managed to bring about 30 students from Angola and Mozambique before the military coup that turned Brazil into a dictatorship in 1964. Many of these students returned to Angola to occupy important government positions, he added. Mendes said he himself traveled to Africa and met with Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah, while Quadros and Goulart sent intellectuals to head Brazil's first embassies in Africa. Dávila (2010) shows that the efforts of the Brazilian diplomatic corps were often haphazard and took place under precarious infrastructure provided by their government. However, Dávila's book also shows how those diplomats displayed notable resilience and courage at times, especially in remaining in conflict-ridden areas such as newly independent Angola. They were met by mixed reactions from African leaders, but an unprecedented line had begun to be established between Brazil and Africa that would evolve into growing trade and development projects.

As Quadros, the governor of the state of São Paulo, assumed the Brazilian presidency in 1961, the government revised its position towards the Portuguese colonial conundrum, while failing to firmly condemn apartheid in South Africa, Brazil's biggest economic partner in Africa at the time (Cervo and Magalhães 2000; Saraiva 2012; Aragon 2010). According to Magalhães, part of his attitude towards Portuguese colonialism was related to the links Quadros had with the Brazil coffee-growing lobby in São Paulo and the fact that Portugal had refused Brazilian coffee-growers' request to enter into association with Angolan coffee-growers amid growing competition from Africa(see Cervo and Magalhães 2000). The idea, according to Saraiva (2012), was for Brazil to be able to negotiate directly with African governments (which would be facilitated by their liberation). Alberto offers a synthesis of Brazil's economic scenario, and attached international motivations, over the previous five years: that

> Pragmatically, Quadros and Goulart's search for new markets responded both to the significant growth in Brazilian industry in the second half of the 1950s under President Kubitschek and to the enormous foreign debt, inflation, and economic crisis that resulted from his ambitious modernization policies. Overtures toward the emerging nations of Africa, the Quadros and Goulart administrations hoped, might result in the sort of South Atlantic influence that could earn Brazil greater economic stability without excessive reliance on the International Monetary Fund and other financial institutions dominated by Europe and the United States (Alberto 2011, 237-238).

Brazil under Quadros began distancing itself from its traditional steadfast alignment with Portugal in favor of a policy of alignment with the countries fighting for independence – but without ever completely shunning Portugal in terms of diplomacy. Brazil's revised rhetoric

carried an undertone of superiority and geopolitics: Brazil had reached a level of development that had put it into a position to help other (underdeveloped) countries develop, and it should use its altruism and status as a “racial democracy,” as promoted by lusotropicalism, to help lead the world on a similar ideological path. This idea, minus the “racial democracy” emphasis, still now frames the Brazilian discourse on providing technical cooperation, an activity that would grow exponentially during Lula's administration four decades later, as the post-Cold War political climate opened up to the influence and development aid of those deemed emerging powers.

In his tenure as president, Quadros had come to use in his addresses a Freyre-inspired rhetoric of warmth and lack of prejudice by Brazilians towards their other “lusophone brethren” (Glasgow 1972; Aragon 2010). But unlike the use of lusotropicalism in the past, the revised version excluded a partnership with Portugal. In his message to Congress in March 1961, Quadros painted Brazil as a Western Christian democracy whose foreign policy should reflect its racial tolerance, benevolence, and capacity and willingness to help the world fight against social injustice, conflicts, poverty and underdevelopment. He further stated that “we want to help create, in the southern hemisphere, a climate of perfect understanding and comprehension on all levels: political and cultural, a veritable spiritual identity… A prosperous, stable Africa is an essential condition for Brazil’s security and development… They and we have the experience of battle in similar ecological environments, which can facilitate the useful exchange of techniques and experiences” (Franco 2007, 55-56, translation mine).[19] Efforts connected to Brazil's new and expanded African policy included creating the Africa Division at Brazil's Ministry of External Relations; opening Brazilian embassies around Sub-Saharan Africa and Brazilian consulates in pre-independence Angola and Mozambique: sending a floating exhibit of Brazilian products aboard the *Custódio de Melo* ship over to various African ports; and sending delegates to the Non-Aligned Movement Summit held in 1961 (Cervo and Magalhães 2000; Aragon 2010).

Despite these actions and grandiose stated goals, Aragon (2010) contends that Quadros and Goulart's strategies towards Africa lacked coherence; Brazilian diplomats were “ambivalent” over implementing them, limited by Portugal's repressive presence, South African apartheid constraints and their own lack of knowledge about the harsh African colonial reality (blinded by the lusotropical equality myth) and of a contact network for relevant African political figures. Using as a platform for rapprochement the argument that Brazil shared economic problems and geographic and cultural traits with Africa, the two Brazilian presidents were overstating similarities with the big, diverse continent, Aragon adds. (This scenario remains

today in the Brazilian discourse, in stating similarities to justify the implementation of for instance domestic agricultural models in African countries.)[20]

A postcolonial approach

Simultaneously, on Brazil's domestic front, the aforementioned IBEAA institute worked to spread postcolonial awareness while promoting Brazilian global leadership. A somewhat paradoxical rhetoric of both commonalities with and superiority to Africa was being produced. Alberto writes that IBEAA director Eduardo Portella "drew on a range of more- or less-clearly expressed similarities with Africa—including a shared past, a shared geopolitical and economic situation, and especially shared racial and cultural traits—to make claims for Brazil's inherent suitability to guide Africa into world trade and politics" (Alberto 2011, 238). One of the central premises being advanced was that Brazil, like the African colonies, had been a victim more than a beneficiary of Portuguese colonialism and thus shared a bond with them – and it seems Brazilian leaders were, for the first time, officially recognizing Portuguese colonialism as something (at least partially) *negative.*

Lectures in the government-founded institute condemned colonialism on strong terms, while Brazilian diplomatic rhetoric tended to be softer when dealing directly with Portuguese politicians, in an apparent balancing act between Brazil's long-term relationship with the "metropole" and nascent interests towards the "periphery." Similarly to author Alberto, Saraiva analyzes that "the birth of the African policy of Brazil" happened with strategic, pragmatic calculations in mind that involved a quest by Brazil to diversify its trade relations to include also socialist countries from Europe and Asia, but without cutting ties with the United States and aiming to "guarantee capitalist expansion coordinated by the state" (Saraiva 2012, 35-36). This view is compatible with ideas the IBEAA advocated for, as shown by a lecture it organized on March 3, 1962. The lecture, entitled *The Economy of Colonialism and of Independence*, was part of the course Introduction to African Reality, and given by academic and government official Jesus Soares Pereira (1962). The text of the lecture, found in Pereira's private archives at FGV, is strikingly different from the romantic rhetoric on colonial conquests that had pervaded Brazil-Portugal political interactions.

Pereira's text referred to the manner Western colonial powers acted as "monstrous" ("*monstruosa*"), with natives being "annihilated" ("*aniquilados*") and blacks brought from Africa as "machines of slave labor" ("*máquinas de trabalho escravo*"), eventually "decimated" ("*dizimadas*") and "replaced in successive batches until the mid-19th century;" it

condemned Portugal specifically ("the most backward colonial camp") and also among others, acknowledging a common plight among the world's colonized: "The fulminating military domination of India in damage to Arabian trade, by the Portuguese, and the gradual and painful occupation of America by the Spanish, Portuguese, English, French and Flemish, as well as disputes over areas of domination, by these peoples, outside of Europe, developed in the shadow of the diffusion of Christianity, in the lustful politico-economic-religious symbiosis [mentioned in an earlier lecture]... The chronicle of the annihilation of the indigenous populations, in America especially, and the submission of the colonized peoples, since the 17th century until today, constitutes, in fact, one of the most somber pages of the history of humankind" (Pereira 1962, 3, translation mine).[21] Further, in an apparent allusion to development aid provided by the Western powers and a clear nod to Marxism and dependency theories, the lecturer explained that "to maintain the increasingly lucrative domination in these areas, normally inhabited by people that find themselves in a retarded sociocultural state, if measured by Western standards, colonialism becomes compelled to provide some instruction destined to improve the technical level of the indigenous manpower and to form black elites interested in the process of spoliation of the submissive masses, similar to those it utilized for this end in the colonies of commercial-industrial exploration and which are very well-known, here in Brazil, as well" (Pereira 1962, 21-22, translation mine).[22] Pereira contended that African freedom-fighters resisting this scenario could not count on the UN but could find an alternative to Western dominance in trying to build a national economy geared towards human development (namely the eradication of poverty, ignorance and curable diseases).

Such an alternative would be cooperation with the rest of the "Third World," where the newly independent countries could seek out "dynamic centers of economic development" that had already established themselves and could represent a platform for many of their plans (Pereira 1962, 28-29). The related concept of "South-South" cooperation would gain momentum over the coming decades and shape the development aid of Brazil and other emerging powers, which underscored the idea of economic development as a route to greater autonomy, as in Pereira's view. Instead of looking to the United States as a model, Pereira suggested "underdeveloped" countries mirror themselves upon socialist states. According to Pereira's text, Brazil had the potential to play a leading role in rapidly defeating economic backwardness in the "Third World," and even a historical duty to do so. But it would have to overcome its own backwardness and dependency on the "Western vanguard" by rerouting much of its trade towards the socialist states and the "underdeveloped" countries of America,

Asia and Africa, while still focusing on accelerated wealth accumulation (Pereira 1962, 29-30). Under Quadros, efforts to build relations with socialist leaders included re-establishing diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union, receiving the visit of Fidel Castro, and decorating Ernesto "Che" Guevara and Soviet cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin with the Order of the Southern Cross, the highest honor given by the Brazilian government to foreigners (Cancian 2011).

The rough-landing

Quadros would resign within less than a year in August 1961, under murky reasons open to speculation, although it is reported that the "independent foreign policy" he adopted had begun to bother the United States and the conservative domestic elites (Cancian 2011). But his vice-president Goulart, whose presidency the Brazilian military and elites would never fully accept, would not abandon the "independent foreign policy" upon assuming the presidential post (Cancian 2011; Cervo and Magalhães 2000). The new balancing act by Brazilian politicians involved continuing to acknowledge deep ties with Portugal and even to praise its cultural influence in Brazil and Africa, while trying to urge its former colonizer to stop fighting against the internationally supported decolonization current. In other words, although colonialism had offered some contributions to the countries' societies, it was unsustainable in the present world order.

Correspondence between the presidents of Portugal and Brazil in 1963, found in Lima's private archives, clearly illustrates this position. One of the great values of Lima's archives is that they offer a snapshot of Brazil's transition away from s staunch rhetorical alignment with Portugal and its colonial claims towards a pro-Africa discourse. After all, Lima was the only one of Kubitschek's close friends allowed to stay in charge of a Brazilian embassy after his presidency (FGV/CPDOC 2013). While his earlier archives (i.e. Lima 1959; Lima 1959b) feature effusive displays of affection and loyalty towards Portugal, later ones (i.e. Lima 1961) feature statements by Brazilian politicians in line with the country's new "independent foreign policy." Lima himself had to cope with this as ambassador of Brazil to Portugal while fielding expressions of outrage from members of the Portuguese society via letters and newspaper articles (also exemplified in the archives).

Portuguese President Tomás (who served under Prime Minister Salazar and later Marcello Caetano), had written pleading with Brazil to defend Portugal in the UN Security Council, He contended that the Portuguese government's position was compatible with the UN Charter and human rights in that it was "inspired by, above any material value, the sacred duty that

belongs to the Portuguese Nation of looking after the dignity, progress and well-being of the populations which under its flag have lived for many centuries... Portuguese action in the African territories puts [the Portuguese] on the vanguard of progress in that continent, at the same time as human societies conscious of their responsibilities are establishing themselves there, without prejudice against race, color or religion" (Lima 1961, translation mine).[23] Goulart's response effectively declines Portugal's plea, arguing that Brazil had to reflect the thoughts of those that elected it to the UN Security Council and also "by force of the principles which it defends, Brazil cannot remain oblivious to the aspirations of Angola, Mozambique and other Portuguese territories to self-determination and independence, as faculty of choice" (Lima 1961,translation mine).[24] This letter, dated August 7, 1963, offers a good summary of the position Brazilian diplomats were trying to pursue at that moment:

> In a certain sense, no divergence exists between the position of Portugal and that of Brazil. What apparently separates us is the question of knowing which will be the best manner to permit that the spiritual and cultural presence of Portugal continue to be felt in African lands. [ ] Indeed by the force of the generosity which they have inherited from Portugal, the Brazilian people have accompanied with interest and sympathy the emergence of new nations in the African continent. We recognize as one of the historical realities of our days the profound transformation that operated there amid ample application of the principle of people's self-determination. [ ] This is, in our understanding, an irresistible and infectious movement, to which no African populations that still do not have their own governments will be able to remain immune. We know how much Portugal has done for its overseas territories: We agree in that they can be pointed out as examples of orderly and enlightened progress in many sectors. We do not believe, however, that it is possible to maintain unchanged, in the current conjuncture, the present system of political relations. [ ] We think, therefore, that it is no longer possible to deny the peoples of the overseas territories the right to govern themselves. Associated with Portugal, if they wanted it thus, independent even, if they preferred that, such peoples would not be adverse to a continuing cooperation with the old metropole. The human, cultural, linguistic, economic values of Portugal would thus certainly be preserved: The new nations would value, like Brazil, their Portuguese legacy." (*ibid*, translation mine).[25]

Less than a year later, on March 31, 1964, Goulart was removed from office through a military coup supported by some segments of the Brazilian society as well as by the United States government, which feared a communist threat in South America's biggest country. This

took place as a major economic crisis persisted in Brazil (with inflation at more than 100 percent) and as Brazilians found themselves deeply divided in their opinion of Goulart's proposed policies, writes Alberto (2011). Controversial policies included the nationalization of land and oil refineries, universal suffrage (to allow the illiterate to vote) and concessions to labor unions and leftist groups' demands (ibid). In Aragon's view, both Quadros and Goulart failed at communicating "their outreach to Africa," thus failing at getting sufficient support from either the domestic right or the left: "Conservatives thought the presidents' diplomatic readjustment too radical and impractical since Africa offered little clout in international forums and it held the potential to antagonize Europeans and Americans; leftists believed Quadros and Goulart were not pursuing nonaligned policies such as decolonization consistently enough" (Aragon 2010, 122).

Alberto (2011) writes that Brazil's black intellectuals saw the progress they had made in the public dialogue on race halted by military governments that insisted on using the Freyre-inspired "racial democracy" idea. Combined with the threat of the use of force, the new regime to quash anti-racism demonstrations while promoting selective aspects of black folklore to paint a false picture of racial harmony in society. Mendes managed to save the postcolonial-inspired IBEAA institute,moving it to his family's university (*Universidade Cândido Mendes*), where it was renamed Center for Afro-Asian Studies (*Centro de Estudos Afro*-Asiáticos, CEAA) in 1973. It has since become one of Brazil's major academic research institutes (CEAA 2013). Mendes became a major critic of Brazil's authoritarian regime and civil rights activist, working to divulge internationally the military's actions against political dissenters, and remains rector at *Universidade Cândido Mendes* (FGV/CPDOC 2013).

In terms of foreign policy, the Brazilian military regime initially reverted back to supporting Portuguese colonial claims, and moved away from a non-alignment discourse towards a closer alignment with the Western capitalist bloc. Such measures included Brazil's interruption of diplomatic relations with Cuba and deployment of anti-communist troops to the Dominican Republic, as pointed out by Brazilian diplomat Patrícia Soares Leite (see Leite 2011). This rapprochement with Portugal is clearly illustrated by the 1966 FGV archives of Brazil's then-Minister of Foreign Affairs Juracy Magalhães – a powerful political figure who had served as president of Brazilian companies Vale and Petrobrás (FGV/CPDOC 2013). These private archives show speeches and interviews by Magalhães in which he exalts Portugal's name and attributes to it a "civilizing" mission, laments Portugal's "loss" of Goa and Daman, invokes Freyre's lusotropicalism, pledges loyalty to Portugal's objectives, celebrates the removal of barriers to harmonious understanding between Brazil and Portugal,

and promotes the strengthening of a "Luso-Brazilian Community" through pragmatic measures (see Magalhães 1966a). It was during Magalhães's official visit to Portugal in September 1966 that Brazil and Portugal signed accords promising to completely open their markets to each other's companies and treat them like national companies, as well as to fully recognize diplomas conferred to professionals by their respective institutions (Cervo and Magalhães 2000).

Brazil's first military government following the coup –that of Humberto Castelo Branco (1964-1967) – saw the concept of development as "conditioned to the guarantee of security. It was believed that the independent foreign policy [under Quadros-Goulart] had shaken up internal order, bringing the country closer to communism, besides having distanced Brazil from the USA, our main political, economic and military partner," (Leite 2011, 122, translation mine).[26] Still, this did not prevent Castelo Branco from publicly stating that perhaps the solution to the colonial quandary lay in gradually creating an "Afro-Luso-Brazilian Community" with Brazil's presence as its economic pillar (Cervo and Magalhães 2000). This idea had already been suggested during the Goulart government in March 1962 by then-Minister of Foreign Affairs San Tiago Dantas. Despite his government's attempts at an anti-colonial stance and his development of Brazil's "independent foreign policy," Dantas told Portugal's then-Minister of Foreign Trade that perhaps sovereignty could be avoided if the African peoples were consulted as to whether they wanted to be a part of the "Luso-Brazilian Community" and its decision-making process (Cervo and Magalhães 2000).

The return to Africa

Efforts towards a "lusophone" community of sorts – although clearly based on propelling the economic and geopolitical interests of Portugal and Brazil in the colonies, which remained excluded from the benefits and decisions – were discussed by scholar Glasgow in 1972. He analyzed that "essentially, both [Brazil's] military and the previous constitutional government envisioned Great Power status in foreign affairs. [But] while the nationalists had chosen to side with the struggle against racism and colonialism… the new policy was dominated by a fear of communist subversion in Africa, dependence on the United States, and the desire to develop and reinforce close cultural and commercial ties with Portugal and South Africa. [Portuguese leaders even talked about] a military alliance between Brazil, Portugal, and South Africa for the defense of the South Atlantic" (Glasgow 1972, 4-5). This did not materialize, and neither did a project Glasgow mentioned regarding the division of

industrial production among Brazil, Portugal, Mozambique and Angola, in a transoceanic complex where certain facilities would be located in each country and trade barriers would be brought down. He also wrote about how Portugal encouraged Brazilian political and economic involvement in Africa as a partner to try to boost its chances of hanging on to the colonies, allowing Brazilian citizens to purchase real estate in Mozambique and Angola and hold public office in either country. Brazil and Portugal opened bank branches and supermarkets in each other's countries and discussed joint oil exploration possibilities. Meanwhile, Brazilian "trade missions" scouted for new markets in the colonies while banks offered medium to long-term loans to finance Brazilian exports to them (Glasgow 1972).

During the military government of Emílio Garrastazu Médici (1969-1974), Brazil's official position towards decolonization would shift back away from Portugal as Brazil began to assume the identity of an emerging power hungry for partnerships beyond the Western powers, whose Bretton Woods financial system was ailing. Thus, Brazil turned to supporting African countries' self-determination and anti-apartheid efforts and to intensifying diplomatic visits, trade and technical cooperation agreements in the continent (see Leite 2011). But by then, Caetano's government in Portugal and its entire colonial system was collapsing anyway.

Brazil's new political shift reportedly began in earnest as Mario Gibson Barbosa, who had worked directly under Arinos when the latter was Quadros's Minister of Foreign Affairs, assumed the head position at Itamaraty himself at the beginning of the Médici presidency (Cervo and Magalhães 2000; Dávila 2010). Calvet de Magalhães writes that Barbosa also held strong anti-colonial convictions; however, as usual in Brazilian diplomacy, he felt the need to play a balancing act so as to preserve the "friendship" with Portugal and appease the pro-Portuguese lobby in Brazil, which was by the way angered by Barbosa's tour of various African states in the early 70's (Cervo and Magalhães 2000). At the time, Brazil was experiencing record growth in what came to be known as the "economic miracle," and Barbosa "saw [it] as a reason to break away from Portuguese fealty, which had begun to hamper Brazil's economic needs. And Africa seemed to be a potentially rich market for the export of the sorts of industrial consumer goods that Brazil was now producing for its domestic market" (Dávila 2010, 146). Dávila deems Barbosa's trip a success in terms of building rapport with African leaders and signing technical cooperation agreements – "in agriculture, the development of commercial markets, infrastructure engineering, housing, and education" (ibid). But on another count, his Africa-related efforts reportedly did not go so well. Barbosa launched an unsolicited strategy of mediation between the Portuguese government and African revolutionaries, which he kept out of the public eye, according to

Calvet de Magalhães (Cervo and Magalhães 2000). Portugal's Salazar had died by that time and been replaced by Caetano, with whom Barbosa dealt directly and who, according to Barbosa's writings years later, admitted the possibility of granting political autonomy to the colonies while supporting Brazilian mediation on the matter in the UN (see ibid). The author adds that Barbosa spoke to leaders of independent African states about the Portuguese government being open to a ministerial meeting with them, to be held in Brazil, but this fell apart on the Portuguese side when African leaders demanded the presence of revolutionaries from Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau.

Barbosa attempted to convince the Portuguese government that measures towards liberation were urgent, at least concerning Guinea-Bissau, and suggested that if Portugal remained inflexible in the UN, Brazil would seek to apply pressure via voting. Seeing no change, in 1973, as two resolutions condemning Portugal were launched in the UN, Barbosa ordered the Brazilian delegation to be absent from one and abstain from voting on the other, after which Caetano publicly declared he had no interest in Brazil's mediation in the Portuguese colonial issue (Cervo and Magalhães 2000). Barbosa faced political downfall over the matter, according to Calvet de Magalhães, but Caetano's was more dramatic: In 1974, he would be overthrown, and seek and be granted asylum in Brazil. The Portuguese colonial issue would then be closed with the African countries' (official) independence. In 1975, Brazil would become the first country to recognize Angola's independence; four years later, Petrobrás would start operating in Angola, after the company's former president, Ernesto Geisel, had ascended to Brazil's presidency (1974-1979) and begun a liberalization process (see Dávila 2010). By the mid-80's, Brazil had transitioned into a democratic regime.

Lusofonia today

It would not be until after the Cold War and massive liberalization in both Brazil and Africa that the idea of a "lusophone" community would officially be implemented in the political realm. Back in 1966, Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs Juracy Magalhães had stated that he did not believe that was the moment "a Portuguese language bloc is viable as a force of international equilibrium. But I also do not consider it impossible that, in the moment in which there are, say, 200 million people in the world who speak and write in Portuguese, the lusiad culture will become a ponderable element in the evolution of humankind... Of course Brazil will be a decisive element in the development of this international projection, without ever quitting to remain faithful to its Portuguese roots, basic for our mental life, structural in

our social, religious and intellectual quotidian" (Magalhães 1966b, translation mine).[27] Exactly 30 years later, as the combined population of Brazil, Portugal and the PALOPs in Africa had reached the mark of 200 million, these countries signed a declaration in Lisbon establishing and joining the CPLP community. Under its charter, members declared a commitment to respecting each country's sovereignty while disseminating their "common cultural identity" and Portuguese language; supporting each other's economic and social development and the establishment of a collective political voice; implementing and promoting the liberal discourse of sustainable development and human rights; and welcoming each other's entrepreneurs, technical and educational capacitation projects and student exchanges (CPLP 1996). East Timor, Portugal's former Southeast Asian colony, joined CPLP after it broke away from Indonesian occupiers in 2002.

This initiative, put in motion during previous democratic presidencies in Brazil, managed to find ground amid President Fernando Henrique Cardoso's (1995-2002) simultaneous focus on neoliberal alliances and South American regionalism. His was what Vigevani and Oliveira refer to as "a logic of autonomy through integration [maintaining] that Brazil would be able to confront its problems and secure more control over its future if it actively contributed to elaborating the norms and guidelines of the administration of the global order" (Vigevani and Oliveira 2007, 58). Under Cardoso's successor, President Lula (2003-2010), Leite suggests that Brazil managed to strike a balance between maintaining cordial relations with the developed powers and, with a rhetoric of seeking greater responsibility in building a more multipolar world order, intensifying "relations with the countries of the South, particularly Arabic, African and China, universalizing Brazilian foreign policy, with bilateral and multilateral objectives" (Leite 2011, 169, translation mine).[28] Lula publicly called for a more inclusive, multilateral world order with the BRICs at the forefront, prioritized relations with Africa in the foreign policy discourse, and has been credited with solidifying Brazil's international image as a capable emerging country and one of the leaders of "South-South" cooperation (see i.e. Da Silva 2010). Brazilian scholar Alex Vargem (2008) reports that within a few years Lula nearly doubled the number of Brazilian embassies in African countries to 30 and visited more than 17 of those countries during his first term, quickly acting to elevate their importance in relation to Cardoso's more Mercosul-focused foreign policy.

Discoursing for a new "global architecture" at a 2009 Lisbon seminar, Brazil Foreign Affairs Minister Celso Amorim declared that CPLP had become so important to Brazil that the country created a mission in Lisbon just to deal with related topics (FUNAG 2010). Also,

Brazil has been involved in international peace-keeping operations in conflict-torn member countries such as Guinea-Bissau and East Timor, and has forgiven millions of dollars in debt of the PALOPs and other African countries. Technical cooperation projects, which are centered in the PALOPs, increased twenty-fold to 413 under Lula's presidency, reports the African Development Bank (Ncube, Lufumpa, and Vencatachellum 2011). However, Saraiva (2012) notes that Brazil lacks a solid strategy towards and knowledge about Africa, and that Africans have perceived CPLP as lacking political and economic substance. During a February 2012 interview in Maputo, Brazil's interim ambassador to Mozambique said an overarching African policy was still under construction, and that Brazilian diplomats were more reactive than proactive. [29]

Saraiva (2012) also writes that African diplomats in Brazil as well as members of the Afro-Brazilian community have been critical of the "culturalist" discourse, which he characterizes as evoking "lusophone" affinities and "racial democracy," and its gaping contradiction to the treatment of blacks in Brazil. He assesses Lula and his successor, Dilma Rousseff, as having used CPLP as a platform for political action in the Atlantic region, of which four of the five African members of the community are part. He sees CPLP as the manifestation of what he calls a "pragmatic atlantism," as opposed to the "culturalist" discourse that painted a "romantic" South Atlantic of lusophone culture and bonds forged by a so-called "civilizing destiny" across the tropics (Saraiva 2012, 109). Saraiva – a renowned professor at the University of Brasília, which represents a cross between scholarship and diplomacy – is a strong supporter of such "pragmatic" discourse, involving the repayment of a "historical debt" to Africa, evident especially under Lula. He describes it as having an "altruistic" vein while taking into consideration Brazil's interests ("oil and power") as well as Africa's development priorities (Saraiva 2012). He writes that "the news in the discourse of the redemption of a historical debt is the rupture with the cynicism of the culturalist discourse... This language is a lot more palatable for the African leaders. It is also closer to the quotidian reality of the African descendants in Brazil. The rupture with the culturalist discourse proposes a meeting of equals, horizontal relations between partners, in a common effort of overcoming social and economic difficulties of the most weakened on the two sides of the South Atlantic" (Saraiva 2012, 112,translation mine).[30]

Although portraying their country as a *partner* to the African countries in development, Brazilian leaders do not portray them as *equals* – it is a discourse about Brazil providing *them* with know-how and equipment, the tools to achieve the Western standard of development via Brazilian-modified techniques. This ties into an idea put forth by Brazil's head diplomat in

Mozambique in the aforementioned February 2012 interview. As much as Brazilian politicians/diplomats use the term “cooperation” to describe the country's multiplying development aid to Africa, it is clear that Brazil is positioned in the discourse as the more developed donor – although admittedly still learning the ropes of providing aid and implementing projects – and the African countries as the recipients learning from Brazil's experience on its ascent to the “First World” club:

> The relationship between Brazil and Mozambique is an asymmetrical relationship. This is not a decision or a choice. It is asymmetrical for the size of the country’s economy, for our technical capacity… even if the discourse addresses a desire for partnership, and there is a component of return [in what Brazilians working with Mozambique learn in the process]… necessarily, the balance is in favor of Mozambique; we are transferring technology, transferring knowledge and often transferring financial or material resources... The government of Mozambique, the authorities and the people who are thinking up this country look at the world and see Brazil as a source of inspiration; because we have many problems similar to theirs and some solutions we came up with that are more compatible than what they see in other countries.[31]

Lusophone opinion-makers have been engaged in dissecting the construction of common bonds, given the centrality of language and culture in the production of meaning and how *lusofonia* had been turned into a folkloric narrative to attempt to justify enduring Portuguese colonialism . At least two international conferences on aspects surrounding a constructed lusophone identity were held in Portugal this past summer, *Interfaces da Lusofonia* in Braga and *Lusofonia Pós-Colonial* in Lisbon (CECS 2013; ECATI 2012). Also headed from Portuguese academic circles, by the University of Coimbra's Boaventura de Sousa Santos, a project named TOLERACE has been underway, as a historical analysis of views and discourses on race and tolerance in different European countries including Portugal (CES 2013; Almeida 2012). Santos is prominently cited by Portuguese-speaking postcolonial scholars, often for his seminal *Between Prospero and Caliban* (2002) on the particularities of Portuguese colonialism and Portugal's position as a subaltern empire in a British-dominated system, caught between the roles of colonizer and colonized.

Brazilian and Portuguese scholars have presently been collaborating on re-examining the Portuguese Empire and its contemporary ramifications using postcolonial theory and the theme of Santos' work,revisiting slavery and past and present questions of race, miscegenation and migration, according to scholar Júlia Almeida (2012)**.**She also notes ongoing research on the foundation of CPLP and the idea of reconstructing a common

“lusophone identity” as a way to counter globalization effects and Portugal's marginalization in the European Union. Various researchers from the former Portuguese colonies in Africa have been focusing particularly on the imposition of a “lusophone identity” as a phenomenon obscuring national African identities, she added (Almeida 2012)**.** Brazil's Federal University of Espírito Santo organized in 2012 the first *Congresso Nacional de Africanidades e Brasilidades*, where Almeida and scholars such as University of Basel-based Mozambican Elísio Macamo discussed the deconstruction of the idea that the diverse cultures naturally share a common space (ibid)**.**

In the past few years all CPLP members except Angola and Mozambique have agreed to implementing the “orthographic accord,” the proposed standardization of the Portuguese language in education and administration across the transcontinental political community (although actual implementation levels vary among them). The language accord had been discussed, elevated, knocked down and resurrected by Portuguese and Brazilian politicians and scholars since the 1930s (ILTEC 2013), previously excluding their African and Asian counterparts from the process. It has elicited popular dissent lasting to this day. For instance a 2012 editorial in the *Jornal de Angola* brought up a lack of affinity between Portuguese and some CPLP members’ native languages, and that Angolan officials had shown CPLP leaders some unwillingness to go along with the accord: “The inexistence of a common vocabulary made from other orthographic vocabularies of the Portuguese language of each CPLP member state – developed only by Brazil and Portugal for being older countries with well-established academies – the elevated number of exceptions to the rule and words with double spelling, and the utopic perspective of a unified orthography of the Portuguese language cause, evidently, constraints”[32] (Wa-Zani 2012,translation mine).

Meanwhile, Brazil has moved to address its racial problem domestically, in actions Saraiva (2012) sees as an arm of foreign policy. Another Brazilian scholar, Mapa (2009), writes that Lula notably saw the value of the Afro-Brazilian connection for cultural diplomacy, and sought to promote it: Under Lula, it was “clear how the Afro-Brazilian cultural capital, historically constructed, [had] been used… as much for the enhancement of commercial, cultural, educational and health [cooperation] exchanges as for the strengthening of developing countries in negotiations in multilateral organs through unified claims” (Mapa 2009, 51, translation mine).[33]

Brazilian schools are now required to teach Afro-Brazilian history and culture and universities to adopt quota systems to guarantee spots for black students; in the meantime, theAfro Brazil Museum on African contributions to Brazilian society has opened its doors

(Mapa 2009; Brasil.gov 2011; Presidência 2003). But the number of blacks occupying power positions in Brazilian society is still very low (Sadlier cites 1.8 percent of blacks as high-level executives), and so is the human development index of blacks compared to whites. If measured separately, blacks would have lowered Brazil's HDI rank in recent years from 73rd out of 173 countries to 105th, while whites would have raised it to 44th (Sadlier 2008). The Brazilian government reported in 2011 that, despite efforts to change the situation, still half as many blacks as whites were enrolled at Brazilian universities and 70 percent of the country's illiterates were black or of mixed race (Brasil.gov 2011).

Conclusion

While certain currents in Brazil have coveted leadership of *lusofonia* for decades, the knowledge of ordinary Brazilians about the concerned countries, let alone cultural identification, has been notoriously weak. Arenas writes that "lusofonia [or 'lusophony'] as a collective project is shared varyingly by individuals and elite groups… it is still an open question as to the degree with which Brazilian society, with a relatively insular and self-contained view of itself as a culture, is even fully aware of such project or feels interpellated by it" (Arenas 2005, 12).

Despite strong nationalist currents in Brazil, family has been a running theme in Brazil-Portugal relations, with an "us against them" attitude prevailing in their foreign policy until after the 20th century decolonization movement was well underway. The evolution of *lusofonia* as a political and economic project is intrinsically connected, historically and discursively, and runs parallel to the evolution of (post)colonial perceptions. Although it had for long populated the imagination of certain elites, a "lusophone" political community would not come together until the last years of the 20th century, joined by the sovereign "lusophone" states and their former metropole.

Unlike the African countries, Brazil did not have to violently break with the colonial powers to build its state from scratch, and could therefore afford to harbor geopolitcal ambitions. Sometimes overtly and at other times between the lines, Brazil's kinship with Portugal had often been tinged by nationalist stirrings and a growing sense that Brazil had the potential, and perhaps even the calling, to become a great power. As shown in this paper, Brazil's anti-colonialism would oscillate according to shifting national interests, and in terms of foreign affairs, this was sometimes aided and at other times hampered by the country's position in between the "core" and the "periphery," perhaps similar to Portugal's own dichotomy.[34]

Brazilian leaders would eventually discover the power of portraying their country as one in between the developing and developed worlds and open to diverse partnerships irrespective of ideology, thus being able to serve as a political and economic bridge between different sides of the spectrum, including to countries in Africa. With a discourse based on similarities that has progressed from lusotropicalism to more overtly development-related considerations and distance from Portugal, Brazilian leaders have justified their country's rapprochement with Africa and a project to “bestow” development.

Within a small window in the 1960's, Brazil shifted from colonial defender to anti-colonial activist, being quickly pushed back into a rhetorical alignment with the capitalist powers, before a greater investment in a rapprochement with Africa began to take place largely due to economic considerations. Using archival, interview, government and academic sources, this paper attempted to identify some major milestones of such a process and to zero in on the point where this transition began for Brazil. It also sought to identify some of the major actors in the process – mostly white male Brazilian politicians who flew the flag of “racial democracy” and brotherhood with Africa pertaining to a country that is, to this day, very far from the ideal professed in Freyrean constructions.

---

[1] “Lusophile” pertains to the love of things Portuguese.

[2] “Lusophone” pertains to Portuguese language and culture. Quotation marks indicate that the prevalence of Portuguese may be present in discourse but not in practice in the case being referred to.

[3] “BRIC” was a term coined by global investment bank Goldman-Sachs in the early 2000s to encapsulate Brazil, India, Russia and China, viewed as a “bloc” of countries booming with economic development and ensuing political power.

[4] “Technical cooperation” is known as development aid whose stated aim is to improve infrastructure and capacity (trade, productivity, social services, administration, etc.).

[5] i.e. Both Dávila and I have interviewed Brazilian academic Cândido Mendes, identified some of the same key figures and moments in the construction of Brazil-Africa relations, and used some similar archival examples (i.e. pertaining to Juscelino Kubitschek's relationship with Portuguese leaders). Such research of mine had taken place before I read his book, which turns out to be a very useful body of empirical research to draw from to strengthen my ongoing efforts with the topic.

[6] Original quote in Portuguese: “Sobre o altar, erguia-se a cruz de ferro que, 460 anos antes, abençoara a primeira missa em terra brasileira, rezada por frei Henrique de Coimbra, capelão da esquadra de Pedro Álvares Cabral. Trazida do museu da Sé de Braga, em Portugal, a velha cruz não foi a única relíquia incorporada à

solenidade: minutos mais tarde, no instante da Consagração, repicou o sino cujo toque teria anunciado em Vila Rica a execução de Tiradentes em outro 21 de abril, o de 1792."

[7] Original quote in Portuguese "...quase confundida com uma obsessão, procurava ampliar os espaços do Brasil na ordem ocidental, sem ferir os relacionamentos especiais com os Estados Unidos, mas buscando certa margem de autonomia no interior da dependência por meio do projeto desenvolvimentista."

[8] The archives are held in the CPDOC, the foundation's research and historical documentation division (*Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação de História Contemporânea do Brasil*).

[9] Original quote in Portuguese, "...Instituto da Astronáutica, em que as gerações brasileiras e portuguêsas se aprestassem a emular com seus gloriosos antepassados na exploração e conquista dos espaços siderais... Acredito, Senhor Presidente, que desta maneira... faríamos com que o Brasil e Portugal, perfeitamente atualizados, cooperassem íntimamente no sentido de contribuir com a fé, o vigor e saber de suas novas gerações para a era que as viagens interplanetárias, possivelmente muito em breve, abrirão para a humanidade."

[10] Original quote in Portuguese: "Chego a Portugal num momento histórico, em que a conjuntura internacional se caracteriza pela integração econômica, cultural e política das nações que mais se identificam pelas suas afinidades e pelo que de essencial existe em seus interesses comuns... Eis a hora precisa de reunir nossa família lusíada. Temos de nos colocar também entre os conquistadores do futuro, como os nossos antepassados comuns foram os pioneiros da conquista do Novo Mundo, os desbravadores das trevas e os que desvendaram o mistério dos mares. Os de nossa grei pertencem à raça dos que são capazes de mais essa proeza, se a isso se aplicarem com esfôrço, a tenacidade e o gênio que não lhes faltaram para dominar os ínvios oceanos, descobrir novos espaços para a vida física e espiritual do homem e criar nações do tamanho e da unidade do Brasil... Saúdo a Pátria portuguêsa. Vejo-a ao lado do Brasil, marchando para a aurora deste mundo novo que nasce e de que teremos que participar para sobreviver com a dignidade a que temos direito. A história, as navegações, os triunfos antigos e as gloriosas lutas vividas impelem a Nação portuguêsa para novas conquistas e para a plena realização de seu maravilhoso destino."

[11] Analysis based on the examination of various private archival collections, i.e. Negrão de Lima, Osvaldo Aranha and Gustavo Capanema.

[12] Original quote in Portuguese: "...nas raízes do Brasil, isto é, na herança portuguesa, encontrava-se 'tradição longa', bastante 'viva até hoje', capaz de nutrir uma 'alma comum', que associava o País na América à antiga metrópole européia, pois foi 'de lá [que] nos veio a forma atual de nossa cultura.'"

[13] UNESCO: The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

[14] Original quote in Portuguese: "...seu pensamento abriu as possibilidades de visualização de uma maior presença do Brasil no mundo, como um contraponto essencial ao racismo predominante em outras sociedades (sobretudo nos Estados Unidos). Essa ideia projetou a cultura brasileira como uma alternativa às ideologias em conflito na Guerra Fria levou os brasileiros a acreditarem que seu país tinha um destino especial no que dizia respeito aos países africanos recém-independentes."

[15] Original quote in French (for *Lusotopie* journal): "À chaque critique des Nations unies, les diplomates portugais répondaient que le Portugal était une nation indivisible constituée par des provinces métropolitaines et par des provinces d'outremer et qu'il n'existait ni discrimination ni ségrégation raciale dans aucune de ces provinces. Le lusotropicalisme commence alors à faire partie de l'argumentaire politique et diplomatique en lui apportant une plus-value de légitimité soidisant 'scientifique.' La popularité internationale de Gilberto Freyre et l'image, très di usée dans les années 1940-50, du Brésil en tant qu'exemple le plus parfait de 'démocratie raciale' ont joué un rôle important dans cette appropriation du lusotropicalisme. La situation brésilienne, due à la particularité de la colonisation portugaise, devrait alors constituer un exemple à suivre en Afrique."

[16] Original quote in Portuguese: "Nossas relações fraternais com Portugal e nossa amizade tradicional com a França não nos impedem de tomar posição clara nas dolorosas divergências que a propósito do colonialismo africano se têm apresentado entre as nações unidas e aqueles países, aos quais tanto devemos e com os quais tanto ainda temos em comum. Os dois Estados europeus devem, no nosso entender, assegurar a autodeterminação da Argélia e de Angola. Nada deterá a libertação da África. Parece claro que a África não deseja submissão a nenhum dos blocos. Deseja afirmar a sua personalidade, o que é o mesmo que conquistar a sua liberdade. O Brasil auxiliará sempre os países africanos nesse justo esforço."

[17] Original quote in Portuguese, translation and recording mine: "Me impressionou desde aquele momento) uma visão absolutamente emergente e fundadora com que ele pensou a política externa independente." From interview conducted in Mendes' office at Cândido Mendes University, Rio de Janeiro, on March 22, 2013.

[18] Original quote in Portuguese, translation and recording mine: "Pensei-o como essa maneira de obter essa outra alternativa para a visão internacional do país, a partir de dois princípios: Um, o de que o Brasil tinha uma visão bastante diferenciada dentro da América Latina e sobretudo era o único país que maciçamente tinha uma influência africana na sua formação. Isso não existia no resto do continente e esse protagonismo transatlântico do Brasil poderia ser feito naquele momento."

[19] Original quote in Portuguese: "...queremos ajudar a criar, no hemisfério sul, um clima de perfeito entendimento e compreensão em todos os planos: político e cultural, uma verdadeira identidade espiritual... Uma África próspera, estável, é condição essencial para a segurança e desenvolvimento do Brasil... temos a vivência – eles e nós – de luta em meios ecológicos semelhantes, que pode propiciar proveitoso intercâmbio de técnicas e experiências."

[20] i.e. Brazil's ProSavana project in Mozambique seeks to implement the agricultural model developed by Japan in Brazil's central *cerrado* region. Diplomats I interviewed in Mozambique in 2012 contended that the soils in Brazil and Mozambique are very similar, a claim contested by longtime Mozambique researcher Joseph Hanlon in a recent conference in Portugal (ECAS 2013).

[21] Original quote in Portuguese: "A fulminante dominação militar da Índia em prejuízo do comércio árabe, pelos portugueses, e a paulatina e dolorosa ocupação da América pelos espanhóis, portugueses, ingleses, franceses e flamengos, bem como as disputas de áreas de dominação, por êsses povos, fora da Europa, processaram-se à sombra da difusão do cristianismo, na cúpida simbiose econômico,político-religiosa que Amoroso Lima tão veementemente profligou na aula inaugural dêste curso. A crônica do aniquilamento das populações indígenas,

da América principalmente, e da submissão dos povos colonizados, desde o século XVII até os nossos dias, constitui, de fato, uma das páginas mais sombrias da história da humanidade.”

[22] Original quote in Portuguese: “Para manter a dominação crescentemente lucrativa nessas áreas, normalmente habitadas por povos que se encontram em estágio sócio-cultural retardado, se medido pelos estalões ocidentais, o colonialismo vira-se compelido a proporcionar alguma instrução destinada a melhorar o nível técnico da mão-de-obra indígena e a formar elites negras interessadas no processo de espoliação das massas submetidas, semelhantes àquelas que utilizava para êsse fim nas colônias de exploração mercantil-industrial e que são muito nossas conhecidas, aqui no Brasil, também.”

[23] Original quote in Portuguese: ...“(a posição do meu Governo) se inspira, acima de qualquer valor material, no dever sagrado que compete à Nação portuguesa de velar pela dignificação, progresso e bem estar das populações que sob a sua bandeira vivem há muitos séculos... a acção portuguesa nos territórios africanos coloca estes na vanguarda do progresso daquele continente, ao mesmo tempo que neles se vão estabelecendo sociedades humanas conscientes das suas responsabilidades, sem descriminação de raça, de cor ou de religião.”

[24] Original quote in Portuguese,: “... por fôrça dos princípios que defende, o Brasil não pode permanecer alheio às aspirações de Angola, Moçambique e outros territórios portuguêses à autodeterminação e à independência, como faculdade de escolha.”

[25] Original quote in Portuguese: “Em certo sentido, nenhuma divergência existe entre a posição de Portugal e a do Brasil. O que aparentemente nos separa é a questão de saber qual será a melhor maneira de permitir que continue a fazer-se sentir em terras africanas a presença espiritual e cultural de Portugal. [ ] Por fôrça mesmo da generosidade que de Portugal herdou, o povo brasileiro tem acompanhado com interêsse e simpatia a emergência de novas nações no continente africano. Reconhecemos como uma das realidades históricas de nossos dias a profunda transformação que ali se operou mediante ampla aplicação do princípio da autodeterminação dos povos. [ ] Trata-se, em nosso entender, de movimento irresistível e contagiante, ao qual não poderão ficar imunes quaisquer das populações africanas que não têm ainda govêrno próprio. Sabemos quanto fêz Portugal pelos povos de seus territórios ultramarinos: estamos de acôrdo em que êles podem ser apontados como exemplos de progresso ordeiro e esclarecido em muitos setores. Não acreditamos, todavia, seja possível manter imutado, na atual conjuntura, o presente sistema de relações políticas. [ ] Pensamos, pois, que não é mais possível negar aos povos dos territórios ultramarinos o direito de se governarem a si próprios. Associados a Portugal, se assim o quisessem, independentes mesmo, se o preferissem, não haveriam aquêles povos de ser avessos a uma continuada cooperação com a antiga metrópole. Os valores humanos, culturais, linguísticos, econômicos de Portugal seriam assim certamente preservados: as novas nações valorizariam, como o Brasil, sua herança portuguêsa.”

[26] Original quote in Portuguese: “…o conceito de desenvolvimento esteve condicionado à garantia de segurança. Acreditava-se que a política externa independente havia convulsionado a ordem interna, aproximando o país do comunismo, além de ter afastado o Brasil dos EUA, nosso principal parceiro econômico, político e militar.”

[27] Original quote in Portuguese: “[Não creio que já estejamos no momento em que] um bloco da língua portuguêsa seja viável como fôrça de equilíbrio internacional. Mas também não considero impossível que, no

momento em que no mundo houver, digamos, 200 milhões de pessoas que falem e escrevam o português, seja a cultura lusíada um elemento ponderável na evolução da humanidade... Claro que o Brasil será elemento decisivo no desenvolvimento dessa projeção internacional, sem nunca deixar de manter-se fiel às suas raízes portuguêsas, básicas para a nossa vida mental, estruturais na nossa convivência social, religiosa e intelectual."

[28] Original quote in Portuguese: "…a aproximação com países do Sul, particularmente árabes e africanos e a China, universalizando a política exterior brasileira, com objetivos bilaterais e multilaterais."

[29] Interview conducted by this author as part of field work in late February 2012.

[30] Original quote in Portuguese: "...a novidade do discurso da recuperação da dívida histórica é a ruptura com o cinismo do discurso culturalista... Essa linguagem é bastante mais palatável para as lideranças africanas. É também mais próxima à realidade cotidiana dos descendentes dos africanos no Brasil. A ruptura com o discurso culturalista propõe um encontro de iguais, relações horizontais entre parceiros, no esforço comum da superação das dificuldades sociais e econômicas dos mais enfraquecidos dos dois lados do Atlântico Sul."

[31] Original quote in Portuguese, my recording and translation: "A relação do Brasil com Moçambique é uma relação assimétrica. Isso não é uma decisão ou uma escolha. Ela é assimétrica pelo tamanho da economia do país, pela nossa capacidade técnica… mesmo que o discurso fale de um desejo de parceria e existe um componente de retorno… necessariamente há um saldo em favor de Moçambique, nós estamos transferindo tecnologia, transferindo conhecimento e muitas vezes transferindo recursos financeiros ou recursos materiais."

[32] Original quote in Portuguese,: "…a inexistência de um Vocabulário Ortográfico Comum feito a partir de outros Vocabulários Ortográficos da Língua Portuguesa de cada Estado membro da CPLP - que, apenas, o Brasil e Portugal os têm, por serem países mais antigos e com Academias já institucionalizadas - o elevado número de excepções à regra e de palavras com dupla grafia, a perspectiva utópica da existência de uma única grafia da Língua Portuguesa, causam, evidentemente, constrangimentos."

[33] Original quote in Portuguese: "…é nítido o uso, tanto externo quanto interno, do capital cultural afro-brasileiro, historicamente constituído… tanto para o incremento de intercâmbios comerciais, culturais, educacionais, de saúde, etc., quanto para o fortalecimento dos países em desenvolvimento nas negociações em órgãos multilaterais através de reivindicações unificadas."

[34] As previously mentioned, some scholars, inspired by Boaventura de Sousa Santos, have been focusing on examining Portugal as a former subaltern imperial power caught between its status of colonizer and colonized.

References

Alberto, Paulina L. 2011. *Terms of Inclusion: Black Intellectuals in Twentieth-century Brazil*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Almeida, Júlia. 2012. "Crítica Pós-colonial Nos Domínios de Língua Portuguesa: Pautando Desafios Epistemológicos." *REALIS - Revista de Estudos AntiUtilitaristas e Pós-Coloniais* 2 (1) (June): 33–44.

Amaral Jr., Aécio. 2002. "Relações Perigosas: o Imaginário Freyriano No Discurso Governamental." *Tempo Social, Rev. Sociol. USP, S. Paulo* 14 (2) (October): 163–186.

Aragon, Daniel. 2010. "Chancellery Sepulchers: Jânio Quadros, João Goulart and the Forging of Brazilian Foreign Policy in Angola, Mozambique and South Africa, 1961-1964." *Luso-Brazilian Review* 47 (1): 121–149.

Arenas, Fernando. 2005. "(Post)colonialism, Globalization, and Lusofonia or The 'Time-Space' of the Portuguese-Speaking World." *Institute of European Studies, UC Berkeley* (February 3).

Brasil.gov. 2011. "Percentual de Negros No Ensino Superior é Metade Do de Brancos - Portal Brasil." May 13. http://www.brasil.gov.br/noticias/arquivos/2011/05/13/percentual-de-negros-no-ensino-superior-e-metade-do-de-brancos.

Camões, Luís de, Álvaro Júlio da Costa Pimpão, and Aníbal Pinto de Castro. 1992. *Os Lusíadas*. Lisboa: Instituto Camões.

Cancian, Renato. 2011. "Governo Jânio Quadros (1961): Mandato Polêmico de Sete Meses - Educação - UOL Educação." *Universo Online*. January 9. http://educacao.uol.com.br/disciplinas/historia-brasil/governo-janio-quadros-1961-mandato-polemico-de-sete-meses.htm.

Castelo, Cláudia. 1998. *"O Modo Português de Estar No Mundo": o Luso-tropicalismo e a Ideologia Colonial Portuguesa (1933-1961)*. Biblioteca Das Ciências Do Homem. História 19. Porto: Edições Afrontamento.

CEAA. 2013. "Centro de Estudos Afro-Asiáticos." http://www.ucam.edu.br/index.php/centro-de-estudos-afro-asiaticos.

CECS. 2013. "Interfaces Da Lusofonia | 4 – 6 Julho 2013, Universidade Do Minho, Braga – Portugal." http://www.lasics.uminho.pt/lusofonia2013/.

Cervo, Amado Luiz, and José Calvet de Magalhães. 2000. *Depois Das Caravelas: As Relações Entre Portugal e Brasil, 1808-2000*. Coleção Relações Internacionais. Brasília, DF: IBRI : Editora UnB.

CES. 2013. "TOLERACE - The Semantics of Tolerance and (anti-)racism: Public Bodies and Civil Society in Comparative Perspective." March 5. http://www.ces.uc.pt/projectos/index.php?prj=4032&id_lingua=2.

Corrêa, Luiz Felipe de Seixas. 2012. *O Brasil nas Nações Unidas: 1946-2011*. Brasília: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão.

CPLP. 1996. "Declaração Constitutiva." *CPLP: Comunidade Dos Países de Língua Portuguesa*. http://www.cplp.org/Default.aspx?ID=48.

Da Silva, Luiz Inácio "Lula." 2010. "Brazilian President Lula: BRIC Countries Must Forge a Transparent System of Global Governance - CSMonitor.com." *The Christian Science Monitor*. April 16. http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Global-Viewpoint/2010/0416/Brazilian-President-Lula-BRIC-countries-must-forge-a-transparent-system-of-global-governance.

Dantas, San Tiago. 2009. *Coletânea de Textos Sobre Política Externa*. Brasília: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão.

Dávila, Jerry. 2010. *Hotel Trópico: Brazil and the Challenge of African Decolonization, 1950-1980*. Durham [NC]: Duke University Press.

Dávila, Jerry. 2010b. "Raça, Etnicidade e Colonialismo Português Na Obra de Gilberto Freyre." *Desigualdade & Diversidade – Revista de Ciências Sociais Da PUC-Rio* (7): 153–174.

ECATI. 2012. "Lusofonia Pós-colonial." http://ilinguas.ulusofona.pt/index.php/pt/lusofonia-pos-colonial.

FGV/CPDOC. 2013. "Dicionário Histórico-Biográfico Brasileiro (DHBB)." Accessed April 13. http://www.fgv.br/cpdoc/busca/Busca/BuscaConsultar.aspx.

Franco, Alvaro da Costa. 2007. *Documentos Da Política Externa Independente, Vol. 1*. Fundação Alexandre Gusmão.

Freyre, Gilberto. 1933. *Casa-grande & senzala*. Edited by Guillermo Giucci, Enrique Rodríguez Larreta, and Edson Nery da Fonseca. Nanterre: Allca XX (2002 edition).

———. 1961. *O Luso e o Trópico: Sugestões Em Torno Dos Métodos Portugueses de Integração de Povos Autóctones e de Culturas Diferentes Da Europeia Num Complexo Novo de Civilização: o Luso-tropical*. Lisbon: Comissão Executiva das Comemorações do V Centenário da Morte do Infante D. Henrique.

FUNAG. 2010. *Repertório de Política Externa: Posições Do Brasil (2008-2009)*. Brasília: Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Secretaria de Planejamento Diplomático/Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão.

Glasgow, Roy. 1972. “Recent Observations on the Developing Southern Strategy of Brazil, Portugal, and Africa.” *Issue: A Journal of Opinion* 2 (3): 3–8.

ILTEC. 2013. “Acordo Ortográfico - Portal Da Língua Portuguesa.” http://www.portaldalinguaportuguesa.org/acordo.php.

Inman, Phillip. 2012. “Brazil’s Economy Overtakes UK to Become World’s Sixth Largest | Business | The Guardian.” March 6. http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/mar/06/brazil-economy-worlds-sixth-largest.

Kubitschek, Juscelino. 1960. “Carta de Juscelino Kubitschek. In: Documentos Tratando Da Criação Do Instituto Luso-Brasileiro de Astronáutica. Brasília.” FGV/CPDOC. NL ad po 1960.05.26.

Leite, Patrícia Soares. 2011. *O Brasil e a Cooperação Sul-Sul Em Três Momentos de Política Externa: Os Governos Jânio Quadros/João Goulart, Ernesto Geisel e Luiz Inácio Lula Da Silva / Patrícia Soares Leite*. Brasília: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão.

Lewis, M. Paul, and Gary F. Simons. 2013. “Portuguese | Ethnologue.” *Ethnologue: Languages of the World, Seventeenth Edition.* http://www.ethnologue.com/language/por.

Lima, Negrão. 1959b. “Entrevista de Negrão de Lima. Documentos Contendo Entrevistas, Discursos e Mensagens de Negrão de Lima Incentivando e Comentando as Relações Luso-brasileiras. Lisboa e Rio de Janeiro.” FGV/CPDOC. NL ad po 1959.12.04.

———. 1959. “Discurso de Negrão de Lima Ao Chegar a Lisboa. In: Documentos Contendo Entrevistas, Discursos e Mensagens de Negrão de Lima Incentivando e Comentando as Relações Luso-brasileiras. Lisboa e Rio de Janeiro.” FGV/CPDOC. NL ad po 1959.12.04.

———. 1961. “Críticas Ao Governo Salazar, Cartas e Discursos Com Posições de Brasileiros e Portugueses Sobre o Assunto.” FGV/CPDOC. NL ad po 1961.02.00/NL ad po 1962.05.12.

Magalhães, Juracy. 1966a. “Juracy Magalhães FGV Archives as Brazil’s Minister of Foreign Affairs; Various”. FGV/CPDOC. JM c mre 1966.04.18; JM pi Magalhães, J. 1966.08.00; JM pi Magalhães, J. 1966.08.24/3; JM pi Magalhães, J. 1966.09.05/2;

JM Pi Magalhães, J. 1966.06.23; JM c mre 1966.06.28; JM pi Magalhães, J. 1966.11.17.

———. 1966b. “Speech - Comissão Do ‘Dia de Goa’”. FGV/CPDOC. JM c mre 1966.06.28.

Mapa, Dhiego. 2009. “Diplomacia e Cultura No Governo Lula (2003-2006).” *Revista Eletrônica Cadernos de História* 8 (2): 45–54.

Marques, João Filipe. 2007. “Les Racistes, C’est Les Autres: Les Origines Du Mythe Du ‘Non-racisme’ Des Portugais.” *Lusotopie XIV* I: 71–88.

Medeiros, Aderaldo. 2006. “A Língua Portuguesa.” *DCA-UFRN*. http://www.linguaportuguesa.ufrn.br/pt_index.php

Morton, Orde. 1981. “Brazil’s Emergence on the World Stage.” *International Journal* 37 (1): 13–41.

Ncube, Mthuli, Charles Lufumpa, and Desire Vencatachellum. 2011. “Brazil’s Economic Engagement with Africa”. African Development Bank Group.

Newitt, M. D. D. 1995. *A History of Mozambique*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

OECD. 2011. “Welcoming New Partnerships in International Development Co-operation.” *OECD Development Assistance Committee Statement*. April 6. http://www.oecd.org/dac/47652500.pdf.

Oliveira, Lucia Lippi. 2011. “Gilberto Freyre e a Valorização Da Província.” *Revista Sociedade e Estado* 26 (1) (April): 117–149.

Pereira, Jesus Soares. 1962. “A Economia Do Colonialismo e Da Independência; Palestra Conferida No Curso de ‘Introdução à Realidade Africana’, Promovido Pelo Instituto Brasileiro de Estudos Afro-Asiáticos.” FGV/CPDOC. JSP pi td Pereira, J.S. 1962.03.03.

Pereira, José Maria. 2008. “Os Estudos Africanos Na America Latina: Um Estudo de Caso. O Centro de Estudos Afro-Asiáticos (CEAA).” In *Los Estudios Afroamericanos y Africanos En América Latina : Herencia, Presencia y Visiones Del Otro*, Córdoba; Buenos Aires. CLACSO, Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales/CEA-UNC, Centro de Estudios Avanzados-Universidad Nacional de Córdoba.

Presidência, Brasil. 2003. “Lei 10639.” *Presidência Da República - Casa Civil Subchefia Para Assuntos Jurídicos*. January 9. http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/2003/L10.639.htm.

PTC. 2011. “Observatório Da Língua Portuguesa.” http://observatorio-lp.sapo.pt/pt.

Rampinelli, Waldir José. 2006. “A Política Internacional de JK e Suas Relações Perigosas Com o Colonialismo Português.” *Lutas Sociais* 17/18 (December): 83–98.

Rebouças, Fernando. 2010. "Lei Afonso Arinos - Discriminação Racial - Direito - InfoEscola." August 20. http://www.infoescola.com/direito/lei-afonso-arinos/.

Reisen, Helmut. 2011. "ShiftingWealth: Emerging Partners: Anything but 'Rogue Aid'." *Shifting Wealth Blog*. May 3. http://shiftingwealth.blogspot.de/2011/05/emerging-partners-anything-but-roque.html.

Sadlier, Darlene J. 2008. *Brazil Imagined: 1500 to the Present*. Austin: University of Texas Press.

Saraiva, José Flávio, and Irene Vida Gala. 2002. "Perspectivas Das Relações Do Brasil Com o Mundo Lusófono." In *Política Externa Do Brasil Para o Século XXI*. Brasília: Brasil, Câmara dos Deputados (House of Representatives): Comissão de Relações Exteriores e Defesa Nacional.

Saraiva, José Flávio Sombra. 2012. *África Parceira Do Brasil Atlântico: Relações Internacionais Do Brasil e Da África No Início Do Século XXI*. Coleção Relações Internacionais. Belo Horizonte: Fino Traço Editora.

Santos, Boaventura de Sousa. 2002. "Between Prospero and Caliban: Colonialism, Postcolonialism, and Inter-identity." *Luso-Brazilian Review* 39 (2): 9–43.

Vargem, Alex André. 2008. "A Política Externa Brasileira Para a África No Governo Lula." *Ponto e Vírgula* 4: 6–11.

Veja. 2000. "Brasilia 50 Anos - VEJA Edição Especial." *Abril.com*. http://veja.abril.com.br/especiais/brasilia/primeiro-dia-capital-recem-nascida-p-132.html.

Vigevani, Tullo, and Marcelo Fernandes Oliveira. 2007. "Brazilian Foreign Policy in the Cardoso Era: The Search for Autonomy through Integration (translated by Timothy Thompson)." *Latin American Perspectives* 34 (5): 58–80.

Wa-Zani. 2012. "Jornal de Angola - Rectificar Antes de Ratificar e Reflectir Antes de Agir." *Jornal de Angola*. February 19. http://jornaldeangola.sapo.ao/17/39/rectificar_antes_de_ratificar_e_reflectir_antes_de_agir.

Book review:

Reconciliation, Justice, and Peace: The Second African Synod, edited by Agbonkhianmeghe E. Orobator

Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2011. Pp. 269. US$40 (pbk)

ISBN978-1-57075-916

Reviewer: **Joseph Ogbonnaya**

The convocation of a Second Synod for Africa (2009) in less than two decades of the first African Synod (1994) shows the commitment of the Catholic Church towards reconciliation, justice, and peace in Africa (*Africae Munus*, #2). The contributors of the five parts of this book reflect on the various ecclesiological dimensions of the theme of the Second African Synod: The Church in Africa in service to Reconciliation, Justice, and Peace: You Are the Salt of the Earth…. You Are the Light of the World (Mt 5:13, 14).

In part I on theology of the Church, interreligious dialogue and the challenge of reconciliation, justice and peace, the book calls for a review of the ecclesiology of the church in Africa through a reconsideration of the church's hierarchical structure (Teresa Okure). It encourages engagement in genuine interreligious dialogue that "discover[s] and uncover as much as possible God's presence in each" (p. 33) especially with African traditional religion (Laurenti Magesa) through appropriate use of inclusive local languages (Festo Mkenda). In the light of the importance placed on the Word of God in African culture, the book urges the use of the Word of God as a tool to foster genuine reconciliation (Paul Bere). In this way, small Christian communities can contribute to social transformation (Joseph G. Healey).

Part II on the mission of the Church in the public square feature articles on development of Africa. Here Elias Omondi Opongo acknowledging the challenges facing Africa is systemic, recommend the intervention of the Church through "conflict resolution and reconciliation, and transformation of the structures of injustice" (p. 81). However, the public role of the Church must be balanced by its servant engagement in the public sphere (Yvon Christian Elenga). While doing this, the church must learn how to phrase her religious presuppositions in secular reasoning and language in ways that will capture the increasingly secular worldview (Anthony Egan). The church will achieve a lot in its public role through a

systematic, sustained and collaborative approach that will involve ecclesial organizations and government collaboration as opposed to a haphazard confrontational approach (Odomaro Mubangizi).

Part III on ecclesial leadership and gender justice in Church and society concentrates on the condition of women in the African Church. Within the context of women subjugation, the book suggests practical measures for women liberation in the Church. This includes a paradigm shift in the patterns of thought about women prevalent in the African culture and the church (Anne Arabome). And women religious telling their stories of violence and suffering in the Church (Ngozi Frances Uti). It is important as well to appreciate the involvement of the laity in ecclesial leadership and adequate knowledge of the public role of the church (David Kaulem).

Part IV on integrity of the earth feature articles on ecology, natural resources and poverty. On ecology, the book calls on Christians to take leadership role in sensitizing Africans about the environment and doing all they can to protect it against such marauders like the multinational corporations (Peter Knox). Specifying the extraction of resources, it laments the perpetuation of anthropological poverty of Africans who are denied just benefit from their abundant natural resources (Peter Kanyandago). On poverty, the book laments the contradiction of evangelization, dependence and poverty, which militates against the church in Africa being the ‘spiritual lung’ for humanity (Nathanael Yaovi Soede).

Part V is devoted to theological and ethical issues as well as HIV/AIDS. On HIV/AIDS the book recommends a shift in debate from defense of condom use to a responsible life-style based on abstinence and fidelity (Michael Czerny). The reasons for this shift in debate include first, the relativity of condoms; second, the incompatibility of condom use with the principle of life; third, the fact that the issue of HIV/AIDS is fuelled by poverty, and good treatment is a key factor in fostering prevention (Paterne-Auxence Mombe). In the light of foreign religious/ethical ideologies influencing Africa and exacerbating violence, Paulinus I. Odozor urges the Church to assist Africa in achieving self-reliance and have religiously and morally educated mature laity able to “identify and challenge religious or ethical virus that threaten the health of African societies and peoples” (p. 224). Furthermore, achieving reconciliation in Africa in the light of the scourge of corruption will have to address the twin issues of transparency and accountability in the light of the traditional African religio-cultural contexts (Gabriel Mmasi).

The epilogue balances the pastoral and political mission of the church in the light of the Second African Synod (Peter Henriot). Drawing from Pope Benedict XVI's dialectic of the two foundational poles of the churches mission and from examples drawn from the Zambian bishop's engagement in these missions, Henriot urge the existence of an African church that holds in tension both dialectics in a creatively harmonious tension.

In the light of the increasing violence and conflicts between Christianity and Islam in much of Africa, the omission in the book of a reflection on interreligious dialogue with Islam as a measure of conflict resolution and promotion of reconciliation, justice, and peace is surprising, especially as *Africae Munus* #94 urges mutual co-existence and "patient dialogue" with Islam. Although the book would have served the Second African Synod better were it based on the apostolic exhortation *Africae munus*, rather than on the preparatory documents and *the final 57 propositions*, it remains a highly recommended blueprint exploring the diverse dimensions of the theme of the Second African Synod: reconciliation, justice and peace.

Book review:

Homo Redneckus: On Being Not Qwhite in America, by William Matthew McCarter

New York: Algora Publishing, 2012. Pp. 288. US$24 (pbk)

ISBN: 978-0-87586-921-6

Reviewer: **Vicki J. Sapp**

William Matthew McCarter's original and provocative *Homo Redneckus: On Being Not Qwhite in America* accomplishes the two best things a work can do: make you think about something you never thought to think about, and make you redefine your own self and relation to others. To quote McCarter reading Freire, here we find "thinking that is concerned about reality" (65), a relatively rare quality in academic writing, as McCarter himself aptly observes. His interweaving of personal experience, reality-motivated thesis and exuberant scholarship provides us a careful study of a question, long overdue within the Bartholomew Fair of "otherness"-studies in graduate programs and trendy scholarship: "How do you posit Whiteness against Whiteness?" (47).

The challenge thrown at us in the very title bespeaks McCarter's sensitive exploration of his own duality as an ethnically White man who is all the same not "qwhite" in America due to his geographic and national origins and socio-economic status. This coinage, with its Derridean whiff, playfully yet purposively identifies a hegemonic rupture in Whiteness, one unnoticed for complex reasons by Whites themselves. McCarter argues that the Anglo landholders who founded America and have governed it ever since have a strong vested interest in this rupture, including the use of a White marginalized subculture to offset problems inevitable to the presence of a post-slavery free Black subculture. This White subculture itself, variously called throughout the book by "white trash cracker hillbilly peckerwood bubba etc." signifier chains, has the obvious vested interest in its ethnic whiteness—an easy escape into false security—while it provides much of the labor foundation of the *true* white America that scorns and marginalizes it. The redneck, by the dominant White culture deemed "morally and culturally bankrupt" (40) as a result of his tendencies to drunkenness, wild partying, violence and pseudo-rebellion in the form of both hollow and real threats to kick someone's ass, nonetheless shows up at the factory Monday

morning to sweat out his hangover and earn more beer money for the weekend. The White factory/plantation owner profits and repays by marginalizing the workers into an abhorrent but necessary not-qwhite subculture bought not on the block but rather at the bank:

> Because those of us who are not qwhite are seen and see ourselves as being white, we exist within the 'paradox of privilege' and because we see ourselves as being a part of the dominant white power structure, we reinforce the very structure that oppresses us and prevents us from 'naming the world'. (48)

For me, a white female raised in a lower-middle-class (economically, at least) Deep South family, such talk speaks directly to some of my traditional insecurities and raises questions about my own identity processing. Having been raised in apartheid during the 50's and 60's, I am used to the hegemonic notion of whiteness set ever triumphantly against a "colored" other. However, as an impecunious American sensitive to social class slights and the material minutiae of class invidiousness (see Paul Fussell's extraordinary empirical study of American class consciousness in his eponymous *Class*), I feel the pain McCarter so sensitively brings to (white) light in both historical and personal experience.

Also as a white American of Scots-Irish origin, I read with keen interest his positing of this heritage as at least a nationally and qwhite possibly ethnically marginalized subculture: "the terms *redneck* and *hillbilly* can trace their origin to the Scots-Irish and the terms *hillbilly* and *white trash* are markers of social class (39)." From McCarter I have learned that if I want to "pass" in White America, I'd better foreground that other white-mutt descendent, the German who contributed my family name Sapp some generations ago.

Finally, as a North Carolinian, I read along with the burning question: *Where is William Byrd in all this*? when that old man poked his non-flat Virginian nose into Chapter 4, "I am Redneck, Hear Me Roar." Having branded my fellow Tar Heels with what McCarter deems "some of the earliest stigmatizing depictions and negative stereotypes of us poor white trash peckerwood crackers in the North Carolina colonies" (121), Byrd had long ago caught my attention as I taught American Literature I. Although I could not help but agree that many of my people are lazy, have flat faces and, addicted to pork (it is commonly agreed that we "eat everything but the squeal") find themselves consequently "filled with gross humours" (Byrd)—I nonetheless bristled at this Virginian condescension that endures 300 years to this day (attend a ball game between UVA and UNC, and you'll better understand my point here). McCarter joins me in this discomfort as he processes, reading Byrd, "one of the first

American texts in which me and mine, us hillbilly crackers, are 'the watched.' We are observed with the gaze of a scientist" (125).

Not especially attracted to the study of history, preferring the literary take, I deeply appreciate McCarter's seamless interweaving of the historical, the theoretical and the autobiographical into a study that well, just makes you wanna stand up and holler, especially if you are white, Southern, Scots-Irish (the cracker half, anyway), working class—or an American who appreciates attending to what might be the last bastion of "politically (in)correct inquiry" in the United States. Even before 9/11, I had suspected that the Muslims might have to bear this burden alone since we seem, at least in the academy, to have exhausted every other possibility of subcultural abjection. But William Matthew McCarter can assure our Muslim brothers and sisters that they have a cultural companion in that small category of groups that can still be safely mocked and scorned, and a surprising companion at that. A Black student of mine, upon reading some of *Homo Redneckus*, looked at me incredulously and asked, "Y'all do that to each other?" I answered, "It would seem so—at least this is a prejudice that I have always sensed but had never seen codified in any study." (I do now know, and McCarter cites many of them, that these studies exist; it's just that no one ever thought to point this literature out to me . . .).

My student then asked me, "Is 'redneck' to 'White' as 'ghetto' is to 'Black'?" I told her that I would like to know more about this, and many such challenging questions spark from William Matthew McCarter's challenge to monolithic white power. I myself have several for him, primarily involving the role of cracker *sisterhood* in all this; as his study seems grounded in if not male dominance, at least redneck *his*-story and references to women (outside of his scholarly references) are few. But questions are often as telling as answers, and I am sure that McCarter will plunge into all subtopical inquiries with the apparently tireless scholarly vigor and personal commitment that makes *Homo Redneckus* both a highly erudite historical and theoretical text but also a poignant and user-friendly (in the deepest sense) autobiography of a scholar and an American.

As a scholar myself, I feel much the richer for having read this book. My very ethnically and culturally diverse college students are fascinated with it and raise constructive questions with candor and intellectual curiosity. Perhaps the best Composition lesson I've had was our brainstorming of a definition essay on "White Trash," in which we came up with twenty-one synonyms, thus adding a few handfuls more to McCarter's colorful list. Perhaps the book's best recommendation is that it seems to exert an attraction-repulsion effect on my White

colleagues. One asked me, upon learning that I would review this book, “Aren’t you afraid of being victim of a hate crime?”

I answered, “By whom?” If you aren’t White, you will enjoy this window into a world that has possibly been misunderstood on some important fronts, especially by Whites themselves. If you are “true White,” you will say, “Yes, yes—he’s got it right, we don’t want those people from ‘the other side of the tracks’ (my mother’s pet “Keep Out” phrase for my millworker schoolmates I might try to befriend) in our homes.” Or if you don’t like it, *we’ll just get drunk and kick your superior candy ass . . .*

But if you happen to be not qwhite in America, or suspect so, you will definitely appreciate being both “watched” and watched out for, from your own side here, especially in a time when our nation seems hell-bent to widen and deepen the gap between haves and have-nots—and to push more and more Americans of all hues and backgrounds to the other side of those tracks.

Journal of Critical Southern Studies

Published by Global Hands in Leicester, UK

Global Hands Publishing
Innovation Centre
49 Oxford Street
Leicester
LE1 5XY
United Kingdom

E: jcss@global-hands.co.uk
T: +44 (0)116 257 7952
W: www.global-hands.co.uk

Volume 2. Spring 2014

ISSN 0796-1901